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This thesis seeks to identify, describe, and analyze the tactics used by the 101st 
Airborne Division in the pacification of the Republic of Vietnam’s Thua Thien province 
from 1968 to 1972.  Despite the larger calamity of the Vietnam War, the 101st developed 
an effective set of measures against the Vietnamese communist insurgency.  These 
measures depended largely on the ability of the division’s lower-level units to attack the 
Viet Cong political infrastructure, provide security for Thua Thien’s population, and 
build effective South Vietnamese territorial forces in their areas of operation following 
the communist 1968 Tet offensive. 
These findings are based on the official reports, orders, and records generated by 
the division during its service in Vietnam and currently stored in the National Archives 
in College Park, Maryland and U.S. Army’s Military History Institute in Carlisle 
Barracks, Pennsylvania.  Additionally, the Military History Institute’s “Company 
Command in Vietnam” series of interviews conducted from 1982 to 1984 with officers 
who served in Vietnam provided valuable insight.  This thesis looks at 
counterinsurgency practices at the lowest levels where theory and policy are translated 






Operations Narrative:  3 September 1970.  “At 0525 hours D Company, 3d 
Platoon had two frag grenades tossed into its night defensive position.   A member of the 
platoon threw one of the grenades out of the position before it exploded.  He jumped on 
the other grenade and covered it with his body.  The grenade did not explode due to the 
fact that the safety had not been removed.”1 
I was inspired to undertake and complete this study by the courageous and 
fortunate soldier in 3rd Platoon, D Company, 3-187th Infantry and the thousands of others 
like him whose exploits I found in the footnotes of the Vietnam War.  Their stories were 
resting uneasily as antiseptic fragments in a hundred reports, giving single-sentence 
snapshots of their part in a war many more clever people declared lost just as they began 
their fight in 1968.  Their names are forgotten to time and their efforts largely relegated 
to obscurity by others who occupied a larger, grenade-free stage at much less personal 
risk.  Still, they are the men we all want alongside us in our night defensive position.  






1. Hq., 3-187 Infantry, “Combat After Action Report: Operation Texas Star, dated 20 
September 1970,” p. 5, Box 19, Command Reports, Assistant Chief of Staff 
Intelligence/Operations (S-2/3), 3d Battalion, 187th Infantry, Infantry Units, Record 
Group 472, National Archives and Records Administration II, College Park, MD. 
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INTRODUCTION AND ORIGINS OF U.S. ARMY PACIFICATION 
OPERATIONS IN VIETNAM: 
 “USING A STEAMROLLER TO CRUSH AN EGG IN THE DARK” 
 
 
 During the Vietnam War, the United States and South Vietnamese campaigns to 
increase the legitimacy of the South Vietnamese government with its own people and 
defeat the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong insurgency became known as pacification.  
Pacification existed as a concept and practice throughout the conflict, and by 1968 a U.S. 
Army handbook on the subject gave a formal definition: 
 
…the military, political, economic, and social process of establishing or 
re-establishing local government responsive to and involving the 
participation of the people.  It includes the provision of sustained, 
credible territorial security, the destruction of the enemy’s underground 
government, and the initiation of economic and social activity capable of 
self-sustenance and expansion... The key to pacification is the provision 
of sustained territorial security. 2  
 
Although pacification programs, agencies, and objectives existed from the introduction 
of American forces in the advisory period in 1962, pacification only became the primary 
focus of the U.S. effort in Vietnam in 1968 as a result of changed battlefield dynamics in 
Vietnam and political dynamics in the United States. 
 
___________________ 
This thesis follows the style of the Journal of Military History. 
2. Hq., Department of the Army, Handbook for Military Support of Pacification,  
(Washington: Department of the Army, 1968), 2, Box 186, Organizational History Files, 
Military Historian’s Office, Records of HQ, U.S. Army, Pacific, Record Group (RG) 
550, National Archives II, College Park, MD (hereafter referred to as NARA II).  
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As the last U.S. division to fully deploy to Vietnam, the final two infantry 
brigades and headquarters of the 101st Airborne Division arrived in country during 
December 1967.  Initially operating in the III Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) immediately 
north of Saigon, the 101st rushed north to Thua Thien province and the city of Hue in the 
I CTZ when the surprise North Vietnamese (NVA)/Viet Cong (VC) Tet Offensive of late 
January 1968 nearly overwhelmed U.S. Marine, U.S. Army, and Republic of Vietnam 
(ARVN) forces operating there.   
During the next four years, until the 2nd Brigade, 101st Airborne departed 
Vietnam in February 1972, the infantry battalions of the 101st Airborne constituted the 
primary U.S. combat force in Thua Thien province.  Along with U.S. Advisory Team 18, 
a collection of South Vietnamese Regional Forces/Popular Forces (RF/PF), and the 
ARVN 1st Infantry Division, the 101st waged a complex counterinsurgency campaign 
against regular NVA battalions, smaller NVA and VC guerrilla bands, terror squads 
preying on the populace, and the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) itself that operated as a 
shadow government challenging the Republic of South Vietnam (RVN) government for 
legitimacy. 
 This thesis seeks to identify, describe, and analyze the tactics used by the 101st 
Airborne Division in Vietnam as an example of how U.S. Army units fought the 
insurgency.  While discussing these operations, mostly conducted by infantry units, I 
will confront the view that U.S. forces were always preoccupied with either pursing 
main force NVA and VC battalions or applying firepower with little sensitivity to 
counterinsurgency and pacification.  I believe that U.S. Army pacification tactics as 
finally executed by the 101st Division from mid-1968 to 1972 proved successful in 
defeating the insurgency in the lowlands and thus merit further study despite the larger 
calamity of the Vietnam War. 
 Much of the scholarly attention devoted to the Vietnam War focuses on the 
national strategic and military policy levels, leaving the description of the tactical level 
mostly in the hands of autobiographical accounts and a mountain of unpublished official 
materials.  The period following the war produced many accounts, often by authors who 
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were middle-level civilian or military officials during the war, that criticized the U.S. 
approach to the war as relying too heavily on attrition, firepower, technology, and large 
unit operations.  These advocates contend that a different U.S. military strategy in 
Vietnam, centered on gaining the support of the South Vietnamese population rather 
than the pursuit of North Vietnamese combat formations, would have produced victory 
(or at least a more economical defeat) than the attrition strategy chosen by General 
William Westmoreland.  In these accounts, the ineffective and corrupt South Vietnamese 
government often (though not always) contributed to inflexible U.S. military and civilian 
leadership in explaining the U.S. defeat.3 
 In contrast, many U.S. officers who remained with the army after the Vietnam 
War ended could not understand how they lost a war in which the units under their 
command won almost every battle in the traditional terms of casualty ratios and ground 
taken.  With first-hand recollection of battlefield success, these officers looked 
elsewhere to explain the U.S. defeat.  On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam 
War by retired army Colonel Harry Summers formed a break with the existing 
historiography by asserting that the U.S. strategy wasted energy on pacification.  
Summers and other officers also blamed what they thought were irrational political 
restrictions that restrained the military from defeating the external threat from North 
Vietnam that ultimately conquered South Vietnam.4  
 At the tactical level, the U.S. Army and Defense Department produced numerous 
studies of the war in Vietnam during the conflict.  Most works by army officers were 
written after first-hand experience in Vietnam either for professional journals, or papers 
written while at the Army War College.  These articles and unpublished materials form 
 
3. Thomas C. Thayer, War Without Fronts: The American Experience in Vietnam 
(Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985).  See also Andrew F. Krepinevich, The Army 
and Vietnam  (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).  
4. Harry G. Summers, On Strategy, A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War  
(New York: Dell, 1984).  See also Bruce Palmer,  The 25-Year War: America’s Military 
Role in Vietnam  (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1984), and Dave R.  
Palmer, Summons of the Trumpet:  U.S. – Vietnam in Perspective   (San Rafael, CA: 
Presidio Press, 1978), and Phillip B. Davidson, Vietnam at War, The History: 1946 – 
1975 (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1988). 
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an element of the army’s institutional memory readily discarded by most of the officer 
corps in the post-Vietnam era.  One of the intents of this study will be to bring these 
accounts from the 101st Division to light and integrate them into the actual conduct of 
pacification in Vietnam.5 
 Defense Department studies have similar value, though they largely use the 
analytical and quantitative tools favored in the department’s bureaucracy of the times.  
In this genre, the RAND Corporation published dozens of studies in an attempt to define 
and quantify the insurgency for decision-makers in the Pentagon.  The operations 
research techniques and quantification often used in these case studies are now standard 
fodder for many of the Vietnam War’s critics and participants alike for painting a false 
picture of the war and ignoring the moral factors of combat.  A second look, however, 
reveals meticulous data gathering, lucid arguments, and a good description of the Viet 
Cong and NVA through prisoner interrogations and data analysis.6 
 Some valuable works have taken a more nuanced approach at analyzing the 
Vietnam War by looking at a province and unit at war.  Eric Bergerud’s The Dynamics 
of Defeat: The Vietnam War in Hau Nghia Province and Red Thunder, Tropic Lightning: 
The World of a Combat Division in Vietnam both focus on the 25th Infantry Division and 
Hau Nghia Province from 1965 to 1970.  Kevin M. Boylan’s dissertation “The Red 
Queen’s Race: The 173d Airborne Brigade and Pacification in Bihn Dinh Province,” is 
similar to Bergerud’s works in that Boyland analyzes a single unit in a single province 
that fought mostly in the lowlands against the Viet Cong.  Area studies such as these 
integrate the actions of the various military, civilian, and Vietnamese actors that fought 
the war.  Their narrow territorial scope also allows both authors to gauge the 
 
5. Jim I. Hunt, “Pacification of Thua Thien Province,” U.S. Army War College 
Case Study, 9 March 1970,  Folder 19, Box 141, Center for Military History Refiles, 
Records of the U.S. Army Staff, RG 319, NARAII.  See also Louis D. Swenson, “The 
Revolutionary Development Program,” Infantry Magazine 58 (January-February 1968): 
28-31. 
6. Robert M. Pearce, The Insurgent Environment  (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
Corporation, 1969). See also Robert W. Komer, Impact of Pacification on Insurgency in 
South Vietnam  (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1970).  
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effectiveness (or lack thereof) of the pacification effort.7  This study will do the same for 
the famed 101st Airborne Division during its time in Thua Thien province from 1968-72. 
 
“Our previous methods of operation”: 
U.S. Army Pacification Techniques before Tet, 1968 
 The Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC), initiated by the U.S. Military 
Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) on 1 November 1968 ultimately shifted U.S. 
military strategy in Vietnam from a strategy of attrition based on seeking out enemy 
combat formations to one of Pacification aimed at population security.  For the previous 
four years, from the introduction of the 1st Cavalry Division into Vietnam’s Central 
Highlands in the summer of 1965 until the defeat of the communists’ final “mini Tet” 
offensive in June 1968, army tactical operations primarily aimed at finding and 
destroying NVA and VC units.8  During this period, MACV strategy under General 
William Westmoreland did not altogether ignore pacification, but relegated it to 
secondary status behind “the destruction or neutralization of the enemy main forces and 
 
7. Eric M. Bergerud,  The Dynamics of Defeat: The Vietnam War in Hau Nghia 
Province (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991);  and Bergerud,  Red Thunder, Tropic 
Lightning: the World of a Combat Division in Vietnam   (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
1993).  See also  Kevin M. Boyland, “The Red Queen’s Race: The 173d Airborne 
Brigade and Pacification in Binh Dinh Province, 1969-1970”  (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Temple University, 1994).  
8. Hq., 25th Infantry Division, “Operational Report – Lessons Learned (ORLL), 
period ending 31 Jul 68,” Box 2, 25th Infantry Division Files, Military Assistance 
Command, Vietnam (MACV) Command Historian’s Files, U.S. Army Military History 
Institute, Carlisle, PA (hereafter referred to as MHI). The 25th Infantry Division ORLL 
lists three separate enemy phases of the Tet offensive based on captured documents and 
interrogation reports: A “1st Phase Offensive” from 31 Jan-13 Feb 68, a “Second Phase 
Offensive” from 2-15 May 68, and a “3rd Phase Offensive” which was supposed to occur 
in late July or early August 1968, but never materialized.  See also Hq., 101st Airborne 
Division, “ORLL, period ending 31 Jul 68” and “ORLL, period ending 31 Oct 68,” Box 
1, 101st Airborne Division Files, MACV Command Historian’s Files, MHI, for a similar 
characterization of fighting in I Corps near Hue. 
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bases” and left its execution to the ARVN and U.S. civilian agencies.9  Still, as will be 
addressed, during this period pacification and other counterinsurgency tactics were 
attempted in a limited number of operations in the field.  Although these pacification 
operations remained a sideshow to the quest for a higher kill ratio and the destruction of 
main force units, their continued development laid the foundation for what would 
become institutionalized counterinsurgency practices used later by the 101st Airborne 
Division. 
 The overwhelming majority of U.S. tactical actions during the 1965-68 period of 
the war were conducted with the intent of searching for enemy units, fixing or encircling 
them when possible, and using firepower to destroy them.  These operations were lavish 
in the expenditure of ordnance and usually found sizable enemy formations only if the 
enemy decided to stand and fight.  The 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division’s Operations 
Greenleaf and Portsea conducted in February and April 1967 serve as examples for the 
types of missions and results achieved during this period.   
 Operation Portsea contains examples of many mistakes made during U.S. combat 
operations conducted before Tet 1968.  The expenditure of resources and damage 
inflicted tended to be counterproductive to the results attained.  Greenleaf, on the other 
hand, serves as an example of adhering to the form of counterinsurgency tactics over the 
actual function of the tactics.  These features were common to many population security 
actions conducted sporadically by American units during this period. 
The 1st Brigade’s After Action Review for Operation Portsea stated that the 
brigade’s objective simply was “the destruction of the Viet Cong, his living quarters, 
fortifications, and the capture, destruction, or evacuation of his supplies.”10  The 
brigade’s intelligence section concluded that an area of Phouc Tuy province was a major 
 
9. William Westmoreland, “Westmoreland’s 18 March 1967 Memo on Increase 
in Forces,” in The Pentagon Papers; The Defense Department History of United States 
Decisonmaking on Vietnam, vol. 4, Senator Gravel ed. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971-72), 
428. 
10. Hq., 1st Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, “Combat Operations After Action 
Report, dated 3 May 1967,” p. 9, Box 40, Operational Reports – Lessons Learned, 
Command Historian, United States Army Vietnam, RG 472, NARA II. 
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staging area for the 5th VC Division.  Reports indicated that fourteen battalion-size base 
camps and numerous weapons and rice caches may have been located in this part of the 
province.  Additionally, “all villages within the AO [area of operations] were viewed as 
actively or passively supporting the VC.”  The concept for the forthcoming operation 
was equally direct: “The Brigade was to move into the AO… establish a fire support 
base, cordon the squatter village, assist in the evacuation of VN families, and destroy the 
village; and conduct search and destroy operations throughout the AO.”11 
 To this end, the brigade employed a regular infantry battalion, a mechanized 
infantry battalion, an armored cavalry squadron, an artillery battalion firing over 19,000 
rounds in support of operations, and 39 attack aircraft sorties dropping over 100 tons of 
bombs.  Over the next two weeks, the companies of 1st Brigade conducted numerous 
“search and destroy” operations during the day and employed dozens of “squad and 
platoon sized ambushes” each night.12  The ambushes made no contact with the VC at 
night and enemy contact during the day was with his abandoned fortifications or 
occasionally small squad-sized groups.13  On 16 April 1967, the two-week operation 
ended and 1st Brigade units left the sector after having killed an estimated 44 VC and 
captured six more at the cost of five U.S. killed, 58 wounded, and four armored vehicles 
destroyed.  Before the operation, the brigade intelligence estimate listed enemy strength 
at two to three VC regiments and assorted local force companies.  Although the five base 
camps and tons of supplies destroyed by the 1st Brigade were not necessarily easy for the 
VC to replace, it is likely that replacements for the 50 VC lost by the 5th VC Division 
were now more easily recruited from the 272 Vietnamese forcibly re-settled during the 
opening stages of this operation.14  With no U.S. forces remaining in the area, VC forces 
were free to re-occupy their base camps and wait for the coming Tet holiday in 1968. 
 
11. Ibid.  See pages 4-5 for intelligence estimate. 
12. Ibid., pp. 2-3.  See pages 6-10 for narrative of execution. 
13. Ibid., p. 6.  The daily log for this action is filled with actions such as this brief 
encounter: “The battalion [2-39 Infantry] captured two oxcarts and sustained 1 WIA 
during a brief meeting engagement with 3 VC.  Enemy casualties were unknown.”  No 
U.S. unit made contact with any force larger than 12 enemy for the duration of Portsea. 
14. Ibid., pp. 10-11. 
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 Operation Greenleaf, mounted by 2-39 Infantry over Tet 1967, serves as an 
archetype of a well-intentioned population security mission executed to time and not to 
standard.  The battalion cordoned the village of Ap Binh Son in the Mekong Delta 
region of VI Corps in order to “maintain security of [the village] to thwart VC attempts 
to resupply and build-up or reposition forces” during the Tet cease-fire of 8-12 February 
1967.15  In contrast to Portsea, the 2-39 Infantry during Greenleaf did not need to make 
any use of its supporting fires as the enemy contact was extremely light.   
The battalion made extensive use of civic action and psychological operations 
assets to provide services for and entertain the villagers.  The psychological operations 
team showed eight movies; the battalion surgeon saw seventy-eight Vietnamese patients 
and delivered a baby; and the various units of the battalion repaired bridges, culverts, 
and donated money and food to needy locals.  Meanwhile, the infantry companies 
established a checkpoint on the improved road passing through the village (ostensibly to 
stop any VC traffic passing through the town), conducted search and destroy operations 
during the day, and established blocking positions at night.  The battalion had two 
confirmed enemy contacts during this operation, a sighting of a 12-man VC squad that 
occurred during the Tet cease-fire and an inconclusive exchange of fire with a 5-man VC 
element.  2-39 Infantry did not suffer or inflict any casualties, captured 116 documents, 
100 pounds of rice, and destroyed one tunnel and five foxholes.  No South Vietnamese 
units participated in this operation.16 
The battalion commander claimed that although the operation “netted little in the 
way of actual VC, [it] was successful particularly from a civil affairs point of view.”  He 
also observed that the villagers “displayed more confidence in our ability to protect 
 
15. Hq., 2-39 Infantry, “Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation 
Greenleaf, dated 18 February 1967,” Pages not numbered, Section #6: Mission, Box 40, 
Operational Reports, Lessons Learned, Command Historian, United States Army 
Vietnam, RG 472, NARA II.   
16. Ibid., Section #5: Civil Affairs/Psychological Warfare. The titles of the 
psychological operations team’s movies were listed as “Freedom for Men,” “Night of the 
Dream,” “None of Your Business,” “Dalat the Resort,” “Go Go Mania,” “What is 
Disease,” Dancing to Freedom,” and “Hawaii, USA.”  See Section #8: Execution, for 
details of enemy contact and results of operation. 
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them” and was particularly glad to see that the village policeman had begun to wear his 
uniform again after thinking he was now free from VC retribution.  The final indicators 
of 2-39 Infantry’s success were the “children pointed out to us the locations of trip flares 
and returned two grenades and two hundred sandbags … [and that] the people were 
sorry to see us leave.”17  None of the people were probably more sorry to see the 2-39 
Infantry leave than the village policeman, whose fate would now be at the mercy of the 
VC. 
 At the end of the operation, the battalion listed several conclusions that the 
commander thought were particularly applicable to producing success in future 
population security missions.  First, “the Village Chief’s wishes should be adhered to 
when practical” and “a special effort to make friends with the villagers must be 
initiated.”  Next, the battalion leadership thought that “when conducting operations in 
populated areas, maximum number of ARVN forces should be available” and that it was 
important to employ the local population when repairing the area, but equally essential 
to use village leaders instead of giving things directly to the people.  Finally, “it is not 
good to cater to one religious sect.”18 
While these conclusions were not necessarily incorrect, the temporary nature of 
the unit’s presence made them irrelevant.  2-39 Infantry was passing through the village 
on what became a week-long, low-intensity mission to find the VC and hand out 
goodies. On the other hand, the VC were in Ap Binh Son to stay and transform the 
village’s social structure by both coercion and cooperation.  Any villager bold enough to 
assist the Americans could be dealt with after they left. 
 Both of these operations shared the same fundamental weakness in that they 
viewed the Vietnamese people as an adjunct to the war that needed to be alternately re-
settled, screened, avoided, or assisted materially – but only in order to attack the VC.  
Both operations anticipated finding the VC as a problem whose symptom was an 
uncooperative, sometimes hostile populace instead of the more realistic circumstance:  
 
17. Ibid., Section #5: Civil Affairs, paragraph d; “Indications of Success.” 
18. Ibid., Section #5: Civil Affairs, paragraph c; “Conclusions.” 
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the VC was part of the same villages that the U.S. forces were alternately destroying or 
passing through.  This serious misconception drove the shallow, almost satirical, 
application or ignorance of counterinsurgency tactics seen in the extremes of both of 
these examples. 
Greenleaf gives an instance of the ultimately unproductive results of a 
conciliatory policy towards the insurgency when undertaken without accompanying 
measures needed to give conciliation a chance of success.  To be effective, 2-39 Infantry 
needed to be able to deliver long-term population security from the VC and social 
reforms needed to win the population over to the cause of South Vietnam’s government.  
Despite all of the traditional advantages in equipment and numbers that 2-39 Infantry 
enjoyed over its VC opponent, a U.S. infantry battalion due to change missions and 
leave the area within a week could not accomplish either. 
  Portsea, on the other hand, gives a sample of the uselessness of applying 
firepower and coercion while making little effort to link theses measures to intended 
enemy and civilian behavior.  The VC accomplished far more productive results by 
precisely applying coercion and violence over a prolonged time than all the equipment 
and several thousand men of the 1st Brigade could ever counter in only two weeks of 
search and destroy operations.  
 A contrast to these 9th Infantry Division operations is found in an example from 
the 25th Infantry Division’s 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment to the north in III 
Corps.  This 25th Infantry Division battalion demonstrated a better understanding of the 
requirements of successful counter-insurgency tactics and a more sophisticated approach 
to population security.  Operation Fresno was a month-long mission mounted from 13 
June 1966 to 15 July 1966 in order to restore GVN control to a district of Hau Nghia 
Province previously under VC control.19   
 
19. Hq., 2-27 Infantry, “After Action Report, Operation Fresno,” Pages not 
numbered, Section #9: Mission, Box 11, After Action Reports, Command Historian, 
United States Army Vietnam, RG 472, NARA II.  The mission statement for the 
controlling headquarters, 2-27 Infantry, read: “2/27 Inf… conducts S & D [Search and 
Destroy] operations in AO; conducts combat patrols and ambushes; conducts combined 
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 2-27 Infantry of the 25th Division began Fresno with “little hard intelligence 
information on the area,” but devoted extensive efforts during the initial days of the 
operation to the interrogation of captured VC and interviews with villagers to attempt to 
determine the enemy’s infrastructure that had established a “shadow government” 
challenging GVN legitimacy.20  At the same time, the battalion’s infantry companies 
saturated the area with day and night patrols that occasionally bumped into small VC 
units.  These patrols scored their most important successes in their psychological impact 
on the local guerrillas and not in their body counts, as evidenced by a VC squad leader 
who surrendered to an ARVN battalion on 29 June 1966.  Two weeks into the operation, 
this squad leader claimed that he had grown demoralized by the continuous U.S. and 
ARVN patrols and feared getting killed.  The next day he led a combined U.S./ARVN 
force to his squad’s hiding place in a neighboring hamlet, resulting in the capture of nine 
more VC.  A similar surrender and exploitation occurred ten days later that led to the 
capture of three more VC, including the hamlet finance chief.21   
 At the conclusion of Fresno, the 2-27 Infantry’s commander gave some 
indication of his enthusiasm for conducting future operations of this type in his analysis 
section of the after action review:  “Operation Fresno was this battalion’s first 
experience with the extended period, area and people oriented mission which 
emphasized pacification, as differentiated from the previous operations, which were 
usually search and destroy missions of short durations in continually changing areas.  
These latter operations virtually were conducted in people and intelligence vacuums.”  
The battalion commander continued with an important insight: “The key to 
counterinsurgency operations at battalion or any level is valid tactical intelligence….  
Lacking this intelligence and discounting pure blind luck, countless man hours and 
resources are wasted alternately ‘using a steamroller to crush an egg in the dark’ or 
                                                                                                                                           
operations with local ARVN forces; provides … technical advice … to RF and PF units; 
conducts road improvement operations in sector; conducts an extensive CA [Civil 
Affairs] and Psy/war program in AO.” 
20. Ibid., Section #8: Intelligence.  The battalion Intelligence section produced 




committing insufficient resources to do the job.”  Furthermore, he hoped these results 
could be duplicated in the future:  “This battalion was able to net tangible results – 
captured Viet Cong with their weapons and equipment, weapons, cadres, documents, etc.  
This was done with considerably less casualties and expenditures of resources than out 
previous operations have produced.  We are enthusiastic about the technique.  It holds 
greater potential than our previous methods of operations.”22 
As a general rule, the longer an American conventional unit could operate in one 
area and develop ties to GVN forces, the more security it provided to the South 
Vietnamese people.  Before the VC offensives of 1968, however, extended population 
security missions were subordinate to the attrition campaign.  American battalions, 
brigades, and even entire divisions were shifted throughout to pursue and contain 
conventional communist units. With the sole exception of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry 
Regiment’s sixteen-month-long Operation Byrd conducted in coastal area of II Corps 
from August 1966 to January 1968, no U.S. Army battalion remained in one area for 
longer than six weeks to conduct a population security mission.23   
 Clearly, the organized and massed battalions of the VC and NVA posed an equal, 
if not greater, threat to the survival of the GVN than did the insurgency.  Therefore, the 
 
22. Ibid., Section #15: Commander’s Analysis.   
23. Hq., 2-7 Cavalry, “Combat Operations After Action Report: Operation Byrd, 
dated 10 May 1968,” Box 5, Combat After Action Reports, MACV Command 
Historian’s Files, MHI.  2-7 Cavalry operated as an independent Task Force of the 1st 
Cavalry Division with its own attached helicopter, Civil Affairs, Psychological Warfare, 
and logistics assets.  See the following division and separate brigade quarterly 
Operational Reports – Lessons Learned (ORLLs) for further illustration of subordinate 
battalion movements within nominally static divisional sectors: 9th Infantry Division 
(May, 1967 – June 1969), 23rd Infantry Division (November 1967 to June 1969), 25th 
Infantry Division (November 1966 to June 1969), and 199th Infantry Brigade (November 
1966 to June 1969).  All ORLLs cited above located in United States Army, Vietnam 
(USRV), Command Historian files, MHI.  These were the only army units continuously 
deployed in the same populated areas before 1969.  The 1st and 4th Infantry Divisions 
were static, but operated largely in sparsely-populated jungle areas north and west of 
Saigon.  The 1st Cavalry Division, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (which deployed 
to Vietnam as a separate brigade until joining the rest of the division in December, 1967) 
and 173rd Airborne Brigade served as theater reserves and often were moved between I, 
II, and III Corps areas in pursuit of enemy main force units. 
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attrition strategy’s effectiveness relative to a comparable commitment to a population 
security strategy can never be completely resolved.  The attrition strategy was effective, 
though probably not efficient, in a narrow sense by driving enemy main force units from 
the battlefield and setting the essential conditions for pacification and population 
security operations that would follow.  On the other hand, the enemy’s capability to 
mount a large-scale surprise attack produced decisive effects on U.S. involvement and 
the ultimate outcome of the war.  Although this question will forever remain unresolved, 
these three examples give a representative sampling of the types of tactics that army 
battalions used to attack the Viet Cong insurgents.  Following the Tet offensive, units 
would take this uneven legacy of population security and search and destroy missions to 
fashion a set of more effective pacification tactics with which to execute the APC and 
later MACV campaign plans. 
 
“Getting off the treadmill”: Pacification Shares the Spotlight 
 The shift of MACV strategy in the APC was the result of three significant 
changes in Vietnam War fully evident by late 1968.  The most visible change to the U.S. 
effort in the war was a change of commander.  On 22 March 1968, President Lyndon 
Johnson announced that Westmoreland would be recalled to become Army Chief of 
Staff and be replaced by his deputy, General Creighton Abrams, in June of that year.24  
For some historians, this change of command in itself marked a decisive shift in U.S. 
operational philosophy.25   While Abrams left a greater record of his belief in the 
effectiveness of pacification operations than his predecessor, it is unlikely that he could 
 
24. Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, 248. 
25. Lewis Sorely, A Better War:  The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy 
of America’s Last Years in Vietnam (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1999).  Sorely’s thesis 
is that Abrams’ orders and intentions for fighting the Vietnam War were a decisive break 
from his predecessor.  See also William Colby, with James McCargar, Lost Victory: A 
Firsthand Account of America’s Sixteen-Year Involvement in Vietnam (Chicago: 
Contemporary Books, 1989), 213.  Colby believed that Abrams’ approach to the war 
was formed in 1967 while serving as Westmoreland’s deputy.   
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have (or would have) pursued the shift in strategy evident in the APC if not for changes 
on the battlefield in Vietnam and in the U.S. strategy guiding him from Washington. 
 Despite the casualties incurred by the Viet Cong in mounting the Tet offensive 
and the failure to achieve the general uprising that was the communists’ immediate 
objective in mounting it, the psychological effects were decisive in the United States.  
Within two months of the start of Tet on 31 January 1968, U.S. President Lyndon 
Johnson froze the open-ended U.S. commitment to South Vietnam by capping American 
troop levels at 549,500 and extended an offer to North Vietnamese officials to enter into 
negotiated settlement.26  William Colby, the deputy director for CORDS (Civilian 
Operations for Revolutionary Development Support), claimed that this move occurred 
despite the feeling held by many in MACV that the time was finally right to go on the 
offensive and attack the enemy in the villages.27  The United States was not yet 
committed to withdrawal from Vietnam, but for the next year, the selection of a new 
strategy for prosecuting the Vietnam War would await the outcome of the 1968 
presidential election and the end of the Tet offensive. 
 Although 1968 is often viewed as a year of decision in the Vietnam War, U.S. 
domestic politics and military operations in the theater really should be characterized as 
indecisive and more of the same.  Change was not immediate or predicated on a single 
decision or individual, and adopting a new strategy in Vietnam only occurred after 
muddling through the events of 1968.  Domestically, the Democratic party split itself 
dramatically over the nature of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, with the administration in 
power often at odds with significant portions of its own party base.  At the same time, 
the Republican challenger, Richard Nixon, offered only vague notions of a “peace with 
honor.”28  In this environment, American domestic politics often had a more immediate, 
rather than long-term and indirect impact on U.S. military operations.  As Abrams 
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observed, the dissent evident in the Democratic party’s Chicago convention “gave the 
North Vietnamese substantial negotiating material. He’s [the North Vietnamese] got 
1000 Democrats [out of 2500 delegates] that were at that convention that would have 
emasculated the position over here.  He [Humphrey] is out to be elected.  And, in my 
opinion, this gives them a substantial negotiating position.  It isn’t the facts here.”  
Abrams’ deputy then summarized the probable effect that the U.S. political environment 
would likely have on future communist activities: “There’s a good possibility that Hanoi 
is convinced that the United States is really militarily, economically, and psychologically 
exhausted, and what they really have in mind is dogging along with the war rather than 
getting into a major offensive.”29 
 Thus, Abrams and his planners at MACV were in most respects in a strategy gap 
between January and November 1968.  The enemy’s increased activity from January to 
June 1968 certainly gave the battalions in the field plenty of intense fighting, but 
MACV’s previous attrition strategy based on large-unit operations was now either 
repudiated or completed and the future of U.S. Vietnam policy left completely in doubt 
until sometime after the November elections.  Clearly, the VC and NVA possessed the 
initiative during these months as U.S. commanders could not launch into pacification 
operations designed to remedy the insurgent problem that allowed for the Tet attacks 
until the enemy spent or withdrew their forces committed to the offensive.  Indeed, 
Abrams did not even assign his MACV Long Range Planning Task Group to report on 
the current situation and determine if a change of strategy was appropriate until 31 
August 1968, when enemy strength seemed on the wane.  The resulting report was 
damning of previous U.S. strategy, stating that “all our U.S. combat accomplishments 
 
29. Creighton Abrams, as quoted by Lewis Sorely, ed., Vietnam Chronicles: The 
Abrams Tapes, 1968-1972, transcribed, selected, edited, annotated, and with an 
introductory essay by Lewis Sorely  (Lubbock, TX:  Texas Tech University Press, 2004), 
39-40.  In a Weekly Intelligence Update conducted a week later, Abrams observed the 
direct impact that Vietnam operations were having on U.S. politics and vice versa: “One 
of the interesting things to me in that- part of the plank was to abolish search and destroy 
operations, but when you think of a serious proposal in the Democratic platform to 
prescribe the tactics of the field commander in the battlefield, it’s really quite and 
amazing development.” p. 42. Italics in original.   
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have made no significant, positive difference to the rural Vietnamese … there is no real 
security in the countryside…. The Viet Cong thrive in an environment of insecurity,” 
and reflected a growing realization within the command that the time was now ripe for a 
change in strategy.30  
 The changed battlefield following Tet had the most immediate impact in the 
adoption of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign.  For MACV, the months of tough 
fighting following the first Tet offensive in January 1968 represented a victory and 
exposed a much-neglected area at the same time.  On the one hand, the surprise attacks 
brought the shadowy VC units out in the open where they were more often than not 
decimated by U.S. firepower after the initial shock of the attacks wore off.31  On the 
other, the very ability to mount these surprise attacks revealed the blind spot of the 
attrition strategy pursued for the last four years.  During the Tet fighting, Abrams 
summarized the problem facing MACV:  “I think we probably all agree that in the end 
what they’ve [the GVN] got to get done here is control of their own people, and get them 
secure.  The pacification effort is the ultimate effort which has to be made.  But right 
now I think we have to focus on what he’s got to do with his major formations.”32 
 In I Corps around Hue, enemy formations proved to be determined, often 
fortifying entire hamlets to resist U.S. attempts to regain control of population centers.  
By March 1968 the situation in I Corps required shifting the 101st Airborne Division 
from III Corps near Saigon north to assist the hard-pressed Marine, ARVN, and army 
 
30. Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, 254.   
31. Thayer, War Without Fronts, 104.  Thayer lists communist deaths for 1968 as 
181,000 – the highest of the war.  In contrast, 1967 produced 88,000 deaths and 1969 
produced 157,000.  See also Sorely, ed., Vietnam Chronicles, 110.   During the 22 
January 1969 Weekly Intelligence Update, the unidentified briefer lists communist 
casualties as “Tet 1968: Enemy losses 42,000.  May 1968: Enemy losses 40,000.  
August 1968: Enemy losses 26,000.” See also Gerald Lord, “Interview with LTC John 
C. Speedy,” pp. 47-48, Box 30, Company Command In Vietnam Series, Oral History 
Interviews, 1981-1985, MHI.  Captain Speedy’s company of 1-502 Infantry destroyed a 
well-entrenched enemy battalion-sized unit during Tet by employing vast quantities of 
bombs, artillery, and naval gunfire. 
32. Abrams, as quoted in Vietnam Chronicles, 16.  Abrams remarks made at the 
6 July 1968 WIEU (Weekly Intelligence Estimate Update). 
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formations in defeating the enemy battalions now massed throughout the area.  Arriving 
in the I Corps area of operations on 18 March 1968, the 101st began on 1 April 1968 
what would be another four years of continuous operations in Thua Thien province with 
Operations Carentan I & II. 
 Operations Carentan I & II were conducted sequentially with the objectives to 
“locate and destroy enemy forces, bases, and logistical installations in assigned TAOI 
[Tactical Area of Operations and Interest] with primary emphasis on those forces and 
bases which pose the greatest threat on GVN control of important population and 
economic centers and the security of friendly military installations,” and ran until 17 
May 1968.33  The fighting during these operations was intense and nearly continuous, 
leaving some officers to remark that it was the most difficult and determined of the 
war.34 Clearly, as Abrams acknowledged, the enemy units fighting in Thua Thien’s 
villages and towns would need to be cleared out before any attempt could be made to 
defeat the Viet Cong Infrastructure and restore GVN control over the South Vietnamese 
populace in I Corps. 
 Operation Nevada Eagle, coming after Carentan I & II, saw the end of large-unit 
enemy resistance in the populated lowlands of Thua Thien province.  On 11 May 1969, 
the 101st Airborne recorded its last contact with an NVA formation in the lowlands and 
followed this with a “running battle with fleeing enemy east of Hue” from 30 May to 5 
June 1968 that resulted in 800 VC killed and captured. 35  After this action, as the 
division’s after action review noted, “contacts with and sightings of the enemy in groups 
 
33. Hq., 101st Airborne Division, “Combat After Action Report: Operation 
Carentan,” p. 3, Box 1, After Action Reports, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, 101st 
Airborne Division, RG 472, NARA II. 
34. Lord, “Interview with LTC John C. Speedy,” Speedy assessed these two 
months of fighting as the most difficult he encountered during his two years in Vietnam; 
service that also included the re-taking of the U.S. embassy in Saigon during January 
1968 and the Cambodian invasion in 1970.  His infantry company was reduced to an 
effective strength of 60 men during Carentan due to the effects of continuous combat. 
35. Hq., 2nd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, “After Action Report (Offensive 
Operations 17 May 68 to 28 Feb 1969),” p. 4, Box 1, After Action Reports, Assistant 
Chief of Staff, G-3, 101st Airborne Division, RG 472, NARA II. 
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of larger than squad size were infrequent.”36  Although the men of the 101st could not 
have anticipated it at the time, the VC and NVA would not or could not organize in large 
units to fight amongst the population until their Easter Offensive of 1972.   For the 
remainder of the 101st Airborne Division’s service in Thua Thien, contact with enemy 
main force units would be in their jungle base camp areas and contact with the VC 
would be against their squads and infrastructure in the villages and hamlets.  The 
pacification of Thua Thein province could now begin. 
 At the end of Tet 1968, Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) statistics indicated that 
47 percent of South Vietnam was under GVN influence, with the remainder either 
contested or totally under VC control.37  At the same time, by September 1968, U.S 
Reconnaissance in Force missions (or RIFs) rarely made contact with sizable enemy 
formations during their operations.  Clearly, these two factors when taken together 
pointed to a need and opportunity for change of mission for army tactical formations.  
On one hand, MACV could take some satisfaction in the grievous casualties inflicted 
upon the VC since January 1968.  On the other hand, the fact that nearly half of South 
Vietnam fell under enemy influence still normally allowed him the freedom to choose 
when to strike and when to reconstitute.  For the next phase of the war, HES ratings 
would replace kill ratio as the American command’s measure of unit effectiveness.  
MACV attention turned to population security. 
 Abrams presented the Accelerated Pacification Campaign to his division 
commanders at a Weekly Intelligence Update on 20 September 1968.  The APC was 
derived directly from the Program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of 
Vietnam (PROVN), a study that Abrams’ biographer Lewis Sorely claims the MACV 
 
36. Hq., 101st Airborne Division, “Combat After Action Report, Operation 
Nevada Eagle, 17 May 1968 to 28 February 1969, dated 19 April 1969,” p. 11, Box 22, 
After Action Reports, Command Historian, Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, 
RG 472, NARA II.   
37. Thayer, War Without Fronts, 144.  Thayer’s statistics indicate that in 
December 1968, 47 percent of South Vietnamese hamlets were rated in the “A” or “B” 
Secure status, 30 percent in the “C” Relatively Secure status, 11 Percent in the “D” and 
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commander was very familiar with from his time in the Pentagon before becoming 
Westmoreland’s deputy.38  In the strategic guidance vacuum that existed in Washington 
at the time, the APC was nothing more than a temporary fix designed to counter the 
possibility of another Tet offensive in 1969.  As the CORDS representative at the 
meeting, John P. Vann, commented, “I do think we are suggesting a basic policy change 
in country. As you know, we have always vacillated between whether we do the job 
well, and not have to do it again, or whether we go for a quick fix.  Right now, this 
suggests a quick fix, to some extent.”39  
 APC objectives were simply stated, but more difficult to achieve: raise 1000 
contested hamlets to relatively secure status by 1 February 1969.40  This three month 
crash course in pacification would fill the existing strategy gap nicely by focusing units 
on preventing another series of surprise attacks that could prove fatal to U.S. objectives 
in Vietnam while testing out the viability of pacification in the field.  At the end of the 
ACP, the new U.S. presidential administration would also be in place and operational 
objectives could be shifted based on both the APC’s success in the field and whatever 
new strategic guidance might come from Washington.  Despite its potentially temporary 
nature, however, the ACP was to represent a watershed in U.S. high-level planning in 
Vietnam. 
 Although population security now achieved prominence in MACV planning with 
the ACP, units in the field still conducted a large number of RIF operations in search of 
main force units after November 1968.  The adoption of a population security-centered 
strategy did not mean that enemy main force units were viewed as any less of a threat by 
U.S. commanders, however, and much of the U.S. effort over the next three years would 
 
38. Sorely, ed., Vietnam Chronicles, 49.  According to Sorely, Abrams must have 
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coming to Vietnam.  
39. John P. Vann, as quoted in Vietnam Chronicles, 50.  At the time of this 
meeting John P. Vann served as Deputy CORDS Commander for II Field Force.   
40. William Colby, as quoted in Vietnam Chronicles, 105. These were 
Ambassador Colby’s remarks at the 16 January 69 Weekly Intelligence Update briefing.  
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still be expended in keeping these enemy units from infiltrating into the population 
centers.  As MACV’s Deputy Commander, General Andrew Goodpaster, explained, 
“everything that can be pulled together and not locked into big operations, [will be 
directed] against the local forces, [to] get [them] going against the guerrillas.”41  With a 
weakened enemy, though, Abrams believed by October 1968 that “the picture’s clear 
enough so that some risks can be run with respects to large units,” and directed that 
significant forces be used against the “guerillas, the infrastructure, the local force, all 
that stuff” so that the U.S. forces could finally get off the “treadmill” where army forces 
had been focused on smashing up main force units with firepower, but neglecting the 
support network that made it all possible. 42   
With the enemy now unable and unwilling to combat the 101st’s battalions in the 
open, the mission for these units in Operation Nevada Eagle shifted from “find, fix, 
encircle, and destroy NVA/VC forces” to “conduct cordon operations in villages … to 
destroy enemy forces and installations and pacify the area of resettlement” over the 
course of the next five months.43  It can be argued that the resulting 101st Airborne 
Division actions would prove to be some of the most innovative and effective U.S. 
pacification operations of the war.
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“A QUESTIONABLE STATUS OF PACIFICATION”: THUA THIEN, 1968 
 
 
 The I Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) included the five northern-most provinces of 
South Vietnam.  The two northernmost provinces, Thua Thien and Quang Tri, created a 
hundred mile long, sixty mile wide finger of South Vietnamese territory bounded on the 
east by the South China Sea, to the north by North Vietnam itself, and to the west by the 
communist sanctuary of Laos. Geographically, Thua Thien consisted of three very 
diverse regions:  rugged western highlands featuring triple canopy jungle and steep 
3,000 foot ridges, a heavily-populated coastal lowland strip approximately fifteen miles 
wide in most places that ran the sixty-mile length of the province, and a narrow rolling 
piedmont area between the coastal plains and mountains largely unsuitable for rice 
cultivation.  Although the NVA and U.S. forces conducted ceaseless infiltration and 
reconnaissance in force operations in the western highlands throughout the war, the 
densely-populated coastal lowlands, where the bulk of the province’s 526,000 people 
lived, attracted communist and therefore American attention.44 
 Unlike the rich delta region of the Mekong River in IV CTZ south of Saigon, the 
sandy coastal lowlands of Thua Thien produced only enough rice to remain self-
sufficient in times of peace.  Similarly, with the rail connection between North and 
South Vietnam severed at the DMZ and little other large-scale industry, the “Imperial 
City” of Hue retained more psychological than economic value for either side.45  A city 
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of 140,000 in 1968, Hue served as a center of “militant Buddhism” and opposition to the 
Catholicism prevalent in Saigon ruling circles.  At times, Republic of Vietnam (GVN) 
civil and military leaders in this northern province “openly defied central authority in 
Saigon” and from the communist perspective, this situation offered the promise of 
loosening the region from Saigon’s control.46  Also, the population of this northern 
region ranked only behind Saigon and the Mekong Delta and over the years the VC built 
a strong underground infrastructure in Thua Thien.  Finally the region offered a short 
supply line from North Vietnam for main force units and the potential that a successful 
offensive might isolate this exposed province from the rest of South Vietnam.47    
Following the 1968 Tet offensive, the South Vietnamese authorities exercised 
tenuous control over large swaths of Thua Thien’s rural districts and communist success 
seemed a distinct possibility.  The careful and persistent building of secure base areas 
and infrastructure over many years, enabled the communists to achieve such dramatic 
results with their surprise attacks.  As this account will show, the insurgency’s methods 
capitalized on vulnerabilities in rural South Vietnamese society and deficiencies of 
Allied remedies to produce “a questionable state of pacification” after the 1968 attacks 
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“The king’s law bows before village custom”:  
Village Organization and Communist Exploitation 
 The political organization of Thua Thien province in 1968 followed the standard 
South Vietnamese model of military government.  In 1968 the trappings of constitutional 
governance for South Vietnam remained largely theoretical and its institutions unproven.  
Before this time the GVN would best be defined by its opposition to communism rather 
than its stance in favor of any governing principle.  The constitutional reform process 
began to show results only in September 1966 following pressure from U.S. officials and 
the first national parliamentary elections occurred in October 1967, over two years after 
the Marines landed at Da Nang.49  As one South Vietnamese general involved in the 
pacification campaign remarked after the war, “the U.S. insistence on political stability 
and elective, democratic government as preconditions to continued aid and support 
effectively molded the RVN [Republic of Vietnam] regime into a western-style 
democracy that functioned primarily in form, not in substance.”50  
With the transformation processes underway for less than two years, even the 
bland and uncritical U.S. Army Handbook for Military Support of Pacification stated in 
1968 that “an elected constitutional structure has just come into being.”  Furthermore, 
the handbook cautioned U.S. Army readers accustomed to a definite separation between 
civil and military functions that “the present [GVN] government cannot be divided 
simply into ‘civil organization’ and ‘military organization’.”  The handbook also 
predicted that despite the trend towards constitutional representation, for the foreseeable 
future South Vietnamese military officers would continue to occupy “government 
positions concerned only with civilian functions.”51 
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Army Center of Military History, 1981), 181. 




At the provincial level, the province chief served as the ranking civil and military 
GVN official. Usually a colonel or lieutenant colonel in the Army of the Republic of 
Vietnam (ARVN), the province chief obtained his office by presidential decree and 
recommendation of the corps commander.  The province chief reported to the corps 
commander for military affairs and to the central government in Saigon for most other 
administrative and pacification functions.52  As the Handbook for Military Support of 
Pacification noted, “the province chief is, as an individual, responsible for all 
government functions within his province.”53  The province chief directly controlled all 
Regional Forces (RF) companies in his province and through his subordinate district 
chiefs all Popular Forces (PF) platoons assigned to individual villages.  Although the 
province chief retained operational control over National Police and Revolutionary 
Development assets operating in his province, these agencies also operated within their 
own bureaucracies to Saigon.  Similarly, ARVN tactical forces also stood outside of the 
province chief’s direct control unless specifically committed to a specific Revolutionary 
Development or pacification mission by the division or corps commander.  For civil 
administration resources, the whims of Saigon politics directly affected the province 
chief’s budget.  Thus, for all of his sweeping responsibilities, the province chief 
possessed little power to enforce his authority when compared to the all-powerful 
position occupied by the VC cadres opposing him in the villages.  The political 
bargaining skills needed to succeed (or merely survive) in such an environment often put 
the motives of these officers at odds with their U.S. advisors who usually preferred 
direct, immediate, and relentless action against the VC.  The conventional wisdom holds 
that the friction in these relationships usually resulted from the advisor’s typical one-
year tour in Vietnam, in contrast to his Vietnamese counterpart’s lifetime tour.  In more 
than a few instances, though, the political maneuvering of the South Vietnamese officers 
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produced a revolving door of Vietnamese province and district chiefs changing every 
month while only the U.S. advisor remained constant.54 
The province chief administered his fiefdom through subordinate district chiefs, 
who held ranks between lieutenant and major, depending on the importance of the 
district, capabilities (both administrative and political) of the officer, and combat 
attrition.  Thua Thien province was divided into ten districts and the city of Hue, a city 
further divided into three districts and usually administered separately from the rest of 
the province.55  At district level the military government of the GVN interacted with a 
rural peasant political organization largely unchanged since feudal days.  
 In abstract, the struggle to define how these feudal peasant political 
organizations would be brought into the 20th century fueled the ongoing insurgency in 
South Vietnam.  Under previous colonial and imperial regimes, the peasants extracted a 
form of limited self-rule and isolation in exchange for their neutrality and acquiescence 
in national affairs to the dominant urban or colonial power.  This resulted in the often-
cited Vietnamese maxim that “the king’s law bows before village custom.”56  The 
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for Advanced Research Projects Agency, May 1969 (Santa Monica, CA:  RAND 
Corporation, 1969), 18.  After extensive study of Vietnamese rural society, Pierce claims 
that village autonomy was a peasant myth borne of isolation and ignorance.  The 
peasants, however, developed this myth into the popular proverb quoted above.  
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objectives and methods of the communist insurgency made continued isolation and 
neutrality impossible, however.  Douglas Pike, in his 1966 study Viet Cong, concludes 
that the “revolutionary guerrilla warfare as practiced in Vietnam” sought “to establish a 
totally new social order, thus differing from insurgencies whose objective is either 
statehood or change of government.”57  As one 1969 RAND study of the Vietnamese 
peasantry found, “family, subsistence, and subservience” and not social revolutionary 
historically characterized the traditional Vietnamese peasant.58  Thus, the villages and 
hamlets of rural South Vietnam became the battleground between communists seeking 
ruthlessly to unify Vietnam under their ideology and a GVN haphazardly attempting to 
define one.   
Realizing this, the Department of Defense expended significant intellectual 
capital throughout the war commissioning studies and attempting to understand the 
mechanisms of how the VC came to control these villages so strongly while the GVN’s 
influence usually proved transient.  These studies found that subservience to others who 
owned his land and controlled his local government constituted the fundamental fact of 
life for the lowest rung of Vietnamese peasant.  A few families of landed gentry usually 
controlled local village political and legal systems by restricting membership in village 
counsels to several elite families and selecting the village chief from this select group.59  
Although not wealthy by urban standards, as their plots of land rarely exceeded ten 
acres, these village elites retained coercive legal and economic powers over their tenant-
farming neighbors.  Researchers also discovered that “later colonial administrations 
isolated and reinforced this system in order to retain control over rural areas.”60   
While many Vietnamese joined or supported the Viet Cong out of nationalistic 
motivations, this cause could only provide fighters for VC units and not the secure base 
 
57. Douglas Pike, Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National 
Liberation Front of South Vietnam (Cambridge, MA: The Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology Press, 1966), 32. 
58. Pearce, The Insurgent Environment, 13. 
59. Ibid., 16. 
60. Ibid., 19. 
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areas and underground support network required for a successful insurgent campaign.61  
On the other hand, the communist exploitation of the anachronistic village political 
system found throughout rural South Vietnam proved to be their most enduring method 
of controlling swaths of villages whose loyalties might otherwise be divided.  Pike 
theorized that “the purpose of this vast organizational structure was … to restructure the 
village social order and train the villagers to control themselves.  This was the 
[communists’] one undeviating thrust from the start” and not simply military operations 
against soldiers or merely occupying territory.62  Consequently, the elimination of 
guerrilla fighters and the physical occupation of the villages by the GVN only indirectly 
contributed to the defeat of communist objectives as long as this organizational 
infrastructure remained. 
One study stylized the VC approach to taking over a village as a five-step 
process of:  recognition by the revolutionary elite of conditions within the traditional 
village environment that are potentially exploitable for insurgency; adaptation of 
revolutionary activities to the recognized pre-insurgency conditions; disruption of the 
traditional patterns of administrative and social conditions; domination of the peasants 
through revolutionary organizations created in the villages; direction of all activities in 
 
61. Konrad Kellen, Conversations with enemy soldiers in late1968/early 1969: A 
study of Motivation and Morale. RM-6131-1-ISA, prepared for the Office of the Asst. 
SecDEF/International/Security Affairs and the Advanced Research Projects Agency, 
September 1970, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1970), v.  “Both northerners 
and southerners seem[ed] to feel that their struggle against ‘the Americans’ [was] not 
merely justified, but a national necessity.” 
62. Pike, Viet Cong, 111.  Pike’s passage as written: “The purpose of this vast 
organizational effort was not simply population control but to restructure the social order 
of the village and train the villagers to control themselves.  This was the NLF’s 
[National Liberation Front’s] one undeviating thrust from the start.  Not the killing of 
ARVN soldiers, not the occupation of real estate, not the preparation for some pitched 
battle at an Armageddon or a Dien Bien Phu but organization in depth of the rural 
population through the instrument of self control – victory through organization.”  
Although Pike published this succinct summary of communist objectives in Vietnam in 
1966, many writers continue to accurately observe the phenomenon, yet misinterpret the 
objectives of the communist insurgency in Vietnam.  
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the villages to provide continuing support for the war.63  In his study of VC tactics, Pike 
found that the typical South Vietnamese village was “vulnerable to this kind of assault” 
and thus “became a battleground in a peculiar kind of struggle, part political, part 
military, and wholly social.”64  When the communist cadres succeeded, they transformed 
the old social order in the village and forces inside the village normally proved unable to 
overthrow the new communist order.  The VC cadre and their allies within the village 
controlled all aspects of village life – politics, agriculture, recreation, and manpower 
were all directed to support the insurgency.     
Thus, with the proper conditions, what might start as a squad-sized element of 
VC cadre entering at night to proselytize amongst the villagers could, in several months, 
metastasize into a fortified village containing a local-force VC platoon and available as a 
base of operations for larger VC and NVA main force units.  The Department of Defense 
specialists researching the VC recognized the work of these “elite group[s] that can 
organize the peasants and develop a revolutionary base in the rural villages” as equally 
important to the “mass of recruits, supplies, information, and sanctuaries” that together 
formed “the enduring strength of the VC in its revolutionary war against the GVN.”  
Although the GVN attempted to create parallel organizations to counter the work of the 
VC cadres in the villages, none proved as effective and tenacious as the guerrilla 
leadership.  As an analysis of VC prisoner of war interrogations conducted in late 1968 
and early 1968 summarized after several severe VC setbacks, “they [the VC cadres] can 
perhaps be killed, but they probably cannot be dissuaded by either words or hardships.”65    
 
“The mistakes as well as successes of the past”: 
Roles of U.S. and GVN Pacification Forces 
The method of VC operations, therefore, was not a mystery to U.S. and South 
Vietnamese officials.  Devising effective countermeasures to the insurgency, however, 
had thus far eluded both.  If the communist infrastructure could be characterized as 
 
63. Pearce, The Insurgent Environment, ix. 
64. Pike, Viet Cong, 110. 
65. Kellen, Conversations with enemy soldiers in late1968/early 1969, 102. 
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austere, flexible elements efficiently using resources – with the exception of the lives of 
its members – and under centralized control, the GVN/U.S. response would be exactly 
the opposite: a multitude of narrowly-focused elements profligately expending money 
and material under several parallel and sometimes competing chains-of-command.  As 
the Handbook for Military Support of Pacification recalled defensively in early 1968, 
“present objectives do not differ in significant points from former programs and plans, 
both GVN and US planners have benefited from the mistakes as well as successes of the 
past.”66 
These mistakes and successes were the product of a complicated and diffuse set 
of organizations deployed in South Vietnam to fight the war as the organizational 
diagram drawn from the Handbook for Military Support of Pacification in Appendix B 
shows.67  The GVN deployed two military and paramilitary forces in the field.  The 
ARVN consisted of nine infantry divisions normally tied to a geographic region along 
with a marine and airborne division held in reserve.  These formations were armed and 
organized on the conventional U.S. model.  Originally designed to combat North 
Vietnamese conventional units, the ARVN did not assume formal responsibility for 
supporting the counterinsurgency campaign (or Revolutionary Development, as it was 
formally known at the time) until mid-1966 as U.S. units began to take over their 
primary function of finding and fixing communist main force units.68  The ARVN 1st 
Division, normally considered one of the better South Vietnamese divisions by U.S. 
advisors, was the primary GVN tactical formation operating in Thua Thein province.69  
 
66. Hq., Department of the Army, Handbook for Military Support of 
Pacification, 2. 
67. See Appendix B: MACV Advisory Organization for the complex relationship 
between the various U.S. advisors, their chain of command, and the South Vietnamese 
they advised. 
68. Ibid., 3. 
69. Lung, The General Offensives of 1968-69, 75.  Some 1st Division officers and 
their units also openly joined the Buddhist opposition to Saigon in 1966.  Surprisingly, 
the available advisory team records indicate 1st Division rarely conducted pacification 
operations independent of U.S. formations.  Most recorded pacification operations with 
U.S. forces involved RF/PF and NPPF rather than ARVN units.  The ARVN 1st Division 
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The primary military forces used to fight the communist insurgency were the 
lightly-armed territorial forces, the Regional Forces (RF) and the Popular Forces (PF).  
These units constituted roughly half of the numerical strength of the GVN armed forces 
and were theoretically indispensable to combating the VC insurgency.  These units were 
composed of foot-mobile infantry squads and platoons armed with rifles, machine guns, 
and grenade launchers, but having no heavier weapons, indirect fire support, or 
battalion-level staff or logistical support.  Whatever the theoretical requirements, the 
ground truth of their actual performance is difficult to establish but will be elaborated on 
later in more detailed examples.  In personal recollections, U.S. officers working with 
RF and PF units were often harsh in their criticism of the combat capabilities of these 
outfits and cynical about their potential.70  In official after action reviews, U.S. officers 
were more upbeat and understanding of the limitations of the territorial units.71  Finally, 
at least one noted analyst determined that the RF and PF were “dollar for dollar, the most 
effective large force in killing communist troops in South Vietnam.”72 
                                                                                                                                           
also was one of the principal units involved in the LAM SON 719 attack into Laos in 
1971 where it performed well but sustained high casualties. 
70. Victor E. Stamey, “Interview with LTC James I. Daily,” p. 19, Box 10, 
Company Command In Vietnam Series, Oral History Interviews, 1981-1985, MHI.  As a 
captain, Dailey commanded B Company, 2-327 Infantry of the 101st Airborne from July 
to December 1968.  He recalled one particular operation with a PF platoon: “They had 
no capability, they were pushing drugs, they were pushing women, yet we were expected 
to integrate them into our rifle companies …. We virtually had no control over them, but 
yet, they were kind of stinking up the AO [Area of Operations], I thought that was a very 
poor operation, at best.” 
71. 22nd Military History Detachment, “Case Study: Operation Randolph Glen, 7 
December 1969 to 31 March 1970, 101st Airborne Division,” p. 6, Box 25, After Action 
Reports, Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, RG 472, NARA II.  The after 
action report stated in more measured tones that “the increased effectiveness of Popular 
Forces and improved leadership qualities exhibited in RF and PF units are evidence that 
training efforts have resulted in substantial progress.” 
72. Thomas Thayer, War Without Fronts:  The American Experience in Vietnam  
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), 165.  Thayer wonders “if 30 percent of the 
communist casualties can be attained for only 4 percent of the resources, what might 




Whatever combat efficiency RF/PF units developed later in the war, the Tet 
offensive in 1968 proved more than a match for almost all territorial forces in Thua 
Thien province.   As the U.S. provincial senior advisor observed in his March 1968 
report that “the Tet offensive in late January disrupted all [Revolutionary Development] 
efforts in the countryside, and effectively destroyed all semblance of GVN rule until late 
February.”73  The communist attack pulverized most PF platoons beyond combat 
effectiveness and they simply evaporated, while the Revolutionary Development teams 
they supposedly protected “were withdrawn to the respective district headquarters and 
used as security forces in the defense of these isolated compounds,” thus interrupting 
GVN influence in these villages.74  The RF companies that withstood the initial attacks 
similarly “withdrew … into the city [Hue] and into defensive positions around the 
district headquarters compounds.”75 
In addition to these two military organizations, the GVN initially deployed two 
primary paramilitary forces in the counter-insurgency fight.  The Ministry of 
Revolutionary Development deployed lightly-armed, 59-man Revolutionary 
Development (RD) teams to increase GVN influence and legitimacy as a counter to the 
VC cadre system.76  The other primary GVN paramilitary counterinsurgency 
organization was the National Police.  Along with their roles as standard civil law 
 
73. Thieme, “Thua Thien Report for the Period ending 31 March 1968, dated 4 
April 1968,” p. 1, Advisory Team 18 Collection.  The Tet attacks not only disrupted 
GVN control of the countryside but also disrupted the MACV reporting bureaucracy, a 
far more permanent and formidable organization.  No reports exist for the months of 
January and February, 1968, the only such gaps in the existence of Advisory Group 18.  
The reporting bureaucracy functioned throughout the communist 1972 offensive which 
captured Quang Tri province and nearly overran Thua Thien.   
74. Ibid.  February 1968 was a very fluid time for Advisory Group 18.  Thieme 
admitted that sequence of events was merely “as best [as] can be reconstructed.” 
75. Ibid. 
76. Tho, Pacification, pp. 51-55.  The RD teams were reorganized several times 
during the war.  After Tet 1968, RD teams were 39-man organizations.  By 1971, the 
technical and administrative functions of the non-security portions of the RD teams were 
absorbed by the various GVN ministries. 
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enforcement officers, the National Police controlled the National Police Field Force 
(NPFF) and the Special Police (SP) to fight the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI). 
The NPFF was an arm of the National Police specially created as an “exploitation 
force, employed offensively and aggressively in the attack against the Viet Cong 
Infrastructure (VCI).”77  These units were even more lightly armed that the territorial 
forces, but were “designed, trained, and equipped to operate in rural areas which the 
armed forces cleared of enemy main force units but in which VC guerilla, terrorist, and 
other elements of the [VC] infrastructure prevent the civil government from functioning 
in a normal way.”78  Three companies of the NPFF initially operated in Thua Thien. 
Whereas the NPFF functioned as an overt police striking force to combat VCI in 
newly-swept villages, the Special Police operated undercover as the intelligence-
gathering arm of the GVN police apparatus.  NPFF units were typically assigned to work 
with tactical military units as companies or platoons.  The Special Police operated alone 
or in small groups against a wide variety of targets as “the primary internal intelligence 
and security arm of the GVN.”79  Although primarily directed against the VCI, Special 
Police missions also included “maintaining files on potentially powerful political 
organizations, guarding of VIP’s,” and counter-narcotics tasks.80   The Special Police 
and their multi-faceted set of missions should not be confused with the Provincial 
Reconnaissance Units and Status Census Grievance units (usually referred to as simply 
“census grievance units”) that fought specifically against the VCI and enjoyed greater 
success later in the war. 
 
77. Hq., 5-46 Infantry, “Guide For Hamlet Pacification,” p. B-1,  Cabinet C4, 
Drawer 5, Miscellaneous Unit Files, MACV Command Historian’s Collection, MHI.  
Hereafter referred to as “5-46 IN Pacification Guide.” 
78. Ibid. 
79. Ibid. 
80. Ibid.   
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 In December 1967, there were 2541 National Police on duty in Thua Thien, of 
which 340 belonged to the NPFF and nearly 500 to the Special Police.81  In the period 
before the 1968 Tet offensive, almost all police efforts were deployed inside Hue to the 
neglect of the outlying hamlets and villages where the VC steadily solidified their 
control.82  When these NPFF units did conduct limited operations in the field, the results 
were more often the capture of “illegal residents” than VC.  The NPFF posted these 
results not in secure sector cleared of VC influence, but in an area that would experience 
an unprecedented armed uprising only eight weeks later, indicating the police ineptitude 
and indifference to conditions in the rural areas outside Hue.83  For their part, the Special 
Police “continue[ed] to crackdown on black marketeers,” but proved similarly unable to 
identify the growing VC threat.84  Although the Tet offensive ultimately did not prove 
fatal to pacification efforts in Thua Thien province, the success of the communist effort 
laid bare the inadequacies of the territorial forces and police to provide security for the 
GVN’s citizens.  Both organizations would be re-built from the latter half of 1968 
onwards with an intensified advisory effort, improved equipment and techniques, and 
combined operations with the battalions of the 101st Airborne Division. 
 
81. Louis Spalla, “Monthly Public Safety Field Force Report for December 1967, 
dated 3 January 1968,” Chart, Box 9, General Records, Office of Civil Operations for 
Rural Development Support, MR1 Public Safety Division, RG 472, NARA II. 
82. Jack Sanders, “Monthly Public Safety Field Force Report for November 
1967, dated 4 December 1967,” p. 2.  The provincial CORDS police advisor recorded in 
November 1967 that “During the past 30 days several joint operations with Marine 
companies have been conducted.  This is especially noteworthy when it is realized that at 
least 2 years of advisory effort has been applied without success prior to this time.  
Difficulty is still being encountered concerning the use of the police outside the Hue 
city.” 
83. Sanders, “Monthly Public Safety Field Force Report for November 1967, 
dated 4 December 1967,” un-numbered semi-monthly NPFF Organizational Report for 
NPFF Company 106 for the period 1-30 November 1967 report within document.  The 
106th NPFF Company was by far the most active of Thua Thien’s three NPFF companies 
during this period.  In seven independent platoon-sized operations and one company-size 
cordon and search operation conducted with 2/26 Marines, the 106th netted 24 illegal 
residents and one VC suspect who was later released.   
84. Ibid., p. 2. 
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Unlike the territorial forces and police counterinsurgency forces, the 
Revolutionary Development teams largely faded in importance after Tet ‘68. Their role 
in interacting with the populace gradually came to be taken over by the various GVN 
territorial security apparatuses and their political development role receded as land 
reform and other GVN social programs came to be managed more directly from 
President Nguyen Van Thieu and other GVN ministries instead of the Ministry of 
Revolutionary Development.  The Revolutionary Development team concept originated 
as the GVN counter to VC cadres and sought to “combat the communist insurgents by 
supporting the rural population in providing security, assisting the maintenance of 
democratic institutions, and aiding in the channeling of administrative and technical 
services from the GVN to the rural population.”85  The first RD teams graduated from 
the Ministry of Revolutionary Development’s central academy in Vung Tau in May 
1966 and even though the director of the RD cadre school was a former Viet Minh 
battalion commander who rallied to the GVN cause, these teams never achieved the 
effectiveness of their communist counterparts.86   
In early 1968, twenty-one RD teams operated in Thua Thien province, but due to 
the poor security situation, most of these could not remain in their assigned villages at 
night despite the fact that each team contained over thirty armed members.87  In spite of 
such vigorous combat operations as Carentan I & II undertaken by U.S. units in Thua 
Thien immediately after the Tet offensive, during April 1968 the Thua Thien provincial 
senior advisor still reported that “the large number of hostile forces [were] exercising 
 
85. Hq., 5-46 Infantry, “5-46 IN pacification Guide,” B-2. 
86. Hq., Department of the Army, Handbook for Military Support of 
Pacification, 4.  See also Tho, Pacification, 162.  Tho asserts that the pacification czar in 
charge of the RD program, Major General Nguyen Duc Thang “was the perfect match 
for his new U.S. counterpart, Ambassador Robert Komer, and equally positive leader 
and hard-driver …. But all these outward manifestations betrayed an obsessive 
preoccupation with appearances which led to the tendency of substituting statistical 
results for true achievements.”   
87. See Monthly Province and District Reports for Advisory Group 18, March to 
June 1968.  Although there were exceptions during this period, the overwhelming 
majority of RD teams were withdrawn from villages and those that were re-inserted 
normally could not remain during hours of darkness due to poor security. 
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almost absolute control over the overwhelming majority of the rural population.”88  The 
GVN was powerless to either gain rural legitimacy through reform, or at the very least, 
deprive the communists of their critical sanctuaries until these hostile forces could be 
ejected from the hamlets of Thua Thien. 
The theoretical responsibility for tactical planning and execution of any 
pacification campaign plan rested with the province chief even though these tasks 
usually exceeded the resources available to him.  Aside from material and jurisdiction 
problems, most province chiefs also lacked the expertise to lead and plan effective 
counterinsurgent operations.  As one GVN officer later acknowledged, “officers did not 
always possess a thorough understanding of the pacification concept and its programs.  
As a result, most of the planning was initiated and undertaken by the U.S. side.”89  
Ironically, most U.S. officers had little formal education in pacification operations or 
coordinating the multi-agency pacification effort other than what could be gained during 
experience serving in Vietnam.  
The American advisory effort existed through two parallel organizations, with 
purely military advisors attached to regular ARVN formations from battalion through 
division levels and separate, civilian-military teams operating in the districts and 
provinces.  The officers attached to ARVN units were only indirectly involved in the 
pacification effort when their parent units were assigned direct pacification support 
missions.  As the Handbook for Military Support of Pacification stated, “by exercising 
its influence through advisory channels, MACV guides and advises the ARVN in the 
execution of that part of its mission related to the military support of pacification.”90  For 
the officers and Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) 
civilians assigned to the provincial advisory teams, on the other hand, pacification was 
their primary mission.   A 1966 MACV memo on the role of these provincial advisors 
listed their diverse responsibilities as ranging from “providing advice and support to 
 
88. Thieme, “Thua Thien Report for the Period ending 30 April 1968, dated 4 
May 1968,” p. 2, Advisory Team 18 Collection.   
89. Tho, Pacification, 86. 
90. Hq., 5-46 Infantry, Handbook for Military Support of Pacification, 31. 
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defeat outright guerrilla warfare” in some provinces to “coordinating, directing, and 
supporting numerous civilian development projects, and assisting district and province 
staffs in civil administration” in others.91   
Advisory Team 18 served as the U.S. provincial advisory effort in Thua Thien 
province, deploying eight teams to assist in the pacification of the various districts and a 
large civilian administration advisory effort in Hue.92  Each district team consisted of 
two officers (slotted for a major and a captain as his assistant) and two non-
commissioned officers (a senior medic and a radio operator).  Depending on the 
insurgent environment, priority of the district, and availability of specialists, this district 
team could be augmented by low-ranking intelligence, engineering, security, or police 
advisors.93  These district teams reported to the provincial senior advisor.  Because the 
provincial advisory teams fell under CORDS purview, the provincial senior advisor 
could be a military officer or a civilian.  In cases where the senior advisor was a military 
officer, a civilian usually served as his deputy.94  For most of 1968, Colonel Thomas 
Bowen, an armor officer, served as the provincial senior officer while Earl Thieme 
served as his civilian deputy.  Both men served multiple advisory tours in Vietnam and 
Bowen later served as the senior U.S. military advisor to South Vietnamese forces 
opposing the North Vietnamese Spring Offensive as a brigadier general in 1972.  
Aside from their advisory and planning roles, provincial advisors also played an 
important role in reporting and measuring the progress or lack of progress of 
pacification.  The Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) became the primary tool for 
officials to measure pacification.  As the instructions in the beginning of a 1969 version 
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of a HES handbook reminded the evaluator; “From these data, reports are prepared by 
MACCORDS-RAD [Military Advisory Command, CORDS – Reports and Analysis 
Division] and forwarded to the highest level of government …. It is essential, therefore, 
that the processing of the components of the HES reports be accomplished reliably and 
expeditiously.”95   
The HES attempted to take the ‘feel’ out of assessing pacification progress by 
asking specific, uniform questions of the district advisors throughout South Vietnam 
about the security and development of their villages and hamlets.  The 1969 version of 
the survey contained fifty-eight questions divided into twelve sections ranging from 
“Enemy Presence” to “Education” and “Land Tenure” for each village and a similar 
number and scope of questions for the lower, hamlet level.96  These questions were 
general enough to be applied throughout the country and forced the evaluator to answer 
in one of several multiple choice answers that encompassed a wide range of possible 
situations, or allowed the evaluator to acknowledge that he had insufficient information 
to answer accurately.97  At the end of each evaluation, the district advisor also noted 
where his information came from and if his evaluation agreed with that of his superior.   
As a May 1968 study of Hamlet Evaluation System reliability found, the overall 
validity of quantifying pacification was “impossible to prove.”  However, this study did 
find that the inputs – the answers to the questions posed in the HES surveys themselves-- 
were reliably reported and that “HES, as a total system, is basically sound as a reporting 
device for the entire country and for political divisions down to the district level.”98  The 
study further concluded that “HES is a reasonably reliable method of estimating security 
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trends” even though the “reliability of the development factors is less clear.”99  At the 
individual hamlet level, however, the system proved less reliable due to individual 
reporting discrepancies even though “the evidence indicates that advisors are not 
inflating their ratings.”100  
Aside from the fundamental and ultimately unanswerable question of the validity 
of attempting to quantify pacification, the other main objection to the HES ratings arose 
from the difficulty in visiting all of the villages and hamlets in a particular district.  
Some officers doubted that “even if all the time available were devoted to visits … no 
one could possibly cover all the villages and hamlets of a district in a single month.”101  
The sizes and administrative divisions within a district clearly impacted the detail of 
each observation and the frequency of each visit and this was often independent of 
population.  For example, in Thua Thien province, Phu Vang district contained seventy-
one thousand people spread among only five villages and twenty-two hamlets, while Phu 
Loc district contained sixty-one thousand people in eight villages and eighty-three 
hamlets.  In contrast, the remote Nam Hoa district contained only six thousand 
inhabitants but fourteen widely-scattered villages and twenty-nine hamlets.102   
Despite these limitations, the Hamlet Evaluation System survey appears in 
hindsight to be a useful tool in measuring pacification progress when taken in 
conjunction with anecdotal evidence provided from other sources.  As the narrative 
examples taken from the provincial advisors will indicate, these men did not usually shy 
away from giving their unvarnished observations.  Still, even if the HES data indicated 
an area of “B-rated” villages (or generally adequate security and development) and 
observer accounts did not specifically mention an area, its relatively secure status should 
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be doubted if the combat log reports several ambushes, or the CORDS police log records 
acts of VC terror.  Therefore HES data, observer narratives, and operational indicators 
such as the type of combat operations undertaken or not required in a particular area give 
a good indication of just how pacified an area was at any time.  
 
“The 1968 Provincial RD Plan was lying in the rubble of Hue city:” 
A Prologue to the Pacification of Thua Thien 
 Advisory team reports from the months immediately before January 1968 gave a 
steady stream of GVN progress in combating the VC and showed no sign of the 
impending communist offensive.103   The observations filed when normal reporting 
resumed in late March 1968 give a different account of the pacification task that lay 
ahead for Thua Thien province.  Before the offensive, most VC activity was confined to 
the countryside and outside of Hue city.  The CORDS pacification report stated bleakly 
that “The 1968 Provincial RD Plan was lying in the rubble of Hue city” and that after the 
city center was alternately occupied by the VC and then destroyed in the fighting to eject 
them “one out of every two inhabitants of Hue has become a refugee.”104  In March 1968 
the deputy senior provincial advisor assessed that twenty-two enemy main force 
battalions were operating in Thua Thien and that “at night, the enemy can move freely 
and harass or launch limited attacks at their choosing” despite the 101st Airborne 
Division sweeps targeted on main force units that “have forced the enemy to break down 
into smaller, constantly moving units.”105  Earl Thieme went on to forecast that “unless 
exceptional measures are taken, the rice crop would well be lost to the enemy when the 
harvest starts in late April.”106  Protecting this rice harvest and not any revolutionary 
 
103. See “Monthly Public Safety Field Force Report for November 1967, dated 4 
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pacification plan generated by a cabal of visionary officers would drive the 101st 
Airborne Division’s initial involvement in population security operations. 
 In the outlying districts, the 1968 Tet offensive produced diverse effects.  In 
Quang Dien, the district advisor reported that “all villages along [Highway 1] are under 
GVN control and are reasonably secure, except during the hours of darkness.”107  
Perhaps the best single analysis of the effects of the Tet combat on pacification came 
from the Huong Tra district advisor.  Once he could regain access to his sector, Major 
Jack E. Walker reported that “the 1967 Rural Development Area was almost completely 
destroyed due to friendly bombing and artillery.  The area was overcome by a large 
NVA troop concentration and was used as a staging area in the Hue attack.”  Not to be 
outdone, the communists also applied their own version of violence to the citizenry 
when “prior to the departure of the NVA, many civilian officials, PF and other persons 
actively supporting the GVN were killed.”  The district advisor recorded dryly that “this 
could have seriously hampered the effort to win these people wholly to GVN.  The 
friendly bombing could not have had a dissimilar effect, even though its purpose was 
purely military, in that the NVA had to be dislodged.”108   
As for the future, Major Walker believed that “these conditions have left the 
people of this area in a questionable status of pacification.  The most adequate 
description would have to be that the people are in a state of flux, supporting no one 
government fully but rather living a day-to-day personal existence.”  The eviction of the 
NVA still did not solve the problem because “even though RF and PF troops have been 
re-inserted, they can not provide the degree of security required to allay all popular fears 
of the return of the NVA for a second Hue offensive.”  Finally, to illustrate the uneven 
effect of the offensive, the district advisor stated that “other areas of the district which 
were to be included within the 1968 RD plan have not been so seriously affected.”109 
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 The inadequacy of rural security and destruction caused by the Tet combat 
weighed heavily on the populace as evidenced by other district advisor reports.   Major 
James E. Davis, the Huong Thuy district advisor, reported that “the enemy maintains the 
capability of attacking the majority of hamlets in this district at a time of his choosing” 
and that “4342 homes [were] damaged during battle.”110  Additionally, “three of the four 
New Life Hamlets selected for the 1968 program are now controlled by the NVA/VC.  
The fourth has two VC squads permanently assigned.”  Overall, Davis discovered that 
“of the ten New Life Hamlets in the 1967 program, three hamlets are NVA/VC 
controlled and the remainder are contested.”111 
For the future, Major Davis cautioned that ”the decreased security in many of the 
hamlets detracts considerably from the pacification effort … [because] the people in this 
district are aware of the threat of a second offensive and are therefore guarded in their 
acceptance of civic action and pacification projects proposed by Free World Forces 
operating in the district.”  In most areas, communist takeover meant a death-sentence for 
any village leader or active supporter of the GVN and on the other hand, as one advisor 
reported “the citizens of this district continue to suffer bodily injury, death and property 
damage caused by combat activities of RVNAF [Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces] 
and FWF [Free World Forces].”112  When caught between U.S. firepower and 
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communist assassination squads, the existence of the Vietnamese villager was both 
tenuous and tragic.  For most villagers in this environment, the appeal of ideology 
certainly paled in comparison to the appeal of relative peace.  Their allegiances would 





“IF WE’D HAD DONE MORE THAN THAT EARLIER IT COULD HAVE 
BEEN DIFFERENT”: 
THE 101st AIRBORNE DISCOVERS PACIFICATION,  
MAY 1968 – DECEMBER 1969   
 
 
 The Tet offensive placed most Viet Cong (VC) Infrastructure and local force 
units in Thua Thien province in a precarious position.  On one hand, the communists 
demonstrated considerable capability and delivered significant psychological shock by 
occupying portions of the provincial capital and several district headquarters.  On the 
other, their forces and administrators operated openly and attempted to retain significant 
portions of territory conventionally for the first time in the lowlands in the face of a 
powerful American force.  Although the 101st Airborne Division’s intelligence section 
estimated enemy strength as approximately seven thousand strong in March 1968, 
during Operations Carentan I & II, the division inflicted devastating casualties on the 
communist units.113  This heavy fighting first stemmed communist momentum and then 
pounded their forces into full-scale retreat during the first five months of 1968 as VC 
and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) units attempted unsuccessfully to hold their gains 
in the lowlands. 
The outcome of the 101st’s operations differed only in scale to previous actions 
elsewhere in Vietnam that occasionally led to premature predictions of the demise of the 
Viet Cong.  These predictions, usually based on inflated body counts, a favorable kill 
ratio, material captured or destroyed, and the enemy leaving the battlefield, almost 
always failed to come true as a shadowy and resolute insurgency returned as soon as the 
U.S. units involved in the latest big sweep moved on the next hot spot.  In May 1968, the 
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U.S. and South Vietnamese forces once again gained the opportunity to pacify the 
countryside as surviving NVA units retreated to their sanctuaries and the VC attempted 
to melt away and regroup in the lowlands under intense pressure from U.S. and Army of 
the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) battalions.  Unlike earlier actions in other locations, 
though, the 101st Airborne Division’s nine-month Operation Nevada Eagle (May 1968 – 
February 1969) proved a remarkably successful and flexible exploitation of the enemy’s 
overextension during the Tet offensive.  Similarly, the three divisional operations that 
followed Nevada Eagle from February 1969 to December 1969 consolidated these gains 
and made the still-evolving U.S. policy of Vietnamization possible in Thua Thien 
province.  The tactics and techniques devised and refined during Nevada Eagle did not 
prove universally effective or applicable even within Thua Thien province, but overall 
they proved adaptable and more than adequate to provide the province’s citizens the 
essential first step in pacification – security from enemy forces.    
 
“Thus far little had been accomplished by the division in the pacification field”: 
The Transformation of Operation Nevada Eagle 
 In this statement, the 1-501st  Infantry’s commander, Lieutenant Colonel Jim I. 
Hunt, referred to the period before 5 June 1968, when the last sizeable enemy 
concentrations broke contact after sustaining significant losses north and east of Hue.114  
Before this time, units of the 101st Airborne Division maintained almost constant contact 
with organized enemy battalions and had little opportunity or incentive for pacification 
operations.  After crushing this last pocket of conventional resistance, the 101st Airborne 
accomplished the first goal of Operation Nevada Eagle, “to clear the lowlands of NVA 
units,” and took its first tentative steps in dedicated pacification operations.115  
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 The 101st Airborne Division began Nevada Eagle on 17 May 1968 with the 
primary mission of locating enemy base areas and interdicting his lines of infiltration, 
secondarily protecting “vital GVN lines of communication and population centers,” and 
only lastly “ferreting out and destroying the enemy infrastructure in the lowlands” and 
“promoting the overall GVN pacification plan.”116  At the outset, then, Nevada Eagle did 
not represent a significant philosophical shift in U.S. counter-insurgency practices.  The 
division’s order of priorities, find and destroy enemy main forces, protect major cities, 
and only then attack enemy infrastructure and assist pacification, did not differ 
substantially from most other previous U.S. operations.  In practice, however, the 
enemy’s main force units and larger local force units remained elusive and mostly 
hidden in their sanctuaries in Laos and the A Shau Valley.  Therefore, during June and 
July 1968, the 101st fulfilled the first two priorities with moderately decreasing losses 
and significantly decreasing enemy contact.  Battalions continued to conduct near-
constant Reconnaissance in Force (RIF) missions that one company commander 
characterized as “literally walking out … and looking for bad guys” with little detailed 
intelligence, but these operations began to run into more booby traps and fewer 
organized communist units.117 
 Communist losses from stiffer-than-expected U.S. and GVN resistance to their 
Tet offensive enabled the 101st Airborne Division to truly concentrate on pacification for 
the first time, yet the division’s initiatives evolved over time based on conditions, 
opportunities, and emerging capabilities, instead of shifting rapidly based on planning 
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and theory.  Organizational inertia certainly played some small part in this gradual 
change, as did the much larger determination to avoid a second Tet offensive and 
damage to Hue.  Early on in Nevada Eagle, these factors kept most battalions scouring 
the lowlands and mountains for large enemy units either unable or unwilling to confront 
the 101st Airborne units.  When a second offensive did not appear in June or July 1968 
as predicted, most leaders and units in the 101st Airborne soon displayed remarkable 
initiative and creativity in developing techniques to execute pacification. 
 The 101st Airborne Division’s initial pacification efforts evolved because of rice 
denial operations and the command emphasis on working with and developing GVN 
forces.  Although NVA and VC main force units withdrew to their sanctuaries and local 
force units broke into squad and smaller sized elements, officers throughout the division 
realized that “a sizeable and well organized VC infrastructure still operated” in the 
province that thwarted GVN political control and constituted a logistic and 
psychological support base for the communist armed forces.118  With enemy contacts on 
the wane, the division concentrated on stopping the essential flow of rice from the 
lowlands to the sanctuaries.  Or, as the 2nd Brigade after action report stated, “by 3 June, 
the remaining NVA managed to slip out of the [area of operations] and into the 
mountains, leaving behind the VC units and the guerrillas….  Accordingly, the 2d 
Brigade adjusted its modus operandi by conducting daily combined operations with 
RF/PF forces.”119 
 Rice denial operations, as the 101st Airborne’s orders termed them, essentially 
changed the object of the division’s endless RIF patrols from contact with enemy forces 
to locating enemy rice caches and VC rice taxation and transport parties.  As the 2nd 
Brigade’s after action review summarized, “Brigade units conducted daily sweeps within 
the respective AO’s, searching suspected locations for enemy rice caches….  At the 
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same time the presence of the units throughout the rice producing lowlands served as a 
protection for the local villages, thus preventing VC from levying taxes to be paid with 
harvested rice.”120  Units confiscated large caches of rice that did not belong to villagers 
for redistribution by the provincial government, or alternately secured those stores of 
rice that did belong to the village and coordinated for their transport to centralized GVN 
storage facilities.  Initially, units conducted operations narrowly directed against the 
enemy and his logistics, population security coming as a by-product and not and 
objective of the constant daytime patrolling and nighttime ambushes.  For example, in 
the initial phases of Nevada Eagle, the 2nd Brigade intelligence section did not care as 
much about the nature of the VC Infrastructure in its area of operations as it did such 
questions as “where and how does the enemy obtain rice?  What are his routes into and 
out of the rice producing and storage areas?  Does he purchase the rice, take it by force, 
or both?  Where does he store the rice he obtains?” 121 
 While rice denial operations indirectly attacked the VC Infrastructure, they led 
directly to two important developments that later opened the door to actions more 
directly contributing to pacification.  Firstly, the constant small-unit saturation patrolling 
kept the VC or NVA from organizing any unit larger than a squad and essentially 
separated the communist political organization remaining in the lowlands from the 
military forces withdrawn to the sanctuaries.  Although the VC infrastructure retained 
some control through terror tactics and for the time being kept the ability to elude the 
still-ineffective intelligence organs of the U.S. forces and GVN, they clearly stood on the 
defensive and unable to provide material support for sustained military action.  
Secondly, as one U.S. battalion commander recalled, U.S. and South Vietnamese Army 
(ARVN) units “developed close working relationships during this combat against main 
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force units” and the rice denial operations extended this working relationship to the 
fledgling Regional Forces (RF) companies and Popular Forces (PF) platoons.122   
 Working with South Vietnamese forces contributed significantly to prospects for 
pacification and became the fundamental objective of the new division commander, 
Major General Melvin Zais, who took over from Major General Olinto Barsanti in July 
1968.  Within a week of taking command, one of Zais’ first directives concerned the 
integration of all forces available to fight the enemy.  His “fundamentals” of division 
operations included the co-location of 101st Airborne battalion command posts with 
corresponding district headquarters and the integration of U.S. advisors into the tactical 
command group in order to gain his knowledge of the enemy, the terrain, and the 
friendly capabilities.  Furthermore, Zais stressed the integration of RF companies with 
U.S. battalions and acknowledged that “although it is frequently necessary for the US 
commander to have to provide the spark to ignite the successful joint operation, RF – PF 
personnel should receive the same consideration as US personnel.”123 
 The Regional and Popular Forces would play a vital role in the upcoming 
pacification campaign in Thua Thien province because, as one commander remarked, the 
RF and PF had “certain inherent skills and acquired knowledge which the US trooper 
[could] not duplicate.”124  Notwithstanding the official line, more than a few U.S. 
officers and soldiers viewed the territorial forces (as the RF and PF were collectively 
known) as simply “not effective at all,” or worse due to their many conventional 
weaknesses in comparison to American rifle companies and platoons.125  In conventional 
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terms, these assessments probably did not miss the mark.  A 101st Airborne infantry 
company consisted of just over one hundred men, lavishly equipped, extravagantly 
supported, well-educated and professional, and only tied to the war in Vietnam for a 
year.  In contrast, as a case study of one combined operation explained, “The individual 
RF/PF is a product of the village and hamlets of rural Vietnam….  Consequently, 
individual and unit discipline is not as highly developed as in a U.S. unit.”  Tactically, 
“fire discipline is generally poor – the RF/PF reconnoiters by fire when and where the 
mood strikes him, his rucksack becomes a home for stray chickens, small pigs, rice, or 
other items he passes.” Finally, the case study highlighted perhaps the largest gulf 
between the aggressive one-year warriors from the 101st Airborne and the soldier-
civilians of the territorial forces usually fighting in their own hamlets, sometimes against 
their own neighbors. “He [the RF/PF] is not by nature and training a ‘hard charger’ who 
tenaciously presses to overcome all obstacles to the accomplishment of his mission…. 
Especially on initial combined operations, the size, firepower, and boisterousness of the 
average trooper inhibit RF/PF aggressiveness and incline him to let his U.S. partners 
lead the way.”126   
Obviously, the most ideological and opportunistic villagers served in either the 
VC or sometimes rose through the ranks of the ARVN, leaving the territorial forces with 
a much weaker pool of potential leaders.  As one U.S. company commander recalled, 
after some initial apprehension, he “began to look at [working with the RF/PF] as a very 
good experience.  When they left us, they were a pretty good unit, and the biggest thing 
that [I was] working with was not the soldiers.  It was the leadership.  The soldiers 
would do anything that their leadership would tell them to do.  And the problem was that 
their leadership was not that strong.”127   
 Allowing for these constraints, the RF and PF did offer some capabilities sorely 
needed by U.S. forces operating in the lowland villages.  When operating in vicinity of 
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their native villages, the territorials gave integrated U.S. forces an improved 
understanding of the geography of the region equal to the VC.  Most importantly, 
though, “they are intimately acquainted with the people and their patterns of activity,” a 
skill that became increasingly just as valuable as the vaunted firepower, mobility, and 
aggressiveness of the American infantry companies when combating the VC 
Infrastructure (VCI) and retaining control of areas cleared of communist local force 
units.128  In fact, the after action review of the 101st’s first successful pacification 
campaign in Thua Thien found “a key component in digging out these locally based, 
deep-rooted, and elusive VC elements, and in establishing a permanent GVN presence to 
deter their return, was the effective utilization and exploitation of the potential of the 
RF/PF in all operations.”129 
  
“The most bitter and difficult stage we ever had”: 
Pacification Begins in Quang Dien District 
 Quang Dien district, located immediately to the north and west of Hue, harbored 
a VC Infrastructure that in late summer 1968, U.S. officers assessed as “solidly 
entrenched with key district personnel having operated against the French and GVN 
since 1945.” 130  Although the 2nd Brigade’s 1-502nd Infantry killed and captured over 
five hundred NVA in a cordon there in late April, the U.S. and GVN still had a long way 
to go to gain control of an area in which the communists controlled over 95 percent of 
the district following in the Tet offensive. 131  However, when the 1-502nd Infantry 
located their headquarters with the district headquarters in May 1968, Quang Dien 
district became the test bed for long-term, combined pacification operations in the 101st 
Airborne Division. 
 
128. Hq. 101st Airborne Division, “Pacification of Quang Dien District: An 
Integrated Campaign,” pp. 3-4 
129. Ibid., p. 2. 
130. Ibid., pp. 4-5. 
131. Ibid., p. 2. 
  
51
 Initially, VC strong resistance in the district kept the U.S. and RF/PF forces in 
their long-standing relationship of Vietnamese dependency.  Territorial forces could not 
be trusted to stand up to determined VC attacks or aggressively pursue smaller bands of 
insurgents.  In June 1968, the U.S. district advisor reported that “ARVN/US combined 
forces have had almost daily, but light contact w/ VC elements of platoon size and 
smaller… [and] the only day and night GVN controlled areas are the villages and 
hamlets physically occupied by GVN troops.”132  In this environment, the territorial 
forces usually spent their nights defending their garrisons and their days integrated as 
squads within American infantry companies conducting reconnaissance missions.  The 
daytime missions occasionally turned up caches and found booby traps, but kept up 
pressure on the VC attempting to retain control of Quang Dien and slowly built 
confidence and capability in the RF and PF. 
 At night, the territorial forces defended their villages while the 1-502nd Infantry 
(an infantry battalion with four rifle companies and a reconnaissance platoon) conducted 
between thirty and sixty ambushes a night along infiltration routes.  Over time, 
numerous squad (eight man) and fire team (four man) night ambushes employed by the 
1-502nd became the staple small unit action of the 101st Airborne Division’s pacification 
operations in the lowlands.  When the communists proved unable to field units large 
enough to overwhelm, or savvy enough to evade these small ambush parties, they 
gradually lost the ability to support, communicate, and draw supplies from the VCI in 
the villages. Even though at this stage the Americans lacked detailed intelligence on the 
VCI in Quang Dien, the saturation ambushes produced results because “District 
Committees are the action level of the VCI, where broad directives are formed into plans 
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of action for implementation, and hence are the most critical level of the infrastructure 
organization.  The requirement for frequent contacts with the populace into the lowlands 
makes the district level cadre vulnerable to neutralization.”133  When most of the civilian 
population adhered to curfew, or simply followed the rural norm of staying in their 
villages at night, the all-important VC cadre (men or women) became a much more 
easily identifiable target as they traversed the district at night. 
 As these operations increased RF/PF proficiency and decreased VC capabilities, 
the territorial forces took on more responsibility for securing their district.  At first, the 
Vietnamese conducted strictly combined operations with U.S. forces, but integrated at 
the platoon and company levels instead of the squad and individual level as their leaders 
gained competence and confidence.  Later, operational restrictions thrust small RF/PF 
forces into a more offensive role, since each 101st Airborne Division infantry battalion 
normally received only one UH-1 logistics re-supply helicopter per day.  Each of these 
helicopters could usually carry only six of the heavier U.S. soldiers, but up to ten smaller 
Vietnamese soldiers and as one officer recalled “greater surprise could normally be 
achieved when that force made the combat assault….[and] an officer from the district 
advisory detachment with a radio … remained with them throughout the operation.” 134  
In a reversal from previous experience, the Vietnamese units made the helicopter assault 
and sweep while the American infantry waited in blocking positions. 
 The American and Vietnamese staffs also integrated at a low level throughout the 
operation.  The 1-502nd commander located his headquarters with the district 
headquarters and his staff (to include the U.S. advisory team), a move which initially 
produced practical results in shorter planning cycles and better integration, but after 
several months of close and informal contact resulted in “the staffs [seeming] to be 
members of the same group and US and RF/PF forces [coming] to be regarded as a 
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single force.”135  Importantly, the 1-502nd viewed the Vietnamese as equal and not junior 
partners, with important implications for the usual command arrangement at the 
battalion level.  Operations were planned nightly by a group that included the U.S. 
battalion commander, South Vietnamese district chief, the U.S. advisor, and their staffs.  
Although the Americans had the best planning capabilities and resources for execution 
against armed threats, the district chief had a much better understanding of the political 
situation and requirements, which proved increasingly important as the fight turned to 
operations against the VCI.  Eventually, this exposure enabled the district staff to 
develop similar competence and confidence as their units in the field. 
 A captured VC document revealed that the enemy detected a change in tactics as 
well:  “We used to say that they go sweeping … [but] it has never been like this that the 
US troops are very patient in searching underground bunkers …[and] this has caused 
many casualties for us and also many ralliers [to the GVN].  Most of the village military 
action cadres have been killed.”  The letter went on to describe the problems that the 
constant saturation patrolling caused in communicating with various village cadres.  
“We could not go into the hamlet to get in touch with our men because the enemy has a 
very effective control and checking system.  If we ask our men to go out of the hamlet to 
a certain location to meet us, they would be afraid and scared to come out.”  The VC 
cadre further elaborated, “Most of the village military action cadres have been killed and 
no one is left to carry out the military action program.  Even if there were some left, it 
would do no good now.”  The author concluded that “this is the most bitter, and difficult 
stage we ever had in Quang Dien.”136   
Indeed, at the time that this document’s author was killed in an ambush on 12 
October 1968, the U.S. strength in Quang Dien district consisted of one platoon and, as 
the case study concludes “a major goal was achieved:  although airborne forces were 
nearby and available if needed, security throughout the district was provided by the 
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RF/PF – who the people knew would remain permanently and would not be deployed to 
another area.”137  The next month’s district advisor report revealed continued momentum 
in Quang Dien with no VC-initiated incidents for the month and a measured increase in 
villager confidence in the GVN after the elimination of a key VC cadre. While the 1-
502nd Infantry’s platoons conducted operations outside the district, twenty-four 
independent RF/PF operations resulted in thirteen VC killed, eleven captured, and no 
friendly casualties. 138 
 
“An analysis of past operations”: 
A Breakthrough in Vinh Loc District 
 The 101st Airborne Division began the unnamed operation in Quang Dien in May 
1968, but did not undertake another major, dedicated pacification mission until 1-501st 
Infantry led the recapture of Vinh Loc on 10 September 1968.  Between those two 
events, “the [101st Airborne] Division continued to operate with the major portion of two 
brigades operating in the populated coastal plains, and one brigade conducting 
operations in the mountainous jungle area, searching out and destroying enemy base and 
staging areas.”139 
Between May and September 1968, the five to seven 101st Airborne Division 
infantry battalions operating in the lowlands conducted several short-duration, one- and 
two-day cordon operations normally directed against reported and suspected VC forces 
occupying villages.  These actions superficially resembled the combined 1-502nd 
Infantry/territorial forces operations in Quang Dien, but they lacked the permanence and 
familiarity that proved essential to success in Quang Dien.  U.S. units hastily combined 
with unfamiliar ARVN, RF/PF, and NPFF units for successful, though not lasting 
operations.  American and ARVN units remained constantly on the move, stamping out 
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organized VC resistance, while RF and PF units lacked the numbers and competence to 
retain control of newly-secured territory. As the writers of the Quang Dien case study 
duly acknowledged, “it is realized that the particular set of fortuitous conditions which 
existed and were exploited in Quang Dien District may not all pertain in other 
districts.”140  Still, these operations were not ultimately futile as the VC remained off-
balance and regrouping during the summer.  More importantly, though, during these 
“numerous small scale operations … the vital techniques of coordinating the efforts of 
all cooperating elements were refined.”141 
 When the 101st Airborne Division’s tactical boundary moved east on 3 
September 1968 to take over all of the Vinh Loc district formerly patrolled by U.S. 
Marines, a new opportunity emerged for employing a new pacification technique.  “For 
years Vinh Loc district had been a base of support for the Viet Cong and the 
infrastructure was firmly entrenched and very influential,” as the 101st Airborne 
Division’s account of the operation stated.142  The U.S. command long recognized the 
twenty-five kilometer long, three kilometer wide island east of Hue as a sanctuary for 
VC main forces fleeing from Hue.  In fact, when the VC moved in during June and July, 
nearly half of the island’s 50,000 residents fled.  A Marine battalion sent to clear the 
island in response met no resistance in a three-day operation in early August. Later, this 
same estimated VC battalion fought three RF companies to a standstill in early 
September, forcing the territorial forces to take refuge in their fortified compounds and 
call for American gunship support. 143   
 The “soft cordon” evolved as another effective pacification technique.  The 
particular set of geographic and enemy circumstances in Vinh Loc gave the 101st 
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Airborne Division a chance to use a large-scale, combined, long-duration “soft cordon” 
for the first time and, at the province chief’s instance, Vinh Loc became the first 
significant test.144  The “soft cordon” differed from earlier cordons in that destruction of 
trapped VC by firepower was not the primary objective of the encircling force.  Instead, 
as an official description explained, “in [soft cordon operations] emphasis was placed on 
coordination with and use of GVN forces, surprise, isolation of the battlefield, minimum 
destruction of civilian property by prepatory fires, and population control.”145  Such 
restraints on the employment of firepower as the first and last answers to all tactical 
problems percolated throughout the 101st Airborne Division since the start of Nevada 
Eagle, but by the time of Vinh Loc in September 1968 they appeared to be more practice 
than mere official policy laid out in memorandums.146  
 When preparing for the operation, the 1-501st Infantry’s commander, Lieutenant 
Colonel Jim I. Hunt recalled that combined American and Vietnamese planning ruled the 
day and that “there were no definite lines of command established with a U.S. 
commander having authority over the Republic’s forces or vice versa.”147  Thus, “the 
plan to cordon the area, conduct a sweep, and then return over the same area conducting 
a deliberate search, came out of detailed planning by the Province Chief, District Chief, 
ARVN Commanders, and the Commanders of the Division units participating in the 
operation.”148  Ultimately, the 2nd Brigade commander oversaw this combined operation, 
and his staff consisted of the deputy province chief, Vinh Loc district chief, U.S. deputy 
district advisor, and the 1-501st Infantry battalion commander.  The initial assault force 
 
144. Hunt, “Pacification of Thua Thien Province,” p. 24. 
145. Hq., 101st Infantry Division, “Combat After Action Report, Operation 
Nevada Eagle, 17 May 1968 to 28 February 1969; dated 19 April 1969,” p. 17. 
146. Olinto Barsanti, “Combat Note #10, Combat in Populated Areas, dated 30 
May 1968,” single page, Box 1, Command Reports, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, 101st 
Airborne Division, RG 472, NARA II. “To insure that tactical victories are not tempered 
by propaganda losses I desire that all commanders instruct subordinate leaders on the 
restraints which pertain to combat in populated areas and insure that the reasons for 
these restraints are fully understood.” 
147. Hq., 101st Infantry Division, “Case Study; Operation Vinh Loc, 10-20 
September 1968, 101st Airborne Division,” p. 2. 
148. Hunt, “Pacification of Thua Thien Province,” p. 24. 
  
57
consisted of the U.S. infantry battalion, a reinforced ARVN infantry battalion, two RF 
companies, a PF platoon attached to every infantry company, and one hundred NPFF 
split evenly between the ARVN and 1-501st Infantry companies.  At the same time, two 
ARVN battalions of the 54th Regiment established blocking positions on the mainland 
opposite Vinh Loc Island and a combined U.S./South Vietnamese Navy riverine patrol 
group established a floating cordon around the island.149  
 As Lieutenant Colonel Hunt pointed out, “An analysis of past operations showed 
the need for an operation of long duration using all available GVN resources if we were 
to be successful in rooting out the VC infrastructure.”150  The plan called for further 
cooperation between U.S. forces, territorial forces, and GVN para-military units.  
Therefore, each U.S. rifle company contained at least one PF platoon and fifteen NPFF 
and the 1-501st commander believed placing South Vietnamese personnel “with the 
vanguard of all units … [ultimately] eliminated misunderstandings with detained 
persons.”151  Planning for population security and intelligence screening occupied more 
planning detail than the scheme of maneuver, because all involved recognized the 
requirement “to insure that they [the people of Vinh Loc] were treated in such a way to 
win their support for the GVN.”152  Similarly, the plan called for close integration of the 
offensive combat forces of the 1-501st Infantry and ARVN 54th regiment with the RF and 
PF who would assume responsibility for occupying the secured areas. 
 On 10 September 1968, the assault forces swept across the island with some 
resistance, but the VC mostly attempted to evade and blend in with the local populace.  
Even though the operation ultimately killed 154 enemy, captured 370 more (116 of 
whom were later assessed as VCI and not soldiers) with 176 weapons, resulted in 56 VC 
ralliers to the GVN, and netted 58 civilian detainees, the cost to the GVN forces, 1-501st 
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Infantry, and citizens of Vinh Loc were comparatively light.  The assaulting forces used 
only two indirect fire missions during the ten-day operation, destroying three unoccupied 
huts, and all told the 1-501st Infantry sustained two wounded, the 54th ARVN two killed 
and seven wounded, and the citizens of Vinh Loc two wounded. 153 
 To obtain these results, the Vinh Loc task force used a combination of the same 
daytime RIF patrols and nighttime saturation ambushes that proved successful in Quang 
Dien with a new twist that proved especially effective in Vinh Loc due to the fact that 
most VC operating in the area did not come from the district.  American and Vietnamese 
forces destroyed those forces which resisted and detained every military age male found 
on the island in those villages where the enemy did not resist.  By increasing the 
capability to screen and interrogate detainees in the field and by U.S. and GVN officers 
in the Combined Intelligence Center located in the rear, the Vinh Loc operation 
produced results much more rapidly than in Quang Dien. 
 Specifically, the screeners and interrogators sought to separate the VC soldiers 
from the civilians.  Those classified as soldiers then went through prisoner of war 
channels after interrogation.  With the aid of village and hamlet chiefs, intelligence 
officers and police agents separated innocent civilians – who then moved through district 
channels to secured areas – from common criminals and VCI identified from blacklists 
who then entered the provincial detention and justice systems.154  Importantly, the 
planners anticipated the mass of detainees and developed workable and innovative plans 
to handle them.  For example, taking advantage of a demoralized and disorganized 
enemy, the district intelligence officer instructed the first of approximately 200 VC 
prisoners of war flown to the Combined Intelligence Center to segregate themselves 
according to unit – commanding in a loud voice for the K4B battalion to move here, the 
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C117 company there, and the C118 company another place – which surprisingly almost 
half of them did, with the other half quickly identified by their comrades.155 
 After 20 September 1968, one ARVN battalion and D Company of the 1-501st 
Infantry remained to secure the island while the RF companies trained with them to 
secure Vinh Loc on their own.  During October 1968, the district advisor reported VC 
activity at “zero” and subsequently the 1-501st Infantry company redeployed along with 
all but one of the 54th ARVN’s companies.156  By November 1968, the security of Vinh 
Loc island rested entirely with two RF companies and eleven PF platoons and thirteen 
thousand of the Vinh Loc’s refugees returned.157  The increased capabilities to protect 
the population demonstrated on Vinh Loc eventually resulted in a greater flow of 
actionable intelligence to the increasingly-capable territorial forces and bore out the 
early success of the operation indicated by the 10-20 September 1968 VC prisoner and 
killed tallies.  As Lieutenant Colonel Hunt explained in his account of the operation, “as 
of the first of March 1969, there had been only one reported VC incident in Vinh Loc 
District since the [September 1968] operation.  Seven VC infiltrated into a village under 
the cover of darkness.  Their presence was immediately reported to the District Chief by 
members of the village.  Elements of a Regional Force company conducted an assault 
the following morning and captured all seven.”158 
 
“Yet he seems to be able to bounce back very quickly”: 
The Four Pacifications of Phu Vang 
 Following the success of the Vinh Loc operation, Major General Zais wanted to 
apply the developing pacification tactics to other locations and immediately turned 2nd 
Brigade’s attention to the most troublesome enemy area in the 101st Airborne’s sector, a 
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twenty-eight square kilometer area of rice paddies and narrow villages strung out along 
numerous canals directly east of Hue located primarily within Phu Vang district. 159  
Available intelligence indicated “the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI)… to be strong and 
deeply rooted in the area” as evidenced by the “numerous contacts with small groups of 
enemy, generally from two to five per group, throughout the area” over the preceding 
four months. 160  Practical experience with the enemy’s tenacity in Phu Vang came from 
a two-day soft cordon operation conducted in one village during early August 1968 by 
the 1-501st Infantry that killed forty-three enemy and captured twenty more.  In 
describing the stronger-than-expected enemy presence, the battalion commander 
remarked, “we didn’t anticipate the operation taking this long however, of course, we 
didn’t expect to get this many people.”161   
 Initially, the Phu Vang operation did not exactly duplicate the successes of the 
two earlier pacification actions.  The Quang Dien operation ground on for six months 
with slow and steady progress while the Vinh Loc operation produced what turned out to 
be lasting results after a short, intense soft cordon operation.  In contrast, the Phu Vang 
district provided the 101st Airborne Division with more difficult terrain, a more 
tenacious enemy, and a complex force integration problem involving Vietnamese forces 
from three districts.  Though ultimately successful, the four Phu Vang operations 
required to pacify the area showed progress in fits and starts and highlighted the 
importance of detailed para-military intelligence in regions with a stubborn VCI element 
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in addition to the now-accepted requirement for local forces to assume security of 
cleared areas. 
 Phu Vang I lasted from 27 September 1968 until 10 October 1968 and involved 
the same 1-501st Infantry battalion just involved with the successful cordon operation on 
Vinh Loc reinforced with an armored cavalry troop from the 101st Airborne’s division 
cavalry squadron.162  GVN forces involved included five RF companies from three 
districts and eight PF platoons (along with one attached Marine Corps CAP team) which 
operated with U.S. forces and one ARVN infantry battalion as part of the cordon.  A 
battalion from the 54th ARVN Infantry and squadron from the 7th ARVN Cavalry 
conducted the assault and search.  A U.S. Navy riverine patrol group, Provincial 
Reconnaissance Units, Census Grievance personnel, and one NPFF company also 
assisted the operation. 163  A simple scheme of maneuver resulted in a U-shaped cordon 
with the open end facing west and the ARVN forces moving from west to east through 
the pocket. 
 During Phu Vang I, the enemy attempted to evade detection and capture at 
almost every instance and fought only when necessary to escape the cordon.  The 
intelligence summary of the action concluded, “Many of the enemy hid, submerged in 
the numerous canals and inundated rice paddies, breathing through bamboo reeds.  At 
night they would attempt to exfiltrate and would be killed, captured, or driven back into 
the cordon by the Combined Forces.  They would spend the nights in the villages within 
the cordon, and the next day move back into their hiding places or attempt to blend in 
with the farmers in the area.…”164  Within the cordoned area, the ARVN units employed 
the same daytime search patrols and nighttime saturation ambushes proven successful 
during previous operations and accounted for the majority of the eighty-six enemy 
killed, 168 enemy and 152 weapons captured, and forty-two ralliers to the GVN 
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produced during the operation.  To accomplish these results, the 101st Airborne suffered 
nine wounded while their South Vietnamese allies sustained ten wounded and one 
killed.165 
 Although the units involved in Phu Vang I employed the same field interrogation 
and intelligence gathering techniques that succeeded in the Vinh Loc operation, they did 
not produce similarly decisive results.  During the operation, the American and South 
Vietnamese forces detained over five hundred military-aged males and employed Census 
Grievance Cadre teams native to the region with the ARVN sweep elements to aid in the 
initial screening of detained persons.166  Still, these methods did not break the insurgency 
in Phu Vang most likely because, unlike on Vinh Loc, many of the VC in Phu Vang did 
not stand out to the NPFF and Census Grievance Cadre as outsiders.  Although these and 
other locals likely knew most of the VC cadre in their areas, they also likely still doubted 
the GVN’s ability to protect them once Phu Vang I terminated and therefore many of the 
enemy remained undetected until Phu Vang III or IV (there is no record of a Phu Vang II 
ever being conducted).  A report prepared for General Zais concluded that “the 
population was not sympathetic to the enemy cause, but supported him because of 
coercion and the threat of reprisals … [and] were reluctant or refused to provide 
information and assistance to the forces of the Government of the Republic of 
Vietnam.”167  Whatever their ideological motives, at this time the villagers certainly did 
not see supporting the GVN with potentially life-endangering information as in their 
practical interests. 
 In the weeks following Phu Vang I, an increase of enemy sightings and agent 
reports indicated that the VC remained in the region and appeared to be gaining 
momentum in resurrecting their ranks despite the measures taken in the initial operation.  
Consequently, 2nd Brigade launched a very similar soft cordon operation from 25 
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October to 6 November 1968 over the same area as before.  Phu Vang III involved the 
101st Airborne’s 1-501st Infantry battalion along with the entire ARVN 54th Infantry 
regiment, seven RF companies and five PF platoons, and the now-ubiquitous NPFF, 
Census Greivance, and PRU support.  The initial scheme of maneuver changed slightly 
in hopes of surprising the enemy to be encircled.  Once in place the American and GVN 
forces employed the same search, screen, and ambush tactics now prevalent in the 101st 
Airborne Division’s operations in the lowlands.168  Despite the apparent similarity, Phu 
Vang III did include several revisions adapted from lessons learned in the previous 
operation.  Most importantly, after years of atrophy, the RF and PF began to show signs 
of strain in their continuous operations after their apparent re-discovery following Tet 
1968.  Forces designed and recruited as local defense forces spent much of the summer 
on continuous sweeps, searches, and ambushes resulting in one officer’s observation that 
“…sector forces are not as flexible as US forces, sector forces are in great demand in out 
area … and finally after about 8-10 days they seem to lose their interest and 
effectiveness.” 169  Indeed, some officers thought that the lack of adequate territorial 
forces to secure the area after Phu Vang I resulted in the rapid reconstitution of the 
enemy in the region. 170 
 In addition to an easier load for the RF and PF, Phu Vang III featured the first 
large-scale integration of the Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU) into 101st 
operations.  The PRU specialized in identifying and attacking the VCI and in the 
spectrum of anti-infrastructure organizations operated somewhere between the more 
restrained and bureaucratic NPFF and the limited oversight and accountability of the 
Phung Hoang (also known as the Phoenix Program).  Whereas the NPFF operated 
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normally in squads and platoons, the PRU operated in pairs and small teams to collect 
and act on intelligence while the NPFF focused on police work.  During Phu Vang III, 
U.S. commanders found that “Low Level agent reports on the battalion area of operation 
were at best 35% reliable” but that “the use of two-man PRU ground reconnaissance 
teams proved effective as an intelligence watch” and “provided excellent intelligence on 
the target area.”171  Additionally, the small PRU teams retained the capability to act 
rapidly on this intelligence themselves and on one occasion used information gained 
from a prisoner of war to kill the Vice Chairman of Phu Vang’s communist party and 
capture three of his aides.172 
 The pattern of events in Phu Vang III closely followed those of Phu Vang I.  
Units conducted daytime sweeps and night ambushes ultimately accounting for fifty 
enemy killed, sixty-seven captured, four ralliers, and sixty weapons captured at a cost of 
one American and four South Vietnamese killed.  Just in the last operation, the enemy 
attempted to evade capture rather than fight and were “found in the numerous canals and 
inundated rice paddies, breathing through straws or bamboo reeds.”  Also mirroring the 
last operation, “the enemy personnel would spend the nights in the villages within the 
cordon, and the next day move back into their hiding places” becoming easy targets for 
ambush patrols.173  In this case, search forces detained just under two hundred military 
age males in Phu Vang III and the 1-501st battalion commander noted that “there was a 
sharp decrease in the number of [booby traps] and mines encountered in the area 
following the first operation.174   
Despite the observation that “the enemy was completely disorganized, confused, 
and lacked leadership” during Phu Vang III, the pattern of sightings and reports indicated 
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yet another resurgence in the Phu Vang area and in December 1968, the 101st Airborne 
conducted Phu Vang IV from 11 December 1968 to 4 January 1969.175  During 
interrogations in Phu Vang III, intelligence officers learned that “insurgents believed that 
areas in which US forces operate and depart, are relatively safe for a prolonged period 
after their departure” and apparently after Phu Vang III, the enemy believed that the two 
previous operations conducted within weeks of each other gave them sufficient breathing 
room to reconstitute. 176  After three months of campaigning, during operation Phu Vang 
IV the VC finally showed signs of breaking in Phu Vang district. 
In contrast to the previous two Phu Vang operations, the enemy found during 
Phu Vang IV showed little inclination to seriously evade capture and little fighting spirit 
until cornered in their bunkers.  With an ever-decreasing population to blend in with and 
growing mistrust of those who did remain, the VC abandoned their earlier practice of 
attempting to blend in with the population and instead remained on the fringes of 
abandoned and destroyed hamlets and did not attempt to hide their weapons.  
Apparently, the daytime patrol, nighttime ambush technique finally forced a change in 
VC tactics in the district.  “In direct contrast with operation Phu Vang III,” the after 
action report submitted for Phu Vang IV declared, “enemy personnel would not spend 
the nights in the villages and the next day move back to their hiding places.”  Utterly 
demoralized and unable to either blend in with the population, hide, or mass for effective 
resistance, the VC either fought to their deaths in small groups from bunkers or 
surrendered and rapidly turned over the names and location of their comrades.  
“Contacts were frequent with body counts and IWC [Individual Weapons Captured] 
counts rising steadily throughout the operation,” the after action report summarized.  
While at the same time, those VCI taken prisoner often “revealed the names of other 
VCI in the [area of operations], plus the locations of many new bunkers,” creating new 
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leads and targets for the seventy-six Provincial Reconnaissance Unit men assigned to 
Phu Vang IV. 177 
In the end, the 1-501st Infantry battalion, 54th ARVN Infantry regiment, two RF 
companies and two PF platoons accounted for seventy-five VC killed, ninety-nine 
captured, one rallier, and sixty weapons at a cost of two killed and seven wounded.  Over 
the course of the three Phu Vang operations, the number of people living in the Phu 
Vang district steadily decreased during the period from Phu Vang I through Phu Vang 
III as they fled VC retribution and constant searches from U.S. and GVN forces.  Even 
though the enemy had been “denied the use of 297 of his personnel” over the previous 
three months the 101st Airborne’s leadership remained much more sanguine about their 
ability to stomp out the insurgency quickly with novel tactics.  “After Phu Vang III, it 
was believed that the VCI could not regain the momentum needed to support any 
offensive within this area,” the 1-501st Infantry’s commander declared at the end of Phu 
Vang IV, “yet he seems to be able to bounce back very quickly.  His ability to recruit 
VCI, and people to fill the ranks of [Local Force] VC units cannot be treated lightly.  
Constant and unyielding pressure must be placed continuously upon the enemy if we are 
to completely root out the VC Infrastructure.”178  The Phu Vang experience 
demonstrated that pacification would usually require more than a single innovative 
application of available forces to break the insurgents.  In more difficult areas, the as the 
101st learned for the first time in the Phu Vang district, lasting pacification could not be 
achieved quickly or with an economy of forces. 
 
“On paper, it seems simple”: 
An Assessment of Operation Nevada Eagle 
 Operation Nevada Eagle officially terminated on 28 February 1969 and the 101st 
Airborne Division began Operation Kentucky Jumper.  The end of Nevada Eagle 
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coincided roughly with two other events outside the world of the 101st Airborne 
Division; the end of the three-month Accelerated Pacification Campaign on 1 February 
and the passing of Tet 1969 without major incident.  On the ground, the battalions 
committed to Nevada Eagle noticed by early 1969 areas formerly requiring “Allied 
battalion and company sized operations, could now be covered by provincial forces 
supported by short range reconnaissance patrols and ambushes.”179  In upcoming 
operations, these U.S. battalions would be committed in greater numbers to hunt for 
NVA and engage units in the mountains during the 1969 summer dry season.   In the 
lowlands, no communist unit operated at larger than squad size, Hue remained free from 
VC attack, most other population centers fell under positive GVN control for the first 
time in over a year, and South Vietnamese territorial forces gained the capability to deal 
with the weakened VC for the first time ever.  Most of this can be attributed to the 
practices developed over the course of Nevada Eagle.  “There was a marked 
improvement in the civilian population’s willingness to cooperate and to assist, once the 
Division started using the soft cordon and saturation-type night ambushes,” claimed 
Lieutenant Colonel Hunt.180   
 The growing capabilities and close integration of the Vietnamese territorial 
forces and para-military organizations with 101st Airborne operations were similarly 
essential to the success of Nevada Eagle and their performance ultimately gave the 
people the confidence to provide information against the VC.  Neither factor could 
progress far ahead of the other – Vietnamese civilian confidence in security and RF and 
PF effectiveness in providing it progressed together, yet this progress varied according to 
circumstance.  Vinh Loc illustrated sudden and dramatic confidence-building, Quang 
Dien showed steady and constant progress, while Phu Vang ultimately became a test of 
endurance requiring constant assistance from the 101st Airborne Division and ARVN 1st 
Division.  
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 For the companies and platoons actually marching out of their base camps every 
day to fight the pacification campaign, two techniques predominated – the soft cordon 
and the squad night saturation ambush.  Both missions allowed the U.S. units to integrate 
with and develop the capabilities of South Vietnamese forces.  At the same time, 
cordons and ambushes allowed units to generate and act on specific intelligence 
information.  “On paper, it seems simple,” one 2-327th Infantry company commander 
with extensive experience in the lowlands remembered.  In reality, though, this officer 
classified the cordon operation as the most difficult of all his combat experiences in 
Vietnam.  Tactically, the cordon presented a nightmare of fire control with, in one 
particularly difficult example, “about six companies of people in a big circle at night and 
inside enemy units, firing out and us firing in, bullets going every which way.”181  Any 
force of the same nationality and training level would find such an operation difficult, 
but 101st Airborne Division battalions and companies executed such operations while 
training ARVN, RF, and PF units alongside them, in front of them, and integrated within 
their own units with minimal casualties and a high degree of effectiveness.  Learning on 
the job might not have been the safest route to creating an effective counter-insurgent 
force out of the RF and PF, but these initial actions integrated with U.S. units showed the 
territorials first-hand that their VC enemies could be beaten and were not invincible 
super-soldiers in black pajamas.  Most importantly, the common experience of combat 
and successfully executing difficult operations together created the ingredient of trust 
between the South Vietnamese and Americans so often missing in previous joint efforts.  
 Carrying out these difficult operations built Vietnamese confidence in themselves 
and 101st Airborne Division confidence in their Vietnamese allies.  As one company 
commander later recalled, “I worked some in the delta with ARVN divisions and had not 
been impressed with them at all, but I thought that the 1st ARVN Division was a super, 
super unit.” 182  “They fought very well with us,” remembered another of the ARVN 1st 
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Division’s 54th Infantry regiment, “they did a first rate job.”183  According to General 
Zais, the “rapport which developed between U.S. and Vietnamese commanders and 
staffs” was “one of the most significant factors which contributed to the successes 
achieved in Operation Nevada Eagle.”184 
District advisor monthly reports from the 1968-69 winter period highlight the 
change in nature of the campaign.  Colonel Thomas Bowen, still the provincial senior 
advisor, declared almost euphorically on several occasions that the struggle in Thua 
Thien moved “from tanks to tractors and from artillery to agriculture” as “economic 
factors have replaced enemy forces as the main form of planning and action.”185  The 
December report declared glowingly that “the infamous ‘Street Without Joy’ area is now 
rightly titled, ‘The Street with Some Joy’,” before finally declaring that “pacification in 
Thua Thien is not longer a distant objective but a reality.”186 
Though Colonel Bowen’s reports tended to be more optimistic than his 
subordinate district advisors, even these officers could find little but progress to report.  
The district advisors for Vinh Loc, Quang Dien, and Phu Vang observed similar 
progress.  The Phu Vang report for February 1969 claimed that the villagers enjoyed a 
freedom of movement and activity “which have not been possible for five years” and 
that the 417 independent operations conducted by RF and PF units in the district resulted 
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in one VC killed and two captured.187  The March report stated “the pacification of Phu 
Vang is almost complete with all areas safe to travel at day without weapons and secure 
enough at night to travel anywhere with minimum security.”188  In Quang Dien, no VC-
initiated incidents occurred in either February or March 1969.189  Over the same period, 
the Vinh Loc district advisor reported three VC captured, one killed, and “pacification 
throughout the entire district [as] outstanding.”190  By the end of March 1969, thirty-
eight RF companies and forty-one PF platoons operated in Thua Thien province and so 
long as the protective shield of 101st Airborne and ARVN 1st Division battalions kept the 
NVA in their sanctuaries, these territorial forces – the equivalent of more than a division 
of light infantry – consistently demonstrated the capability to keep the lowlands 
secure.191 
The conclusion of Operation Nevada Eagle demonstrates an interesting contrast 
between the initial concept and the actual actions undertaken by the 101st‘s nine infantry 
battalions over its nine month duration, pointing to the ad hoc and improvisational 
development of the effective pacification tactics.  Importantly, these developments took 
place because of – and not in spite of – a division leadership that emphasized combined 
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operations with all types of Vietnamese forces in addition to the more traditional 
American emphasis on finding and engaging large enemy units.  For three years from 
1968 through 1971, the primary mission in every 101st Airborne division-level operation 
order remained the detection and destruction of NVA and VC main force units.  Yet, 
when these opportunities did not present themselves, as during Nevada Eagle, the 
leadership and infantry units of the 101st remained flexible in their approach to 
combating the enemy and found effective methods to attack the insurgents and their 
infrastructure. 
 
“They searched men’s minds:” 
Pursuit of VCI in the Summer of 1969 
 For all of their success driving organized enemy units from the lowlands and 
bringing the most populated regions of Thua Thein under control, the soft cordon 
technique began to produce diminishing returns as VC ranks thinned.  In this 
environment, multi-company cordon operations in the lowlands gave way increasingly to 
intelligence gathering, para-military operations against the VCI, and saturation ambushes 
by 101st Airborne infantry companies living in the villages.  With life returning to a rare 
level of calm and quiet for most villages in Thua Thien, General Zais reminded his 
subordinates that they “must recognize that any cordon operation is an inconvenience for 
those innocent and loyal citizens living inside the cordon” and instructed them to take 
“positive measures” to alleviate the adverse impact of cordon operations” lest the people 
“become irritated and alienated.”192 
 South Vietnamese units and agencies led the summer-long fight against the VCI 
and many of the battalions committed recently to pacification operations in the lowlands 
necessarily changed tactics to search for and do battle with larger NVA forces hiding in 
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the mountains.  The 101st Airborne Division planned operations Kentucky Jumper (1 
March – 14 August 1969) and Richland Square (15 August – 28 September 1969) to 
direct two-thirds of the division’s infantry battalions against the five NVA regiments 
believed to be infiltrating into, or reorganizing within the mountainous western portion 
of Thua Thien.193  These actions, overwhelmingly company-sized reconnaissance in 
force missions conducted in triple canopy jungle, normally found nothing and 
occasionally encountered small trail watching parties of NVA.  On rare occasions, by 
contrast, as at the largest and most famous example on Dong Ap Bia (Hamburger Hill) 
in the A Shau Valley during May 1969, American units found substantial groups of 
NVA defending their base camps.194  After months of light or no contact, 101st battalions 
exhibited extreme aggressiveness in piling on defending NVA main force units when 
they could be found and usually extracted a great toll on the enemy, but not always in 
the most efficient cost in American casualties.  Though these NVA units represented the 
greatest threat to GVN sovereignty in the lowlands after the year-long smashing of the 
VC, the 101st Airborne Division’s operations against these forces merit attention in this 
study only in that they illustrate the flexibility required of all infantry battalions to be 
able to disperse and conduct pacification operations in the lowlands and then rapidly 
transition to conventional fire-and-maneuver battles with the NVA in the jungle 
highlands. 
 Although most of the 101st Airborne’s assets turned to engaging the NVA, at 
least three infantry battalions remained involved in pacifying the lowlands fighting 
against the insurgents and their infrastructure.  “Terrorism was rampant,” Captain David 
 
193. Hq., 101st Airborne Division, “Operation Nevada Eagle After Action Report 
Briefing Narrative, dated 1 April 1969,” p. 9. The division intelligence estimate 
concluded “at this time [April ‘69] there are elements of five NVA regiments [4th, 5th, 
9th, 90th, and  6th] in our area of operations.”   
194. Hq., 101st Airborne Division, “101st Airborne Division; Operational Reports 
– Lessons Learned; period ending 31 October, 1969,” pp. 1-9, Box 2, 101st Airborne 
Division, Operational Reports – Lessons Learned, MACV Command Historian’s 
Collection, MHI.  See Samuel Zaffiri, Hamburger Hill (Novato, CA:  Presidio Press, 
1988) for an in-depth account of the May 1969 fighting, past fights in the A Shau 
Valley, and implications of the last battle on U.S. politics and the Vietnamese battlefield. 
  
73
Bramlett who commanded C company, 2-327th Infantry in the lowlands in early 1969 
recalled, “they would just come in, drag a village official or a government sympathizer 
out and execute him….  There was that sort of intimidation through terrorism and taking 
the rice harvest.”  After taking over the area from a U.S. Marine company, his 
company’s “job was to build confidence with the local population, isolate the population 
from the NVA, and our technique was ambush, ambush, ambush.”195   
 Captain Bramlett’s account of how his company accomplished this mission gives 
one example of the decisive impact of intelligence against the insurgent infrastructure.    
Initially, Bramlett’s company operated without significant intelligence from higher 
levels, but his battalion commander encouraged his subordinates to develop his own and 
sent the company commander a two-man PRU team to assist in the effort.  “I didn’t 
know what PRU’s were but they were experts in intelligence,” Bramlett said in an 
interview fourteen years later, “they didn’t speak much English and through an 
interpreter, they told me that they searched men’s minds.” 196 
 At one point, Bramlett’s C Company went three weeks without enemy contact 
until the PRU team brought in a woman who provided the name of an important local 
VC cadre member and a time and location of his link-up with other VC cadre.  When 
one of his platoons and an attached PF element laid an ambush on the site, the seven 
cadre appeared within five minutes of the predicted time, within meters of the predicted 
place, and all died in the ambush.  “An interesting thing happened in the village [after 
the ambush]” Bramlett remembered, “The villagers saw we were serious … and [I] kept 
two platoons out ambushing and moving through out the villages….  From that point on, 
the villagers would tell me, they would come to tell me and tell me when the NVA were 
coming.  It was the most incredible experience.” 197 
 While developing and exploiting his growing intelligence network, Bramlett 
found “people very hostile to NVA.  They were tolerant, if you will, of the VC.  They 
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were their neighbors who had chosen to support the Viet Cong.”  On the other hand, “the 
NVA they had no time for.  Once they saw we had the capability to protect them and 
inflict casualties on the NVA, kill them, it was incredible.”   Bramlett’s infantry 
company compiled an “incredible record of ambushes” because C Company “lived in 
the village [and] acted on every tip, even though in many cases, some cases it was a dry 
hole” in order to retain the villagers’ confidence.  His advantage “was all intelligence” 
and allowed Captain Bramlett to retain the initiative against the enemy.  “When you pull 
the ambush, you hold all the aces,” and he explained, “I rarely had to guess.”  After 
several weeks, the company commander built a by-name list of all VC (but not NVA) in 
his area and used this list persuade family members to induce their surrender lest they 
get caught in one of his company’s ambushes.198 
 Of course, the PRU team provided the information that led to the initial VC cadre 
ambush and broke open C Company’s enviable operating environment.  Most of the 
time, the information they gained did not come cheaply.  “They were rough on 
prisoners,” Bramlett remembered of the PRU team.  “They didn’t kill them but they 
pushed them around and, again, under U.S. control I couldn’t allow that to happen.”  A 
101st Airborne Division operations order defined the PRU’s mission simply as “the 
elimination by capture, if possible, or killing, if necessary, of the VCI.”199  Bramlett 
agreed that “they were excellent at interrogation,” but he also added that “occasionally, 
when they worked with me, I had to reign their methods in.” 200 
 C/2-327th Infantry’s example of pacification certainly could be labeled unique in 
many ways.  However, many units apparently replicated the same results throughout 
Thua Thien province during Operations Kentucky Jumper and Richland Square.  In 
addition to village and hamlet elections held in March, the VC’s ability to impact the 
civil aspect of GVN pacification programs waned throughout the period from March 
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through October 1969. 201  From May through October 1969, the number of VC incidents 
recorded throughout the province steadily decreased from a high of 132 in May to a low 
of 33 in October.202  By the end of October 1969, though, even the night saturation 
ambushes began to come up dry as VC action and movement became scarce in the 
lowlands.  Despite the increasing weakness of the enemy in the lowlands, the new 
division commander, Major General John M. Wright, warned his subordinates not to 
become complacent.  In a November 1969 directive he explained that the 101st Airborne 
Division conducted 5591 separate ambushes in the preceding month apart from other 
friendly forces, of which only nineteen engaged enemy elements, resulting in twenty-six 
enemy killed and two captured. 203  During the winter 1969-1970 monsoon, most 
intelligence officers thought communist units currently reconstituting in their mountain 
sanctuaries needed to infiltrate back into the lowlands to obtain a share of the vital rice 
crop.  General Wright intended to keep “the price of rice” high during the coming 
Operation Republic Square, but needed effective execution by his infantry companies to 
do so. 204 
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“The Price of Rice”: 
Losing Momentum During Operation Republic Square 
 Instead of returning to the lowlands in force for rice during the 1969-70 winter 
monsoon season, the communists did not repeat the same infiltrations that cost them so 
dearly over the previous year.  Surveying the pattern of enemy activity from recent 
years, General Wright and his planners believed that the enemy would use cover that the 
monsoon season provided to move from their sanctuaries and re-gain a foothold in the 
lowlands in time for the rice harvest in March and April.205  The low cloud cover and 
torrential rains hampered the 101st Airborne Division’s ability to detect the enemy from 
the air, rapidly pile on reinforcements and firepower if elements found the enemy, and 
regularly re-supply isolated firebases and patrols in any circumstance.  Taking into 
account these enemy intentions and their own limitations, the division launched 
Operation Republic Square beginning 29 September 1969 to pre-empt the enemy’s 
move. 
 The 101st Airborne’s mission for Republic Square was to “provide maximum 
protection for the populated lowlands of Thua Thien Province” and in a change from the 
previous six month’s operations, “conduct operations west of the piedmont only in 
reaction to hard intelligence indicating the presence of NVA/VC units.”  In order to 
counter the enemy’s expected effort to re-energize the VC, the “primary emphasis was 
placed on providing maximum close-in security for the populated lowlands.”206  Once 
again, the primary means of accomplishing this mission on the ground would be the 
now-proven tactics of the soft cordon, nighttime small-unit saturation ambushes, and 
combined operations with Vietnamese territorial forces. 
 In the Phu Thu district, 1-327th Infantry battalion conducted Operation Saturate 
to achieve the division’s objectives set out in Republic Square.  Saturate was the 1-327th 
Infantry’s portion of the division’s plan “to establish a coordinated system of territorial 
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security; increase the level of hamlet security and development … and deny resources to 
the enemy.”207  Building on the successful model from the previous eighteen months, 
planners intended “that a company of the 101st Airborne Division will be committed to 
the general vicinity of the targeted hamlet.”  Once there, “a 101st Airborne Division 
platoon will be rotated for combined internal defense operations with the regional forces, 
NPFF [and] PF … as they became available” in addition to the 101st Airborne 
company’s own independent ambush and patrol actions.  Drawing on the experiences 
from the last summer, these officers predicted 101st Airborne “forces will be gradually 
reduced as regional forces increase in proficiency and popular forces… become 
available and are trained.” 208 
At the beginning of Saturate, the battalion’s intelligence section estimated the 
enemy’s strength at fifty to seventy-five with a mix of “NVA, VC, Local Force VC, and 
VCI.” 209  Following an unsuccessful attack on the district headquarters in July 1969 that 
left seventeen of their comrades dead, the enemy in Phu Thu settled on a pattern of 
harassing attacks, propaganda, intimidation, and booby-trapping.  During the day, these 
insurgents blended into local populace or hid in small bunkers and assembled at night in 
groups of four to eight men to conduct their harassing attacks or other actions.  The 
initial operations order warned “though the enemy forces operating in Phu Thu District 
are small in number, the are not to be underestimated in their ability ot conduct 
coordinated attacks and harassing actions on Allied units, outposts, and bases.”210 
Conducting these actions likely exposed most of these insurgents to identification by the 
local populace, yet throughout the eight weeks of Saturate, 1-327th Infantry could not 
gain enough of the villagers’ confidence or make in-roads against the insurgent 
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infrastructure to break the enemy in Phu Thu, to the detriment of pacification in the 
region. 
 At the conclusion of Saturate on 4 December 1969, 1-327th Infantry accounted 
for eight enemy killed and nine captured with no ralliers (out of an estimated fifty to 
seventy-five) at a cost of one U.S. soldier killed and thirty-one wounded.  Though they 
worked with the local RF and PF units and “conducted saturation operations, to include 
daylight patrols and night ambushes of squad and fire team size,” 1-327th Infantry never 
operated with NPFF or PRU’s and similarly never gained an intelligence foothold in the 
villages they secured.211  Unlike Captain Bramlett’s company, they always had to guess 
on ambush locations and the true identity of the villagers they encountered.   
The record of the battalion’s operations indicates that their ambush elements 
identified and engaged the enemy based primarily upon their dress, location, and 
possession of a weapon.  When the enemy chose to avoid wearing the black pajamas of 
the VC, or khaki and green uniforms of the NVA, did not carry a weapon, or followed 
normal civilian routines, they escaped detection in almost every case.  Although the 
enemy initiated only five of the fifty-six contacts during the operation, without proper 
intelligence the aggressiveness of the 101st Airborne units could not prevent the VC from 
emplacing the mines and booby traps that inflicted most of the thirty-two American 
casualties.212  At the end of Saturate, the 1-327th Infantry battalion commander asserted 
that “tight control over populated areas and likely routes of infiltration must be 
maintained if a future build up in enemy forces is to be prevented,” and concluded “this 
can be accomplished by a periodic census taking program at district level.” 213  Unless 
the census-takers learned to read men’s minds as the PRU, they were unlikely to expose 
the hardcore communist insurgents. 
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 Throughout Thua Thien province during Republic Square, falling numbers of VC 
killed, captured, and rallied indicated that other 101st Airborne Division units appeared 
to similarly lose momentum.  The lopsided communist-to-Allied loss ratios recorded 
during the summer became more even.  The entire 2nd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division 
accounted for thirty-three NVA and VC killed, two captured, and two ralliers during 
Republic Square, for a cost of six Americans killed and nineteen wounded. 214  A 2-502nd 
Infantry soft cordon in late October 1969 detained one hundred eighteen persons, seven 
of whom turned out to be VC, while two similar late-November actions by the 3-187th 
Infantry detained 735 people to capture seven more VC. 215  Overall, the 101st Airborne 
killed 254, captured sixteen, and induced three ralliers during Republic Square at a cost 
of sixteen Americans killed and eighty-six wounded. 216 
 The loss of momentum for 101st Airborne operations did not indicate a loss of the 
tremendous gains in pacification made over the eighteen months from May 1968 to 
December 1969.  The division’s after action report for Republic Square commented that 
“contact in the 1st and 2nd Brigade areas was extremely light throughout the period” and 
almost all monthly advisory team reports indicated continued progress of the civil 
pacification program by the GVN through December 1969.217  Instead, the communists 
did not intend to – or simply could not – expose themselves again in the lowlands to re-
build the VC to pre-Tet offensive levels.  General Wright’s “Price of Rice” apparently 
was too high for the NVA and VC to try again and they shifted tactics instead.  Most 
signs pointed to success in Thua Thien province, but the NVA remained an increasing 
menace and a hardened core of VC gave these NVA units the intelligence and political 
support to operate outside of their sanctuaries.  Despite the increased attention devoted 
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to the VC infrastructure in Operation Republic Square, effective tactics and sufficient 
effort only produced lasting results against this core of insurgents when supplemented by 
the vital ingredient of time.  The dramatic pacification gains of 1968 and 1969 certainly 
reversed the communist insurgency in Thua Thien, but only a steady and imaginative 
effort by the 101st Airborne and their Vietnamese allies could turn this opportunity into 
long-term stability and security. 
 
“A moment like this did not exist before”: 
Synthesis of 101st Airborne Division Pacification Efforts,  
May 1968 – December 1969 
 The 101st Airborne Division evolved effective counter-insurgency practices in 
Thua Thien province following the communist Tet offensive in 1968.  Generally five 
elements, in different amounts according to circumstances, proved essential to 
establishing security.  Firstly, the 101st Airborne Division exhibited the will and 
capability to place a constant presence in the villages and hamlets to rival that exercised 
by the insurgents.  Secondly, the division’s leadership mandated operations with, and 
training of, South Vietnamese forces for practical and political reasons to assist in 
exercising this presence.  Third, when available, good intelligence allowed units to 
efficiently exercise the continuous presence in the villages without becoming onerous or 
counter-productive.  Also, throughout these eighteen months, division personnel at all 
levels demonstrated an understanding of the political dimension of counterinsurgency, 
including the necessity to minimize damage when fighting the enemy and working 
through a muddled, often less efficient command arrangement.  These four elements 
manifested themselves to varying degrees in two simple tactics at the company level – 
the nightly saturation ambushes and frequent soft cordon operations. 
All these measures eventually built the villagers’ confidence that the U.S. and 
GVN security forces could protect them from the insurgents and that this version of 
security was better than that offered by the enemy.  Gaining the confidence of the 
villagers produced a reciprocal effect in the effectiveness of the security forces and was 
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not a hollow or mere moral victory.  Intelligence improved, territorial forces gained 
rapidly in confidence and respect, and combat more often than not gave way to police 
work in the cases where this important breakthrough occurred.   
A fifth ingredient, the flexible organization of the 101st Airborne Division’s 
infantry battalions, enabled the division to match the enemy across the spectrum of 
operations from counter-insurgency to conventional battle.  Often within days or weeks, 
the same infantry battalions that hunted individual VC cadre and provided security in the 
villages also conducted company reconnaissance in force missions to find NVA 
battalions and regiments in the jungle, or fought the conventional, firepower-intensive 
urban combat like that seen in the aftermath of Tet 1968.  To paraphrase Captain 
Bramlett, on paper the techniques of successful counter-insurgency seem easy and the 
101st Airborne Division’s experience argues against formations organized and trained 
specifically for such contingencies.  “One of the biggest things you’ll have to do is to 
limit the damage that you do at a particular level,” one company commander recalled.     
“There are times when you have to put everything that you’ve got on a particular point 
in time.  There are other times when you can do it with very light forces and accomplish 
the same thing.  And you’ve got to monitor that, especially as a company 
commander.”218  The responsibility for deciding exactly what level of violence is 
required to accomplish the mission ultimately lay with good junior leadership and not 
organization or equipment of the unit.  In this case, a good conventional combat leader 
performed just as well in counter-insurgency actions primarily because of this 
understanding. 
Despite some tactical and province-level success, the 101st Airborne Division did 
not succeed in their overall counter-insurgency operations from May 1968 to December 
1969 through “contacts by major forces or large-scale cordon operations,” a division 
report summarized.  Instead this success was won “by the less dramatic day-to-day 
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execution of a harmonious and well-integrated US/Vietnamese campaign.”219  After 
years of lost opportunities and foiled attempts, the U.S. and South Vietnam finally 
discovered a successful combination to fight the communist insurgency in Thua Thien 
province over the eighteen months from Nevada Eagle to Republic Square.  Captured 
VC documents revealed that even their long-time cadre believed with the loss of much 
of their infrastructure to successful pacification techniques “that a moment like this did 
not exist before.”220  Ultimately, the final moment belonged to the communists, but 
seven years after the fall of Saigon, at least one 101st Airborne Division company 
commander remained “convinced that if we’d had done more than that earlier it could 
have been different.”  Further admonishing his own ignorance of population security 
from his first tour in Vietnam he commented, “I didn’t realize how easy it was to seal off 
populated areas.  I would have never believed it…  You didn’t have to put a gigantic 
cordon out.  All you had to do was gamble occasionally and then react when people told 
you they were coming.”221
 
219. Hq., 101st Airborne Division, “Pacification of Quang Dien District: An 
Integrated Campaign” p. 1. 
220. Hq. 101st Airborne Division, “Operation Nevada Eagle After Action Report 
Briefing Narrative, dated 1 April 1969,” pp. 6-7. 







“THE NAME OF THE GAME FOR THUA THIEN IS CLEARLY SURVIVAL”: 
 A PACIFIED PROVINCE AT WAR, 1970 AND 1971 
 
 
 In 1970 and 1971, as pacification in Thua Thien province moved from a time of 
establishment into one of consolidation, the fulcrum of the Vietnam War moved from a 
confrontation of 101st Airborne Division infantrymen and home-grown insurgents to two 
diverging fights.  In the lowlands, territorial forces proved more than a match for 
communist guerrilla cells and what remained of the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) as 
they demonstrated decreasing need for American support.  In the highlands, the Army of 
the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) 1st Division and the 101st deployed to meet a 
redoubled effort from the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) to build strength from their 
base areas deep in the jungle. 
 The 101st Airborne’s three division-level operations conducted during these years 
reflected this transition from pacification to pacification support.  Operations Randolph 
Glen (7 September 1969 – 31 March 1970), Texas Star (1 April 1970 – 5 September 
1970), and Jefferson Glen (5 September 1970 – 8 October 1971) each demonstrated a 
steadily declining South Vietnamese need for American support in the pacification 
campaign, but an increasing requirement for help against the NVA.  Between Randolph 
Glen and Jefferson Glen, the North and South Vietnamese governments both advanced 
significant initiatives that had consequences for the way both sides fought the 
pacification campaign in Thua Thien.  Still, the 101st Airborne Division kept infantry 
battalions in direct support of pacification in two troublesome districts through most of 
1970 and even with more effective South Vietnamese government institutions in place, 
communist violence never totally withered away in most other districts.  Despite 
continuing communist pressures, 1970 and 1971 were largely years of relative security 
and stability for Thua Thien province.  However, with the NVA massing in the hills and 
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attempting to re-fire the insurgency in the lowlands, pacified Thua Thien remained a 
province at war. 
 
 
 “The enemy’s plots and schemes”: 
 The Communist Response to Pacification and Operation Randolph Glen 
 By the summer of 1969 the communist position in South Vietnam looked bleak.  
Their partial uprising during Tet in 1968 did not produce general revolution in South 
Vietnam as promised.  In fact, the effective response by their adversaries in the months 
that followed effectively gutted the Viet Cong (VC) indigenous insurgent infrastructure 
in many places in South Vietnam and left the Government of the Republic of Vietnam 
(GVN) in provinces like Thua Thien in a stronger position than before January 1968.  
From the communist perspective in late 1969, American withdrawal from Vietnam 
appeared to be more of a rhetorical device aimed at the U.S. public than an actuality on 
the ground.  By October 1969, American troop levels had been reduced by 25,000, but 
units such as the 101st Airborne Division aggressively pursued NVA units in their 
mountainous base areas with no indication of let-up, keeping them off balance and 
unable to effectively aid the insurgents in the lowlands.  Additionally, according to their 
own estimates, the communists now faced twice the number of U.S. and ARVN “mobile 
battalions” in 1969 than they did in 1968 despite the American withdrawals because of 
the effectiveness of the territorial forces in assuming “responsibility for ‘pacification’ 
and defending territory.”222 
 The official Vietnamese history of the war, first published in 1988, acknowledges 
that “when the United States and its puppets began to carry out their ‘clear and hold’ 
 
222. The Military History Institute of Vietnam, Victory in Vietnam: The Official 
History of the People’s Army of Vietnam, 1954-1975, trans. by Merle L. Pribbenow, 
foreword by William J. Duiker (Lawrence, KS:  University Press of Kansas, 2002), 247.  
“Because his local forces were able to assume a portion of the responsibility for 
‘pacification’ and defending territory, the enemy was able to increase his local and 
strategic reserve forces to more than twice their previous level.  In 1968 the puppet army 
had only 30 mobile battalions, but in 1969 this number grew to 63 battalions.” 
  
85
strategy, [communist] battlefronts were too slow in shifting over to attacking the 
‘pacification’ program and … did not concentrate … political and military forces to deal 
with the enemy’s new plots and schemes.”  As a result of the slow reaction to effective 
execution of pacification by U.S. and South Vietnamese forces, “the political and 
military struggle in the rural areas declined and [the communists’] liberated areas 
shrank….  [while] most of [their] main force troops were forced back to the border or to 
bases in the mountains.”223  Thus, in the summer of 1969, after more than a year of 
setbacks in South Vietnam at the hands of a successful pacification campaign, the 
communist leadership faced a similar decision to one that their own 1968 Tet offensive 
forced the U.S. to make – modify their goals in South Vietnam, or modify their methods 
and level of commitment.  Unlike the American response to Tet 1968, the North 
Vietnamese leadership did not waver from their goal of a unified, communist Vietnam.  
Instead, the communists increased mobilization of the population to meet manpower 
requirements for a larger army in the field and decided to extend the war until more 
favorable conditions arose on the battlefield.224  In a further dissimilarity from their 
American adversaries, North Vietnamese leaders maintained a tight control over 
information and debate within their country and the role of public opinion counted for 
little in their decision-making calculus.  The intention to eliminate any pessimistic or 
critical opinions is summarized neatly in one Hanoi directive captured by U.S. forces 
requiring that “reactionary and stubborn persons must be purged.”225  
 The Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) promulgated two major 
resolutions that U.S. forces captured regarding the operational implementation of these 
decisions to continue the struggle and change methods on the battlefield.  COSVN 
Resolution 9 was issued in July 1969 and “postulated two broad, alternate developments 
in the war and proposed strategies to deal with each possibility.”  A U.S. intelligence 
 
223. Ibid., 237-38. 
224. Ibid., 240-44. 
225. Hq., 101st Airborne Division, “Monthly Intelligence Summary for 
December 1969, dated 11 January 1970,” p. 4, Box 1, Monthly Intelligence Summaries, 
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, 101st Airborne Division, RG 472, NARA II. 
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estimate analyzed Resolution 9 as envisioning two scenarios ranging from a political 
settlement brought about by heavy U.S. casualties to a continued, reduced-strength 
American presence requiring a longer campaign.  To deal with either eventuality, the 
captured documents indicated that “the communists planned to engage in a protracted 
conflict in which they would avoid major military confrontations while causing US and 
ARVN casualties thorough small-unit tactics and attacks by fire.”226  Tactically, this plan 
transformed the local force platoons recruited from, operating in, and targeted on gaining 
control of villages into smaller guerrilla cells employing terror and sapper techniques to 
discredit GVN security gains and often composed of men from North Vietnam. 
COSVN Resolution 14, issued in October 1969, indirectly underscored the 
effectiveness of pacification programs on insurgent freedom of movement and clarified 
the role of the new NVA guerrilla cells.  Responding to the losses of insurgent cadre and 
liaison personnel killed and captured by their enemies’ night saturation patrolling, the 
NVA guerrilla cells “were to be self-sufficient in terms of supply; and where possible, 
they were to live legally among the South Vietnamese population.”  Their mission, as 
indicated in captured documents, “was to attack the PSDF and RF/PF forces, local 
police, GVN officials, and pacification cadre – the people who are the instruments of the 
GVN pacification program.”227  Thus, in the event of a political settlement, these 
economy-of-force attacks would preserve the communist position in South Vietnam by 
not risking the bulk of their forces and paving the way for increased communist political 
influence in post-settlement government.   
Most importantly, the ranks of these squads could be effectively manned and led 
by the North Vietnamese who came to dominate the VC after 1969.  The North 
Vietnamese realized that “guerrilla operations had declined” as a result of the insurgents’ 
 
226. MACV Strategic Research & Analysis Division, Directorate of Intelligence 
Production, “Estimate of VCI Activities, January to June 71, dated 7 January 1971,” p. 
2, Box 13, General Records, Office of Civil Operations for Rural Development Support, 
MR 1 Public Safety Division, Military Assistance Command Vietnam, RG 472, NARA 
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227. Ibid., p. 2. 
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losses.228  To remedy this, communist forces in the south began filling their ranks with 
northerners to the point where their official history later claimed “most of the cadre and 
soldiers of the regiments and armed operations teams operating in the lowlands were 
natives of North Vietnam” by 1970.229  By changing their basic offensive formation 
from local force platoons and companies to small indirect fire and sapper assault squads, 
the insurgents hoped to hasten American withdrawal through attacks on fixed U.S. 
installations and fire bases without suffering catastrophic casualties.  At the same time, 
by attacking the principal agents of the GVN pacification program, the insurgents shifted 
from a positive goal of openly attempting to convert South Vietnamese civilians and 
control their villages to a negative goal of discrediting GVN-provided security through 
sapper and terror attacks.   
In Thua Thien province, the communists later claimed that they “assigned 1500 
main force cadre and soldiers … as a hard-core framework to be used to build up local 
district units and village guerrillas.”230  Over the course of the 101st Airborne’s 
Operation Randolph Glen, which lasted from 7 December 1969 to 31 March 1970, the 
division intelligence section noted “recent PW’s [Prisoners of War] and ralliers taken in 
the lowlands have revealed that virtually all of the local force VC units operating in the 
lowlands have received training and reinforcements from NVA units.231  Many 101st 
battalions operating in the lowlands also detected a redoubled booby trap effort on the 
insurgents’ part as the communists implemented stand-off attacks.  The 2nd Brigade 
found that “during this period [of Operation Randolph Glen] the majority of the booby 
traps were constructed of relatively new materials and munitions, showing an emphasis 
on the enemy’s part of using booby traps as an effective offensive means of inflicting 
 
228. The Military History Institute of Vietnam, Victory in Vietnam, 249. 
229. Ibid., 249. 
230. Ibid., 248. 
231. Hq., 101st Airborne Division, “OPORD 13-69: Operation Randolph Glen, 
dated 29 November 1969,” p. B-1-1, Box 1, 101st Airborne Division, Unit History Files, 
MACV Command Historian’s Collection, MHI. 
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friendly casualties.”232  Even though the VC could not move large quantities of war 
material from their logistical bases in the NVA base camps because of the tight GVN 
security blanket in the lowlands, unexploded American bombs and artillery shells 
provided these insurgents with more than enough ordnance to harass their pursuers.   
 Increasingly during Operation Randolph Glen, the VC’s chief pursuers came to 
be South Vietnamese forces instead of American.  By design, Randolph Glen featured a 
partnership between 101st Airborne Division’s brigades and 1st ARVN Division 
regiments in the jungle and piedmont areas and a supporting role for the 101st in the 
pacification program.  The 101st’s account of the operation claimed that Randolph Glen 
“focused the total energy, resources, and good offices” of the division on the pacification 
campaign.233  Rhetorically, the division’s leadership intended to accomplish two 
overriding tasks; “maintain a shield of security for protection of the people in the 
lowlands and provide maximum support for the pacification and development goals 
established by the government of Vietnam.”234  The 101st planned to achieve these tasks 
by providing – along with the 1st ARVN Division – “a belt of security on the periphery 
of the populated lowland area, extensive assistance to improve the capability of 
territorial forces to provide security for their homeland, and an all-out effort to support 
the achievement of all GVN objectives throughout Thua Thien province.”235 
 Each of the 101st Airborne Division’s three brigades directed their principle 
energies on their allotted reconnaissance zones in the piedmont area to curb infiltration 
into the lowlands, yet still maintained a liaison responsibility with two to four lowland 
 
232. Hq., 101st Airborne Division, “Combat After Action Report, Operation 
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districts in their respective sectors.236  In these districts, each brigade organized a small 
Mobile Training Teams (MTT) staffed by experienced junior officers and non-
commissioned officers to standardize the training level of the territorial forces in their 
areas in addition to permanent liaison teams stationed with each district headquarters.  
Employment of the MTT concept would later be increased as actions directly integrating 
101st Airborne and RF/PF decreased, but until that time Mobile Advisory Teams (MAT) 
staffed by the U.S. advisory, and not tactical, chain of command assumed responsibility 
for training those RF units in districts where the 101st’s brigades did not habitually 
operate. 237     
 At the outset of Operation Randolph Glen, Hamlet Evaluation Statistics indicated 
that Thua Thien contained twenty hamlets rated “A” (adequate security forces, 
infrastructure eliminated), 256 hamlets rated “B” (VC threat exists, security organized, 
infrastructure partially eliminated), 135 hamlets rated “C” (subject to VC harassment) 
hamlets, and four hamlets rated “D” (VC activities reduced but still an internal threat) 
hamlets.238  In Phong Dien and Phu Loc districts, however, the insurgency proved more 
troublesome than elsewhere in Thua Thien province.   In these two districts, the 101st 
Airborne Division maintained an infantry battalion in each to directly aid in pacification.  
Phong Dien and Phu Loc, located respectively at the far northern and southern 
boundaries of the province, remained the two most troublesome districts in Thua Thien 
in part because of a relatively strong pro-insurgent popular sentiment amongst the 
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population and secondly because of NVA determination to push reinforcements through 
the heavily-patrolled areas to prop up the infrastructure in each.  As of December 1969, 
Phong Dien contained three of Thua Thien’s four remaining “D” rated hamlets and 
fifteen additional “C” rated hamlets, while fifty of Phu Loc’s hamlets maintained a “C” 
Hamlet Evaluation System rating out of the 135 total “C” rated hamlets in Thua Thien.  
Significantly, Phu Thu district, in which the 1-327th Infantry conducted Operation 
Saturate for the preceding two months also contained one “D” rated and twenty-four “C” 
rated hamlets, but territorial forces in Phu Thu were considered trained by the beginning 
of Randolph Glen and slowly made progress in establishing a pacified district.239  In 
contrast, the territorial forces of Phong Dien and Phu Thu received far less attention 
from U.S. or ARVN forces to this point. 
The 2-327th Infantry deployed with territorial forces in Phu Loc district and the 
3-187th Infantry operated in a similar fashion out of Phong Dien district.  In addition to 
their direct responsibilities in these districts, RF companies located in other districts 
rotated through for a few weeks at a time “to conduct combined operations and on-the-
job training with the two dedicated battalions.”240  These battalions also each maintained 
liaison teams with four adjacent districts in the event that a situation might require 
American ground forces to back up RF companies.  Both battalions conducted roughly 
the same type of actions and achieved similar results, but the 3-187th Infantry left the 
most complete and detailed records of the 101st Airborne Division’s final direct 
involvement in the lowland pacification campaign.  
In December 1969 and January 1970, 3-187 Infantry followed the now-standard 
and successful recipe for pacification success by conducting a series of cordon 
operations along with the Phong Dien Regional Force companies.  After a year and a 
half of cordons, though, both sides learned more effective techniques to alternately 
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implement and slip through them.  On the communist side, guerrilla fighters no longer 
lived and operated extensively in the villages and armed insurgents never were cornered 
into fighting or surrendering weapons in any of 3-187 Infantry’s cordons during 
Randolph Glen as happened so frequently before.  Following communist practices 
established after the disastrous winter of 1968-9, members of the infrastructure 
attempted to evade, rather than resist, the allied sweeps whenever possible even though 
GVN police, tracking, and interrogation methods became more sophisticated.  
As the frequency of contacts decreased on cordon actions, the precision of 
screening and attention devoted to minimizing negative impact on villagers increased.  
In the seven joint cordons conducted in December and January, 3,431 Phong Dien 
villagers were screened, resulting in forty-two suspects being detained for further 
questioning, and all but five of these suspects being released.241  Significantly, these 
suspects then went through district and police channels for questioning and processing 
by South Vietnamese district and police officials instead of a joint U.S./ARVN military 
intelligence center as usually happened before.242   
The 3-187th Infantry companies supplemented their cordon operations by 
conducting medical check-ups and providing rudimentary medical care for the villagers 
during the long screening process, and in addition to reporting numbers of persons 
screened and detained, units undertaking cordon operations also reported numbers of 
villagers served refreshments, entertained, and receiving medical care.243  In making 
these adaptations, the American effort in the villages had come full circle from the 
methods typified by 9th Infantry Division’s Operation Greenleaf conducted almost three 
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years earlier.244  In contrast to earlier techniques such as Greanleaf, which had 
emphasized quick fixes and the short term generation of goodwill, villagers now knew 
that 101st infantry companies and the territorials were expected to be the vanguard of a 
long process of creating permanent security and more than purveyors of entertainment, 
technology, and medicine.  
Aside from the ubiquitous cordons, 3-187th Infantry employed extensive “daily 
combined operations [with Regional Forces]… in order that US soldiers could 
demonstrate, by example, those teaching points stressed during training.”245  By 1970, 
for the most part, the Regional Forces companies were more capable than when built 
essentially from scratch in 1968 and early 1969 and did not require extensive American 
mentoring as before.  Habitually, only one of the U.S. companies worked and trained 
directly with their South Vietnamese counterparts while the other three 3-187th Infantry 
and nine Phong Dien RF companies operated independently, conducting daytime patrols 
and night saturation ambushes.246  U.S. companies compensated for the loss of local and 
language expertise provided by RF soldiers through the use of ARVN translators and 
“Kit Carson Scouts” – VC ralliers who volunteered to serve with American combat 
units.247  For the territorial forces, advisory teams from the 3-187th Infantry enabled the 
South Vietnamese access to U.S. indirect fire support and training techniques.248   
 
244. See Chapter I, pp. 8-9 for a summary of the 9th Infantry Division’s 
Operation Greenleaf conducted in IV Corps Tactical Zone. 
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Instead of direct contact, these patrols and ambushes most frequently 
encountered booby traps rather than groups of enemy soldiers as evidenced by the 154 
booby traps found and 37 detonated by U.S. and GVN troops in Phong Dien district over 
the course of Randolph Glen. 249  When 3-187th Infantry patrols did find the enemy, more 
often than not, they were NVA patrols moving from their base camp areas to support the 
VCI in the villages.  Unlike the black-clad, minimally-outfitted VC encountered during 
earlier ambushes in the lowlands, more and more now turned up enemy “dressed in 
green fatigues and HCM [Ho Chi Minh] sandals … [wearing] OD [olive drab] uniforms, 
[carrying] rucksacks, and AK-47 rifles.”250  These infrequent contacts aside, U.S. 
soldiers with earlier experience in Vietnam noticed during 1970 a “winding down” for 
the U.S. ground effort where “the intensity of the conflict was less and there was more 
hanging-around time at both the base camps and out in the field, to some degree.”251  
Adding to the notion of a lower intensity of combat operations, the 101st Airborne 
Division instituted a battalion seven- to ten-day “stand-down” rotation policy at the end 
of Operation Randolph Glen. This program continued until the division’s redeployment 
in February 1972 and allowed each infantry battalion to move from their tactical mission 
onto an established base camp to “rest, retrain, and improve the quality of the soldiers.” 
252  Officers found the training beneficial for their units and the break a morale booster 
for their soldiers, but only the more relaxed pace of operations allowed for such luxuries.    
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Thus, the pacification campaign in Phong Dien during Randolph Glen became 
one of attrition with territorial forces asserting themselves after shorter periods of 
training with and support by U.S. units.  Communist booby traps continued to take their 
tolls on combat forces and villagers alike while NVA guerrillas took over more of the 
combat role from the insurgents in the lowlands.253  U.S. and GVN units whittled away 
at the insurgent infrastructure through intelligence gained the hard way on documents 
captured with those enemy killed in ambushes and interrogation of wounded 
prisoners.254  Refined search and identification techniques also aided the insurgent 
identification effort and, just as importantly, demonstrated to the villagers the increased 
will and capability of the GVN to combat the insurgency.  Neither side held such a 
decisive edge over the other that could produce immediate decision, but as long as major 
NVA incursions could be kept out of the lowlands, time finally lay on the side of the 
GVN’s pacification program and after years of missteps and dashed hopes the South 
Vietnamese were providing for their own security in Thua Thien’s population centers.   
Paradoxically, then, Operation Randolph Glen was not “a radical departure from 
what has become the conventional approach to the US effort in Vietnam at division 
level” as Major General John M. Wright, the 101st’s commander, claimed in the 
commander’s remarks of the division review.  In fact, the rhetoric of devoting the “entire 
division … to assisting in the pacification and development of a province” contained in 
the 101st’s account of Randolph Glen lagged at least six months behind the reality on the 
 
253. Hq., 3-187 Infantry, “Combat After Action Interview Report: Operation 
Randolph Glen, 7 Dec 69 to 14 Feb 70; dated 7 March 1970,” pp. 3-4 and 5-11, Box 19, 
Assistant Chief of Staff Intelligence/Operations (S-2/S-3), 3rd Battalion, 187th Infantry, 
Infantry Units, RG 472, NARA II.  The insurgents extensively booby trapped the 
refugee re-settlement area in an attempt to deter the refugees from returning and 
discrediting the GVN re-settlement program.  To combat the insurgent booby trap 
program, the 3-187th Infantry began “flame drops” of thousands of gallons of jelled 
gasoline from CH-47 helicopters to detonate booby traps and clear underbrush for 
cultivation. 
254. Ibid., Appendix 1 (VC Infrastructure) 3 pages.  The 3-187th Infantry’s 
intelligence section lists three pages of by-name VCI eliminated during Randolph Glen 
with details of their position within the infrastructure and the circumstances of their 
death, capture, or surrender. 
  
95
ground.255  The most intense period of 101st and GVN ground forces interaction occurred 
from the summer of 1968 when U.S. units “discovered” the territorial forces for the first 
time until the summer of 1969 when these RF and PF units demonstrated the capability 
to conduct cordons and saturation patrols largely on their own.  Randolph Glen did 
feature the matured provincial-ARVN-U.S. command team started during Operation 
Nevada Eagle in mid-1968 and better theoretical integration of the big unit fight in the 
highlands with pacification in the lowlands, but the departure from a more conventional 
approach on the ground occurred over the preceding eighteen months, not in December 
1969. 256 
Instead, during Randolph Glen, American and ARVN battalions returned 
overwhelmingly to their sometimes-maligned search for main force units in the jungle.257  
As the attached table of the division’s infantry platoon utilization shows, only two of the 
101st’s nine infantry battalions expended the majority of their efforts in the lowlands.258  
In contrast to previous allied efforts, neither army neglected the pacification program in 
the lowlands and the clear threat to the GVN survival now lay with the NVA and not the 
insurgents.  Training teams of all descriptions, aviation, engineer, and artillery units all 
acted in support of GVN security forces, even though U.S. infantry battalions operated 
less frequently with their South Vietnamese allies rather than more.  The seven 101st 
Airborne infantry battalions committed to interdict infiltration in the piedmont operated 
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almost exclusively as purely American companies and battalions.  The two battalions 
committed in the lowlands maintained extensive liaison with the various districts of 
Thua Thien.  However, these U.S. companies in the lowlands became more of an adjunct 
force to the territorials because they were seldom used in their originally-conceived role 
as a fire brigade to backstop major insurgent surprises that never materialized.   
 
“Per instructions from the district chief”: 
GVN Initiatives and Operation Texas Star in the Summer of 1970 
 Successes in the pacification campaign from the summer of 1968 through 1969 
gave the Republic of South Vietnam the vital time and security to institute political 
reforms needed to cement security gains into long-term stability.  Drawing on the 
lessons of the 1969 Combined Campaign Plan, the first truly effective joint strategy 
effort between the South Vietnamese government and U.S. Military Assistance 
Command, Vietnam (MACV), the allied leadership in Saigon developed an eight-point 
Combined Campaign Plan for 1970 to take advantage of the improved security situation 
that existed in most of South Vietnam.259  Land reform, village and hamlet level 
elections, and directly arming the people through the People’s Self Defense Forces 
(PSDF) constituted the three most important initiatives to come out of the 1970 
Combined Campaign Plan with regard to the pacificaton campaign.  All three of these 
measures were envisioned to directly attack the roots of the communist insurgency and 
came to fruition in the relatively secure environment prevalent in most populated areas 
of South Vietnam during 1970 and 1971.   
 Village and hamlet level elections proved to be the least substantial of the three 
measures, with the least direct, short-term benefit on either the people’s support of the 
South Vietnamese Government (GVN), or threat to the communist insurgency.  While 
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they were important to the long term development of the Republic of Vietnam, in 1970 
they were secondary to improving the efficiency of existing GVN institutions, and were 
accordingly suspended in 1972 after the communist spring offensive upset the security 
balance in Thua Thien province.  The relative importance of elections can also be 
gauged by the communists’ attempts to disrupt them.  During the summer of 1970’s 
hamlet, village, and provincial election cycle, insurgents did not target a single polling 
station or election target even though security forces and GVN office-holders sustained a 
fair number of bombings, assassinations, and kidnappings over the same time.260 
 Each round of elections held in 1970 generated respectable turn-out, with a 
minimum of 75 percent of eligible voters going to the polls.  These high voter numbers 
masked the deeper problems with the GVN election system.  A “lack of qualified 
candidates” caused a number of village elections to be postponed on several occasions 
until suitable men could be found. 261  Suitable candidates referred to the screening 
process that each potential candidate went through in an attempt to ensure that 
communists did gain a further avenue to infiltrate the government.  Other than loyalty, 
simple demographics also restricted the number of candidates.  “In many villages there 
were very few youths left and the majority of their population consisted of elderly 
people, women and children,” one senior South Vietnamese officer recalled.  “As a 
result, the GVN had to bring in people from outside to run for office.”262  Obviously, the 
local security situation constituted a further restriction and “electoral process were only 
held where GVN control was tight enough to ensure effective leverage over village 
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councils.”263  As these examples suggest, the GVN instituted controls necessary to 
ensure that the democratic process did not disrupt institutions finally displaying some 
competence in fighting the communists.  In reality, the villagers voted with the 
information provided to and participation in local security forces and not ballots.  While 
at war with the North, Thua Thien and the rest of South Vietnam required an effective 
government and not necessarily a democratic one. 
 Land reform also produced enigmatic direct results on the pacification program.  
One knowledgeable Vietnamese observer called the “Land to the Tiller” program the 
only truly successful social change attempted by the Republic of Vietnam.264  In theory, 
the Presidential Decree 3/70 of 26 March 1970 terminated the practice of land rent and 
gave peasants the rights to the land they tilled.  It also should have generated a 
groundswell of popular support for the GVN amongst the villages and what amounted to 
a social revolution.265  The traditional agricultural villages that filled the lowlands of 
Thua Thien should have been far more concerned with the implications of owning their 
own land than the abstract notions democratic governance, but the true impact on the 
pacification effort on the ground is difficult to measure.  Advisory Group 18’s monthly 
province reports, which comprehensively cover all important social, economic, and 
military developments in Thua Thien, make no mention of any popular reaction, or even 
the decree itself.  Similarly, the battalions of the 101st Airborne Division stationed in the 
lowlands record no impact and little indication that villagers gained the right to own 
their own land, except in resettlement areas which had been cleared of insurgent control 
and re-settled by refugees.266   
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 The development of the People’s Self Defense Force (PSDF) represents perhaps 
the best indirect measure of the villagers’ loyalty to the government and the 
government’s confidence in the villagers.  Armed villagers could chose to resist any and 
all forms of outside control – be they communist, GVN, or American – and though the 
PSDF had been a paper militia for some time in South Vietnam, where widespread doubt 
about the loyalty of the villagers to the Saigon government kept the surplus weapon and 
small supply of ammunition to be distributed down to individual households in the plans 
file cabinet and off the battlefield.267  Still, as 101st Airborne Division records indicate, in 
order to accomplish two of the 1970 Combined Campaign Plan goals of providing 
security for 100 percent of the population and protecting the people from terrorism, “it 
was necessary to reconstruct and revitalize the People’s Self Defense Forces.”268 
 In Thua Thien, district officials made participation in the PSDF mandatory for all 
males below and above the age for military service and even voluntary for women of all 
ages.  These raw recruits received rudimentary military training in the form of 
marksmanship and constructing defensive fighting techniques, but were not expected to 
fight offensively or as cohesive military units like the Popular Forces platoons they were 
intended to supplement.269  District officials did not arm the villagers haphazardly and 
remarks in 101st Airborne records such as “the PSDF weren’t entrusted with weapons by 
the district chief even though the weapons were authorized and on-hand at district 
headquarters” give some idea of the baseline loyalty to the GVN that full participation in 
the PSDF represented.270  By April 1970, the 101st Airborne Division reported over 
30,000 PSDF members organized, trained, and armed out of a total province population 
of approximately 600,000, but the district strength breakdown gives an indication of the 
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relative GVN control over the area.  Hue, Phu Vang, Huong Tra, and Quang Dien all 
supported over 2,000 PSDF members each, with Hue and Phu Vang counting for more 
than 5,000 apiece.  At the same time, troublesome Phong Dien and Phu Thu district each 
contained less than 1,000 PSDF members.271 
 In the field, the PSDF produced the uneven results as might be expected from a 
raw, largely leaderless outfit.  Still, they usually demonstrated the capacity of taking on 
their primary targets of insurgent terrorism, if not always in the most thorough and 
efficient manner.272  Some accounts of their actions read more like vigilante mobs than 
organized self-defense forces, such as a 26 April 1970 incident in Huong Tra district 
where “PSDF surrounded a group of VC in a house at 2115 hours [and] a firefight 
ensued with three VC in the house.  Results were one VC KIA, one civilian WIA and 
one pistol captured.  The VC had been at his house collecting food.  The other two VC 
managed to escape.”273  A second incident from June 1970 in Phong Dien district gives 
some indication of the deterrence effect – if not combat effectiveness – of these 
minimally-trained levies; “The National Police and the PSDF of Phong Hoa village 
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engaged a VC squad at 15 meters with small arms fire as the enemy were attempting to 
enter the village.  The enemy did not return fire and fled in an unknown direction.”274    
 Arming the people to demonstrate their loyalty to the GVN was not simply an 
end in itself.  An invigorated PSDF served as part of a trickle-up effect of South 
Vietnamese combat effectiveness that U.S. and South Vietnamese leaders both thought 
would take the 101st Airborne Division’s infantry battalions out of a job in Thua 
Thien.275  With improved NPFF and PSDF forces capable of taking on the VCI and 
small terrorist actions in secured areas, the 43 RF companies and 169 PF platoons 
available in Thua Thien province in April 1970 could mass sufficient forces for the long 
times often needed to clear the insurgents from contested lowland areas without 
assistance from either the 101st Airborne or 1st ARVN Division.  When freed from their 
responsibilities in the lowlands, the 101st Airborne Division intended to use the 
upcoming summer dry season campaign to prepare the 1st ARVN Division to take on the 
NVA main force units on their own in the mountains of Thua Thien with an eye towards 
more ambitious and yet-unspecified “future operations which extended beyond Thua 
Thien and Quang Tri provinces.”276 
 The 101st Airborne began the 1970 dry season campaign, named Operation Texas 
Star, on 1 April 1970 when “weather conditions … improved significantly and it became 
possible to increase the tempo of offensive operations against enemy base areas which 
had been established west of the piedmont during the northeast monsoons.”277  Building 
on “the foundation for progress in the lowlands developed during Randolph Glen,” 
whose “basic concepts” of building GVN security capability and support of the 
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Combined Campaign Plan the Texas Star planners thought “remained valid,” the 101st 
Airborne Division sought to counter “the forward dispositions and build-up of enemy 
forces in the western portion of the division [Area of Operations].”278  Leaving the 2nd 
Brigade responsible for pacification and development support, the 101st’s 1st and 3rd 
Brigades would “conduct offensive operations against enemy units in the western 
portions of the province.”279 
 3-187th Infantry remained committed to northern Thua Thien province as part of 
the 2nd Brigade’s mission of dedicated pacification support for the duration of Operation 
Texas Star and 1-502nd Infantry assumed 2-327th Infantry’s similar role in the southern 
districts of the province.  In an indication of the territorials’ lessening need for U.S. 
backing, the 2nd Brigade’s dedicated battalions’ assigned areas of operation were 
expanded to include direct responsibility for four districts.  In the 3-187th Infantry’s 
example, only “a company remained with Phong Dien district,” and “emphasis of the 
Mobile Training Team effort was redirected from a training role to a concentration on 
rejuvenating the Vietnamese supply system.” 280  By June 1970, the battalion deployed 
“one company patrolling vicinity the firebase, and two companies operating in the 
unpopulated lowlands of southern Phong Dien district” as two RF companies and one PF 
platoon conducted cordon and search of a village in Phong Dien in which “219 
individuals were processed and two were detained” but later released after interrogation 
at the district headquarters.281  With territorial forces capable of conducting such local 
security missions unaided, the 3-187th’s primary combat duty became searching for 
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Teams [that] remained deployed and co-located with territorial forces to evaluate tactical 
operations and upgrade the Vietnamese Supply System.”282   
 For South Vietnamese villagers and GVN officials, however, communist 
capabilities remained a threat in many districts.  Terror attacks of assassination, 
kidnapping, and assaults upon district official buildings were the method of choice for 
the insurgents during Texas Star.  In one typical example, “six VC entered a village in 
Huong Tra district during the evening and murdered a woman” in May 1970.  At this 
stage of the conflict, separating ideologically-motivated action from simple revenge-
taking and murder could be difficult.  In this instance, “a note attached to her body by 
the VC stated that she was an informer,” indicating a political or military pretext for the 
killing.283  Other times, such as an April 1970 attack in which “one VC squad entered the 
hamlet of Van Xa, [also in Huong Tra district] murdered three civilians, wounded one, 
and kidnapped four civilians,” the motives of the attacks were less clear.284  In another 
report of seemingly random violence from early July 1970, “20 VC entered a village and 
fired 1 RPG and small arms into [a village].”  In this case, the “PSDF returned small 
arms fire and at 0200 hours, VC departed in unknown direction.”285  Actions such as 
these surely created doubts on the part of many villagers exactly what the insurgents’ 
promised liberation from the Americans and their puppets might entail for them. 
Typically, small insurgent bands entered villages at night to settle scores with 
hamlet or village leaders, or occasionally prominent citizens in order to intimidate the 
populace.  In one of the more discombobulated exchanges, twelve “VC kidnapped the 
village chief and his assistant, four other members of the village administrative council, 
and five PSDF” during a midnight council meeting.  Yet, “due to the rapidity with which 
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the VC wanted to move and the size of the group, the deputy village chief and five PSDF 
managed to escape.”286  Even more rarely, the insurgents gathered the strength to attack 
a police or territorial force outpost and one recorded occasion boldly occupied a village 
“for approximately thirty minutes and departed” before security forces arrived.287  Thus, 
the pacification glass was either half empty – in that the VC insurgents and NVA 
guerrillas still mounted attacks on the lowland populace, or half full – in that these 
attacks occurred at a low frequency for a province at war with an obstinate enemy. 
 The two 101st Airborne Division battalions still committed directly to the 
pacification campaign during Texas Star were not needed to repulse any major 
communist actions in the lowlands and in this respect the counter-insurgency glass 
appeared half-full and pacification on track in Thua Thien.  The 1-502nd and 3-187th 
Infantry therefore devoted their efforts to supporting the territorial forces through Mobile 
Training Teams and occasionally providing capabilities that district forces lacked, such 
as snipers.  One combat example from the 1-502nd Infantry’s sniper platoon gives a good 
example of the integration of U.S. and GVN institutions and the nature of the war during 
Texas Star for an American unit at the squad level.  In early May 1970, the Phu Thu 
district chief requested 1-502nd’s sniper platoon to counter “increasing enemy activity” 
that occurred because of an exchange that occurred the week prior in which the VC 
carried out one assassination and the RF later killed the VC district police chief during a 
sweep.288   
 Though “the villages in the immediate area were considered pacified and the 
populace was not considered sympathetic to enemy forces,” intelligence provided by the 
MACV District Intelligence Operations Center – a combined U.S. and Vietnamese 
information collection center – indicated “that there were 70 VCI and 30 to 40 VC 
within the district.”  Furthermore, “a recent agent report indicated that an element from a 
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NVA sapper platoon had infiltrated the area and a B-40 rocket launcher had recently 
been found in an old bunker,” which indicated that the NVA might coming to reinforce 
the local insurgents, exploit their assassination, or take some of the significant stores of 
rice held in the village.  The 1-502nd Infantry force, a five-man sniper team led by a 23 
year-old sergeant and containing four other 20 year-old junior enlisted men, “was to 
engage any person between 2000 and 0500 [hours] per instructions from the district 
chief.” 289   
Following a night spent without seeing any movement in their sector one of the 
snipers “at 2210 hours spotted three individuals with the naked eye about 300 meters.”  
The individuals were “assumed to be VC under the rules of engagement” and “the first 
and third men carrying rifles at the ready and the middle at sling arms” added a degree of 
certainty to this assumption.290  The snipers then shot two of the three enemy soldiers 
and confident of their accuracy, waited to observe any other enemy movement.  When 
none materialized, they called in to a nearby RF outpost for a sweep of the engagement 
area to secure the enemy dead or wounded.  A platoon from the RF company swept the 
area about thirty minutes after the engagement, but found only two areas where bodies 
had been dragged off and no dead or wounded. 291 
 Obviously, the 1-502nd’s sniper platoon did not end the insurgency in Phu Thu 
with their action and with no certainty of enemy dead or wounded, could not even 
contribute statistically to the war’s management or analysis.  Still, as 101st Airborne 
Division soldiers learned over the preceding two and a half years, the communist 
insurgency would be won through a day and night grind of vigilance and not decisive 
battles.  Although no enemy soldiers were confirmed as killed or wounded, this unnamed 
6 May 1970 action must be considered a success.  The young, almost assuredly all-
draftee U.S. sniper section demonstrated considerable skill and dedication fighting a war 
that some would later remember lost by Tet 1968 or earlier.  The small U.S. and GVN 
units both proved capable in their own rights and able to integrate when needed, as did 
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the district intelligence center and the Vietnamese district chief and U.S. battalion 
commander.  Finally, even if both enemy soldiers survived their wounds to fight another 
day, the villagers in one obscure corner of Phu Thu district were protected from 
communist attacks, terror, or intimidation for at least one more night.  
 Thus, the impression left on the record indicates that the lowlands in Thua Thien 
at night in 1970 consisted of several hundred small bands of well-armed men, almost all 
barely over 20 years old, groping through the dark and attempting to alternately sneak 
past or surprise each other, all while avoiding mines and booby traps hidden below and 
the fire of aircraft and artillery on call from above.  For every U.S. or South Vietnamese 
patrol that found the enemy or his booby traps, perhaps a hundred more typically 
returned from a night laying in ambush outside a South Vietnamese village without 
result.   
By 1970 South Vietnamese patrols in Thua Thien returning without contact 
usually served as a  confirmation of information provided by prisoners and ralliers 
indicating “that the enemy is still experiencing food shortages and morale problems” 
whereas earlier such results tended to indicate a lack of South Vietnamese capability.  As 
the attached chart of the province’s array of territorial forces shows, throughout Texas 
Star, Thua Thien possessed an impressive counter-insurgent capability on paper that for 
the most part performed well in practice also.292  At the end of the operation, even 
though “the [VC] local force units [were] increasing their activity of terrorism and 
kidnappings,” as the 3-187th Infantry intelligence summary of Texas Star explained, the 
VC “still remain combat ineffective and have continued to be reinforced and by the 
NVA.”293  At the same time, the GVN pacification effort showed a declining need for 
American assistance and for the 3-187th Infantry’s area of northern Thua Thien, “Houng 
Dien, Quang Dien, and Houng Tra [districts] security of the population was almost 
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entirely provided by territorial forces,” with only “platoon-size U.S. elements … 
maintained in the unpopulated areas of Quang Dien and Huong Tra for brief periods at 
the request of the respective district chiefs.294  The upcoming Operation Jefferson Glen 
would further rely on the notion of a largely pacified Thua Thien province in order to 
complete the process of transferring the remaining burden of ground combat against the 
communists to South Vietnamese force. 
 
“This drive did not materialize”: 
Vietnamization, Operation Jefferson Glen, and Withdrawal 
Operation Jefferson Glen, the longest single divisional action undertaken by the 
101st Airborne Division in Vietnam, spanned just over thirteen months from 5 September 
1970 until 8 October 1971.  Despite the length of this operation, Jefferson Glen serves as 
a better example of Vietnamization rather than pacification due to the dearth of 101st 
Airborne Division infantry units needed in the lowlands after the completion of Texas 
Star and over two years of dedicated work.  In preparing for Jefferson Glen’s execution, 
division planners stressed “support for ARVN pacification and redevelopment 
programs,” but realized “diminished US presence as the order of the day” and 
established a “requirement to divest the division of its responsibility for maintenance of 
security in the lowlands” due to “the attendant high risk of incidents involving friendly 
civilians.”295  The twin forces of an ongoing, inevitable U.S. ground force reduction and 
increasing South Vietnamese capabilities to combat the enemy in Thua Thien formed 
unstated, but undoubtedly understood factors in the conceptualization of Jefferson Glen.  
According to the plan, the American withdrawal would take place as South Vietnamese 
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capability increased and thus the relatively high level of pacification in Thua Thien 
formed a chief assumption in the 101st’s concept for transferring all ground combat to 
the South Vietnamese.   
 In a 23 December 1969 memo to all major subordinate commands, MACV 
codified the policy of “Vietnamization” as “the process by which the U.S. assists the 
Government of Vietnam to assume increasing responsibility for all aspects of the war 
and all functions inherent in self-government.”  On the U.S. side, the objective was “to 
permit the U.S. to reduce its military and civilian presence in Vietnam without 
unacceptable risks to the objectives of the United States and the security of Free World 
and GVN Forces.”296  After the war, General Phillip Davidson, who served as MACV’s 
senior intelligence officer during this time, was less diplomatic in writing that 
“Vietnamization was a unilateral American policy designed to sever the interests of the 
United States, and the United States only.”297  In time, this assessment proved closest to 
the mark, but from the summer of 1969 throughout 1970, overall U.S. troop strength 
declined from 475,000 at the end of 1969 to 335,000 at the end of 1970 and major U.S. 
combat units such as the 1st Marine Division, 1st U.S. Infantry Division, and 9th Infantry 
Division were withdrawn from Vietnam while others such as the 101st Airborne stayed 
on to build South Vietnamese forces and fight the North Vietnamese.298  Aside from 
American troop strength reductions, Vietnamization broke into three “constituent 
elements; Improvement and Modernization of RVNAF [Republic of Vietnam Armed 
Forces], Pacification, and Combat Operations.”299 
 After analyzing the 101st’s operations up to September 1970, the division’s 
planners realized that “Operation[s] Randolph Glen and … Texas Star were successful in 
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preventing enemy incursions into the populated areas …. [and] laid the foundation for an 
effective Vietnamese security system.”  Essentially, the 101st Airborne conducted 
effective combat operations to spoil NVA forays into the lowlands and helped 
extensively in the pacification campaign.  Ironically, the South Vietnamese ability to 
conduct conventional operations against the NVA in Thua Thien appeared to be the 
weak link in the Vietnamization program in September 1970.  Realizing this, during 
Jefferson Glen the 101st Airborne set out to improve and modernize the 1st ARVN 
Division and “planning for Operation Jefferson Glen was predicated on the realization 
that ARVN forces still did not possess a capability for extended unilateral operations.”  
Tactically, “emphasis was placed on placed on upgrading facilities in expectation of the 
eventual turnover to ARVN forces” especially in the highlands where “all weather hard 
surface roads were constructed to the principle fire bases and extensive land clearing 
operations were programmed to facilitate operations without extensive helicopter 
support” that would be departing with the 101st Airborne Division at some undetermined 
time. 300  During the first four months of Jefferson Glen, all three brigades of the 101st 
Airborne Division conducted continuous raids and reconnaissance missions in the jungle 
highlands with their counterpart regiments in the 1st ARVN Division in order to prepare 
the South Vietnamese for their first offensive extended unilateral operation – Lam Son 
719, the attack against NVA supply routes in Laos.301     
 For Lam Son 719, the 101st Airborne Division deployed one brigade of four 
infantry battalions north to Quang Tri province and assumed control of two U.S. separate 
infantry brigades already located there in order to free the 1st ARVN Division and other 
attached ARVN armored and marine elements for the assault west into Laos from Khe 
Sanh.302  The ARVN forces made substantial progress for the first three weeks of Lam 
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Son, reaching Tchepone in Laos and effectively severing the communists’ only major 
remaining supply line into South Vietnam.  Not surprisingly, this action brought three 
NVA divisions to bear against the South Vietnamese forces and fierce battles erupted, 
halting the ARVN offensive in early March 1971.303  Soldiers on both sides fought 
frantically in desperate, often hand-to-hand battles, but by 10 March 1971, “in the face 
of the build up of numerically superior enemy forces in the objective area,” the ARVN 
commander, Lieutenant General Hoang Xuan Lam, realized “major additional forces 
would have been required to proceed with the original plan … of operating for an 
extended period in that area” and made the decision to begin withdrawing back to Quang 
Tri province in South Vietnam.304 
 The ARVN withdrawal from Laos was hard-fought and not always orderly, with 
battalions and companies “forced to move overland, often at night, in order to break 
contact and make [helicopter] extraction feasible.”  NVA units pressed their attacks in 
close to ARVN units in order to escape the punishing effects of U.S. airpower and 
ARVN artillery support and inflicted “a mauling” on several of the thirty-four South 
Vietnamese battalions in the offensive by employing T-34 tanks and human wave 
                                                                                                                                           
See page 46 for a summary of the 101st Airborne’s actions in support of Lam Son 719.  
Pages 50 through 53 contain a summary of ARVN combat actions in Laos from 8 
February to 1 April 1971. 
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ARVN timidity as the Airborne and Marine divisions were Saigon’s palace guard and 
only reserve.  According to Davidson, on 12 February 1971 South Vietnamese President 
Nguyen Thieu ordered General Lam to halt the offensive if his forces sustained more 
than 3,000 casualties.  In the end, they sustained almost 8,000. 
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Lam later received low marks for his generalship throughout the war from participants 
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assaults on ARVN positions.305  When the ARVN armored column ran into stiff NVA 
opposition on its movement back to South Vietnam, General Lam ordered an ARVN 
marine brigade to “hold and act as a pivot  for a drive … to the east” to rescue the 
column, however, as the 101st’s operations narrative noted laconically, “this drive did 
not materialize.”306 
 As a result of Lam Son 719, the potential for large-scale NVA offensive action 
was delayed by a year, but at high cost.  Some of the best units of the Republic of 
Vietnam Army and Marine Corps sustained almost 50 percent casualties in killed, 
wounded, and missing.307  Although the South Vietnamese demonstrated their 
conventional army units were certainly more capable than earlier years, they were not 
yet up to the task of defeating the NVA in open battle on their own.308  At the same time,  
U.S. leaders chose to continue the Vietnamization policy and the 101st Airborne spent 
the summer of 1971 engaged in less frequent ground combat operations in the jungle 
against the NVA.  Operation Jefferson Glen ended on 8 October 1971, not so much by 
an event on the ground in Thua Thien, but by the 101st’s redeployment to the United 
States.309  Operations Order 11-71 began the process on 9 October 1971 that would see 
the 2-501st Infantry of the 101st Airborne’s 2nd Brigade become the last 101st Airborne 
Division infantry battalion to leave South Vietnam on 16 February 1972.310    
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The ARVN’s second test in extended unilateral operations came one month later 
in the form of the communist 1972 Spring Offensive.311  As in Lam Son 719, the ARVN 
performance was uneven, with some units fighting well and many others contributing to 
the “thousands of military stragglers … wandering around [Hue] or driving their families 
southward in ARVN vehicles.” 312  After a couple weeks’ fighting, in which “NVA tanks 
invaded the lowlands and conventional warfare engulfed the province’s northern 
districts,” the South Vietnamese could not pass the test of stopping the NVA alone and 
halted the enemy only with massive U.S. tactical air support and after losing all of 
Quang Tri province to the north of Thua Thien.313  Within Thua Thien itself, the 
provincial senior advisor reported in late March that “the name of the game for Thua 
Thien is clearly survival” and “the residents … have been badly shaken by these events” 
leaving “the survivability of Thua Thien … in doubt.”314 
 In conclusion, the major decisions of 1970 and 1971 brought the war in Vietnam 
to an ironic and disappointing conclusion for the 101st Airborne in early 1972.  
Paradoxically, the 101st Airborne Division’s three-year success in orchestrating Thua 
Thien’s improving pacification from insurgents forced the communists to the very style 
of conventional warfare once thought to be the misdirected specialty of the Americans 
and their South Vietnamese allies.  In response to the pacification counteroffensive in 
1968 and 1969, the communists redoubled their efforts and transitioned to a more 
conventional effort emphasizing NVA main force capability at the expense of the 
insurgency.  At the same time, the GVN used this breathing spell to implement 
important social and security initiatives which largely protected Thua Thien from 
insurgents during the American withdrawal, but could not stand up to the NVA when 
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called to do so in the spring of 1971 and 1972.  For their part, as the redeployment of the 
101st Airborne over the 1971-72 winter showed, the Americans chose Vietnamization 
over pacification.  






 “THE EXPERIENCES WE HAVE GAINED” 
 
 
Lieutenant Colonel Jim Hunt relinquished command of the 1-501st Infantry after 
his battalion helped clear Vinh Loc district from insurgents in September 1968 and 
attended the U.S. Army War College in 1969.  By this time, Vinh Loc already served as 
a model operation, recorded circulated as a special case study by the U.S. Military 
Advisory Command (MACV) in Vietnam.  While at the War College, Colonel Hunt 
wrote an individual research paper outlining many of his division’s counter-insurgency 
experiences during the summer of 1968 and it was forwarded to the U.S Army Combat 
Development Command under the Secretary of Defense’s guidance “that imaginative 
and substantive ideas developed in selected research papers be given wide 
dissemination.”315  Although written in 1970, Colonel Hunt’s words could be taken to 
accurately describe the state of the U.S. Army’s preparedness for counterinsurgency any 
of the decades that followed. 
In concluding his research paper, Hunt recommended that “service schools must 
better prepare officers for command assignments in any future stability operation” and 
listed his own lack of preparedness for integration with South Vietnamese territorial 
forces as his primary officer’s educational shortcoming.  Ignoring the U.S. Army’s 
history of fighting insurgents, particularly in the Philippines, Mexico, and a half-dozen 
less recognized stability operations, he declared “it can be said that in the case of 
Vietnam, we did not have the experience factor to fall back on,” reinforcing the 
traditional ability of the U.S. Army to forget about its counterinsurgency experiences as 
rapidly as it is forced to relearn them.  The Vietnam experience, Hunt hoped, would be 
different, and declared “we must not let the experiences we have gained in Vietnam go 
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unused.  We must take the lessons learned from our experiences and integrate them into 
the program of instruction at out service schools.”  Hunt also understood the variables 
involved in his division’s success in Thua Thien and cautioned against the notion “that 
every successful technique used in Vietnam will work as well in some other country; no 
doubt they won’t.”  However, he saw “doctrinal and conceptual benefit” derived 
examining the overall execution of the 101st’s operations in Thua Thien.  Only then, he 
claimed, could the army move away from “the need to demonstrate various military 
capabilities in Vietnam” and instead focus on “what is required, and shape our 
capabilities toward that end.”316  Perhaps after one more retelling, the experiences of 
Colonel Hunt and his comrades in the 101st Airborne Division will not go unused. 
Unlike most of America’s wars, where relative success could be easily 
understood by territory gained and armies destroyed, the conflict in Vietnam requires the 
analyst to weigh the outcome before discerning any potential lessons.  By the end of 
1970, MACV’s map displaying the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) ratings for every 
hamlet in South Vietnam showed an overwhelming preponderance of Secure (“A” rated) 
and Relatively Secure (“B” rated) hamlets throughout all of South Vietnam except for 
pockets of Contested (“C” rated) hamlets where neither side had full control in the 
Mekong delta region southwest of Saigon and in Pleiku and Binh Dinh provinces 
halfway between Saigon and Hue.317  In September 1970, nine of Thua Thien’s districts 
were rated as Relatively Secure, with Phu Vang district attaining an even higher Secure 
rating.318  Overall, 91 percent of South Vietnamese hamlets were “A” and “B” rated, a 
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little over 7 percent “C” rated, and less than 2 percent under VC control by June 1970 
according to HES statistics presented by Philip Davidson.319   
In December 1970, conservative estimates taken from the HES data placed the 
communists in control of 38,000 of South Vietnam’s 11 million peasants, or 2 percent of 
the rural population, with another 31 percent living in “contested” areas, and 67 percent 
living under complete GVN protection.320  In most areas, the insurgency gained no 
ground from late 1968 until the communist Spring Offensive in March 1972 and in their 
delta stronghold, the VC effort during this offensive was stillborn and largely ineffective 
in distracting GVN forces from countering the three North Vietnamese conventional 
thrusts that occurred elsewhere.321  Even after the communist Spring Offensive, one 
analyst observed that “most of those gains held through the intense fighting of 1972” and 
though setbacks plagued the areas of most intense fighting, the GVN steadily increased 
control over the rural areas until the final communist offensive in 1975.322   Thus, the 
fact that both previous comprehensive examinations of the U.S. counterinsurgency effort 
at the province level focused on provinces where the insurgency retained its greatest 
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strength points to a need for future work, looking at other provinces, in order to develop 
a more complete picture of the permutations of the pacification effort.323 
For historian Eric Bergerud, who examined the American 25th Infantry 
Division’s effort in Hau Nghia province which was located along a major communist 
infiltration route between Saigon and Cambodian border, the mere fact that a hardened 
cadre of communist insurgents – what he terms “the most politically aware and 
determined segment of the peasantry” – hung on until the final North Vietnamese assault 
in 1975 constituted a defeat for the United States and their South Vietnamese allies.324  
Eschewing the HES data, growing efficiency of South Vietnamese forces elsewhere, and 
need by the insurgents for extensive external support from North Vietnamese sanctuaries 
in Cambodia, Bergerud concludes that the communists maintained greater legitimacy 
than the GVN amongst the South Vietnamese villagers in Hau Nghia simply because 
more South Vietnamese in the delta were “willing to die for” the communist insurgency 
than in the security forces of the GVN.325  Bergerud does not address how many of these 
politically aware and determined local guerrillas could have survived without extensive 
infusions of manpower from the north and the considerable distraction provided by the 
NVA.  In the end, Bergerud relies on the unworthy ally argument that the inefficiency 
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325. Ibid., 328.  On page 293, Bergerud lists the Hau Nghia HES report for 
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This constituted progress from the January reports, in which 62 were rated as “C” and 46 
as “D.”  On page 306, Bergerud bases his claim of greater legitimacy for the communists 
on a “perceived virtue” amongst the peasants which gave the communists a “moral 
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and illegitimacy of the Saigon government made any American effort ultimately doomed 
to failure. 
In Hau Nghia, the insurgency exploited the split between the urban, Catholic elite 
of nearby Saigon with close ties to colonial French rule and the predominantly Buddhist 
peasantry.  In overwhelmingly Buddhist Thua Thien, home to Vietnam’s ancient 
imperial capital of Hue and a proud population, a different situation existed.  As the 
1966 uprising against Saigon and resistance against the North Vietnamese in 1968 and 
1972 showed, the villagers of Thua Thien distrusted control from all outsiders, be they 
from Saigon or Hanoi, and the combat records of the ARVN 1st Division and province 
Regional and Popular Forces indicate large numbers were willing to die in the struggle 
to retain their particular identity.  That the ARVN 1st Division, consistently recognized 
as the GVN’s most effective combat unit, was recruited largely from and operated 
predominantly in Thua Thien province gives further credence to this point.326  
Alternately, most former U.S. officers who served in Vietnam and some others 
observers agreed with Phillip Davidson’s assessment that “the pacification program in its 
narrowest sense – the neutralization of the Viet Cong infrastructure in the countryside – 
was virtually completed by the end of 1970” and would “hold firm, with minor shifts to 
the combat situation, until the end of the GVN in 1975.”327  According to this view, the 
insurgency was under control and the war in most of Vietnam being won even though 
the ARVN’s inability to counter growing NVA capability on its own still required 
substantial U.S. material and combat support.  The insurgency still survived, as even the 
most optimistic reports placed tens of thousands of South Vietnamese citizens under 
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communist control and several hundred thousand more under direct threat from 
insurgents, but the trends all flowed in the GVN’s favor as long as the North Vietnamese 
Army could be held at bay.  Predictably – and with some justification by the facts on the 
ground in at least one province – these officers attributed the eventual failure of U.S. 
policy and collapse of the GVN to a stab in the back perpetrated on those Americans and 
South Vietnamese fighting in Vietnam by political calculations in the United States and 
not ham-fisted American tactics, or the unworthiness of the GVN in comparison to their 
communist adversaries.328  Historian George Herring’s statement that “by 1970, the 
countryside was more secure than at any time since the insurgency had begun” even 
though fragments remained and the ARVN’s capability to deal with the NVA remained 
uncertain probably landed closest to the mark of the true situation.329 
That the 101st and its South Vietnamese allies beat the insurgents in Thua Thien 
but ultimately lost the war to an enemy employing mass formations, copious artillery, 
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and armored vehicles should be of little solace to the U.S. Army or Americans at large.  
The 101st’s performance in Thua Thien from 1968 to 1972 simply demonstrates that the 
U.S. Army can successfully fight insurgencies, just as it has at other times, but never 
seems to digest these experiences into an institutional memory.  Successful pacification 
techniques in Thua Thien almost always percolated from lower to higher echelons as 
they were relearned over time.   
If any overarching military lesson may come out of an examination of the 101st 
Airborne’s fight in Thua Thien, it is that war cannot simply be categorized neatly as “an 
insurgency” or “conventional war” and trained for, explained to the general public, and 
executed as such.  Conflicts may combine these categories, making them more 
complicated to fight and more difficult for militaries to achieve their objectives.  In the 
age of nuclear weapons, commanders from companies to theaters are reminded that these 
objectives have almost always been something less than absolute destruction of the 
enemy.  In the end, victory went to the side that capably employed a variety of methods 
and combined them with sufficient will on the part of the army, the government, and the 
people that it governed to achieve their political object – in this case, the communist 
domination of the people of Thua Thien – despite setbacks and even outright defeats 
sustained along the way.  
 Thus, actions at the tactical level cannot, by themselves, win a war.  At most, 
effective tactics can only assist in efficiently attaining the political objectives of the 
campaign.  In this example alone, the U.S. military effort in Vietnam from 1965 to 1968 
and the communist effort from 1968 until 1970 are great examples of inefficient methods 
at lower levels being overcome by an abundance of national will at the top to continue 
the fight.  At the higher levels, where the objects of war are formulated and calculus of 
national will takes place, tactics are a mere detail.  For the soldiers and officers serving 
in the companies and battalions in the field, however, they are tools and the only way a 
blueprint drawn at higher levels achieves reality on the ground. 
 In Thua Thien, against the Viet Cong (VC) insurgents, the 101st Airborne 
Division needed to solve two key problems in achieving the goals of pacification.  The 
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first involved identifying the enemy and the second concerned the establishing effective 
local forces.  Solving the first problem was diverse, evolving, and depended on local 
conditions and the status of enemy adaptations to be successful.  Alternately, developing 
territorial forces and later improving of South Vietnamese paramilitary organizations 
such as the Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU) were much more uniform and 
promising solutions to the second obstacle facing the 101st Airborne. 
During its tour in Thua Thien, the 101st took part in several battles with battalion-
sized enemy formations, but these large battles played into traditional U.S. strengths.  
When asked if these large battles were the most difficult he encountered during his tour 
in Vietnam, one 101st Airborne Division company commander replied that the big, 
intense engagements often found in the months immediately following Tet 1968 “aren’t 
really the toughest fights because you know where the enemy is.”  He elaborated further, 
“and when you know where he is, it, in my experience, was very easy for any United 
States unit to confront an enemy unit.”330   
Obviously, the lightly armed and protected insurgent derives his only protection 
from more sophisticated government forces by remaining invisible or indistinguishable 
from civilians.  In Thua Thien, the insurgent infrastructure remained indistinguishable 
through its integration with the village populace.  Villagers recruited or motivated to join 
the VC formed the most obvious example of this phenomenon, but VC cadre from 
outside the village also established their own integration in these tightly-knit societies by 
skillfully manipulating the villagers on one hand and effectively applying coercion on 
the other.  In examples like Vinh Loc, the insurgents rapidly lost the ability to stay 
integrated with the population and were quickly rolled up, never to return in strength.  In 
other examples, such as Captain David Bramlett’s company of the 2-327th Infantry, once 
friendly forces accurately identified and eliminated those insurgents controlling the 
enemy coercion mechanisms, the VC lost the cloak of invisibility and did not survive 
long.  Finally, in some areas such as Phu Vang and Phong Dien, the enemy was more 
 
330. Linwood Burner “Interview with Colonel Henry A. Kievenaar,” p.14, Box 
20, Company Command in Vietnam Series, Oral History Interviews, 1981-1985, MHI. 
  
122
deeply integrated and well supported.  Here, no single intelligence breakthrough or 
whirlwind operation exposed the communist infrastructure and the fight became an 
attritional campaign between security forces and armed guerrillas.331 
The 101st Airborne relied on several basic methods to identify the infrastructure 
members.  The village cordon served to separate the hardened core of the insurgents 
from those more lightly coerced or convinced into devotion to communist ideology.  In 
villages where the Republic of Vietnam (GVN) exhibited tenuous control, cordon 
operations provided the necessary first step in reestablishing GVN authority.  In these 
areas, the VC acted in the open as the de facto government and the presence of large 
bodies of U.S. and GVN forces to oppose this rule forced the insurgents to either go 
back underground, or fight to challenge GVN authority.  In the summer and fall of 1968, 
the large killed and captured totals obtained in cordons throughout Thua Thien indicated 
both the openness with which the VC operated and their intent to remain in control.332 
Initially, the cordon required a relatively large force to conduct, and the 
continuous commitment of smaller forces over the following months and years to 
reconsolidate the government’s authority in these areas after the initial investment.  Once 
the insurgents were forced underground by these measures, identifying insurgents 
became the purview of the combined military intelligence centers and GVN paramilitary 
forces such as the National Police Field Force, Census Grievance Units, PRU’s, and 
even the Phoenix Program.  These organizations relied on tips supplied by villagers and 
ralliers and information gained from interrogating enemy prisoners and documents found 
on their casualties.  U.S. and GVN military forces often used this intelligence to attack a 
particularly large or well-protected target, but once insurgent activity was knocked back 
underground, it became more of a police and less of a military problem.  U.S. and GVN 
conventional forces could undertake this role in the absence of effective local 
paramilitary organizations if properly trained – Captain Bramlett’s C Company 
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illustrates the effectiveness of a standard U.S. rifle company in maintaining an effective 
local intelligence network once given a start by the attached PRU team – but most 
infantry companies and battalions lacked the language and interrogation skills to initiate 
these programs on their own.  When operating in alien cultures, these two shortcomings 
often pose problems for conventional forces involved in fighting insurgents. 
Identifying VC guerilla fighters, on the other hand, remained a military problem 
throughout the pacification campaign.  During the early months of 1968, in Operations 
Carentan I & II and the beginning of Nevada Eagle, when communist units dug in 
amongst villagers who did not flee, the U.S. firepower used to dislodge them 
undoubtedly was not as discriminating as more time and manpower-intensive methods 
would have been.  Once they defeated communist main force units in the lowlands, 101st 
saturation patrols used far less firepower and relied primarily on considerations of 
location and time to separate guerrillas from civilians.   As one battalion commander 
pointed out, “in any future stability operation, minimum use of firepower must be made, 
and security of the people must be of the highest priority is we are to get their 
cooperation and support of the local government.”333 
By depending on their limited forms of agriculture, villagers in Thua Thien 
inadvertently aided in the anti-insurgency effort.  With few motor vehicles and little 
electricity, in addition to their labor-intensive work with rice crops, the villagers had 
little reason to be out of their village after curfew.  Thus, curfew could be more easily 
enforced in rural Thua Thien than in a modern or urbanized environment where the 
day’s economic and entertainment work did not necessarily end at dusk.  Additionally, 
small VC liaison parties traveling the trails of Thua Thien at night almost always obliged 
allied forces by carrying weapons openly, making their identification relatively easy at 
up to 300 meters with even the rudimentary night vision equipment of the day.  
Undoubtedly, VC Legal Cadre posing as loyal South Vietnamese citizens traveled and 
conducted unarmed reconnaissance by day, but the overwhelming majority of VC 
activity occurred at night, when the curfew and activity patterns of civilians exposed the 
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insurgents to much more accurate identification by saturation patrols.  In other conflicts, 
it is doubtful that other insurgents will be as obligingly rigid and forego the protection 
offered by conforming as much as possible to civilian behavior patterns. 
Establishing effective local forces formed the second major puzzle to solve for 
the 101st in Thua Thien province.  In this effort, the division used a framework 
consisting of three elements: energizing an existing territorial forces organization, 
integrating closely with U.S. units in order to build their confidence to take on the VC, 
and providing advisors to train the Regional and Popular Forces (RF and PF) on 
effective small-unit tactics.  Without corresponding increase of will to fight against the 
insurgents on the part of those serving in the territorial forces, however, these three 
elements would have amounted to nothing.  In Thua Thien, strong South Vietnamese 
provincial leadership and extensive American tutelage produced lasting positive results.   
Other provinces were not so fortunate, as Kevin Boyland finds in his study of 
Binh Dinh province to the south.  Boyland attributes the ultimate failure of pacification 
in the 173rd Airborne Brigade’s sector of Binh Dinh province to a “fast and thin” 
pacification campaign in which the South Vietnamese territorial forces never outgrew 
their dependency on U.S. support as they did in Thua Thien.334  In Binh Dinh, Boyland 
characterizes the GVN forces and officials there as possessing an “all encompassing 
weakness and ineffectiveness” just as did those Bergerud examines in Hau Nghia 
province.  Boyland more directly addresses the relationship between insurgent moral 
superiority and NVA presence, calling the NVA 3rd Division “the most visible 
manifestation of communist strength in Binh Dinh” and attributing significant 
psychological and operational powers to “its mere presence” near the populated 
 
334. Boyland, “The Red Queen’s Race: The 173d Airborne Brigade and 
Pacification in Binh Dinh Province, 1969-1970,” pp. 777-92.  Boyland summarized the 
results of the 173rd Airborne Brigade’s pacification efforts as, “far from causing the 
South Vietnamese to become more self-reliant, in the end it left them more addicted to 
American support than they had been at the outset.” (page 777)  During the North 
Vietnamese 1972 Spring Offensive, the GVN forces in Binh Dinh collapsed, whereas 
those in Thua Thien performed more credibly, halting the enemy offensive after the loss 
of Quang Tri.  
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lowlands.335  This 5,000 strong regular NVA unit took two of the four U.S. infantry 
battalions in the 173rd Airborne away from conducting pacification operations in the 
lowlands and helped “halt the erosion of the NLF’s (National Liberation Front) 
psychological dominance by causing both the civilian population and South Vietnamese 
governmental and military personnel to recalculate the odds of GVN victory.”  In order 
to not abandon his thesis that the general unworthiness of the GVN ultimately caused the 
communist victory, Boyland goes to great lengths to demonstrate the “strength and 
pervasiveness” of the insurgents even while touting their increasing dependence on 
outside material, manpower, and psychological support.336 
When the 101st Airborne arrived in Thua Thien in March 1968, the territorial 
forces already existed and did not need to be organized from the ground up.  Though 
they performed poorly in the months leading up to Tet 1968 and during the offensive 
itself, the Regional and Popular Forces had an internal structure and definite command 
and control chain within the province.  In the wake of the Tet debacle, the GVN and 
MACV province leadership and advisory teams made little change to the paper 
organization and equipment of these forces other than a promise to replace their World 
War II era M-1 rifles with modern M-16 automatic rifles, a step not actually carried out 
until late 1969.  Ultimately, trained and motivated soldiers, not state-of-the art 
equipment or radical reorganization, made the difference in creating an effective South 
Vietnamese regional security force.  The equipment only needed to be good enough to 
 
335 Ibid., p. 766.  Boyland finds that the 3rd NVA Division’s “return to the 
province in the waning months of 1969 was a pivotal event in the history of Operation 
Washington Green [the 173rd Airborne Brigade’s equivalent to the 101st’s Operation 
Nevada Eagle] because it revolutionized the military situation in [Binh Dinh] almost 
overnight and robbed the operation of much of its early momentum.” 
336. Ibid., pp. 768-72.  After making a clear case for the importance of NVA 
support, Boyland states that “it would be wrong, however, to suggest that the return of 
the 3rd NVA Division was the most important factor in the failure of Operation 
Washington Green.”  Boyland then draws a tenuous connection between communist 
strength in Binh Dinh province and insurgent strength in 1956 in the Malaysia’s Segamat 
district during the British counterinsurgency campaign to support his contention that the 
simple existence of any number of armed insurgents constitutes a victory for their cause.  
Boyland does not directly address HES statistics for Binh Dinh province at any time. 
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give these South Vietnamese district-based units the confidence they could take on the 
insurgents threatening their hamlets.337 
Advisors and liaison teams constituted a long-standing continuation of the 
American effort of improving the territorial forces.  The venerable MACV advisory 
effort extended to the district level, but did not concentrate solely on military 
effectiveness.  These small advisory teams and the diverse missions assigned to them 
precluded extensive contact with any one unit and thus any significant measure of 
combat effectiveness for Regional or Popular Forces.  Instead, territorial forces gained 
most of their experience on the job in the summer of 1968 as they integrated with 101st 
companies, platoons, and even squads.  Additionally, the integration of U.S. battalion 
headquarters elements with those of South Vietnamese districts gave these GVN staffs 
and leaders similar confidence as their soldiers to take on the VC.  During these initial 
missions, the simple military effectiveness of an American unit operating alone often 
was subordinated to complicated chains of command required to integrate a GVN 
territorial force into an action.  It is important to reemphasize that throughout the 
pacification campaign, combined operations required even the most junior U.S. officers 
and non-commissioned officers to employ whatever political skills they possessed to get 
the desired effort and results from their counterparts in the territorial forces.338 
Following Operation Nevada Eagle, 101st Airborne brigades and battalions 
slowly supplemented the MACV advisory effort with their own, homegrown advisory 
and liaison teams.  The training effect of these small groups was secondary to the vital 
link they provided between the South Vietnamese districts and American support.  These 
teams kept the allied operations and intelligence efforts integrated even when the units 
no longer needed to operate together as such.  Simply training, organizing, and 
integrating GVN forces with the U.S. effort only gave the South Vietnamese security 
 
337. See Chapter III, pages 67-71 for a summary of the factors important to 
developing RF and PF proficiency.   
338. The Quang Dien operation detailed in Chapter III serves as the best example 
of this integration at the company and platoon level.  Phu Vang and Vinh Loc illustrate 
combined planning and control at the battalion and brigade level. 
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forces the ability to fight the insurgents, however.  In the past, similar modernization 
programs met failure when, in the end, a simple deficiency of the will to confront the 
communist insurgency doomed the territorial forces no matter what their theoretical 
capabilities. 
Over the course of 1969, Regional Forces companies in Thua Thien 
demonstrated increasing motivation to protect their homes and their neighbors from the 
insurgents even as the 101st’s direct oversight of their operations lessened.  After the 
preview of communist takeover given in their 1968 Tet offensive, the territorials finally 
found something to fight for – or against in this case – and the 101st’s training and 
mentoring efforts simply gave the RF and PF the means to fight.  Democratization, land 
reform, loyalty to the ruling clique in Saigon, and the potential for economic 
development took a back seat to the impetus provided by protecting their native district 
or village from further violence and control from outsiders.  The will to fight could be 
aided, but not created in Saigon, Washington, or the 101st’s headquarters on Camp 
Eagle. 
 
“A far more formidable task”: 
Implications for Future Counterinsurgency 
 Nation-states do not typically elect to fight as insurgents because this method of 
waging war breaks down the rule of law, and the measures taken to both further and 
counter the insurgent’s cause can degenerate into little more than thinly-veiled murder.  
Insurgency is a strategy of weakness chosen – or resorted to – by groups that seek to 
topple the existing social order and usually replace it with a new model.  Even when the 
conventional mindset of the existing government’s forces make insurgency tactically 
efficient to furthering their cause, this mode of combat ultimately makes the task of 
establishing the new order difficult for the revolutionaries.  In this environment, the 
insurgents can survive, but never actually achieve their goals except through political 
settlement.  Sometimes, the insurgents possess little design beyond simply getting rid of 
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the old existing order.  Groups with these negative aims generally lack the cohesion and 
leadership to organize a conventional army or alternative government. 
Thus, states try to avoid social chaos in conflicts by attempting to apply rules 
limiting war as much as possible to combatants.  These rules seek to preserve social 
order and confine the application of violence as much as possible to the battlefield.339  If 
possible, states seek to wage war conventionally with designated armed combatants so 
that they might steer clear of this chaos and more precisely achieve their goals.  
Insurgencies happen when the disparities between the capabilities of opposing armies are 
as great as the desire to overthrow the existing political order.  Insurgency, then, is a 
risky strategy for any group or society resorting to it precisely because when successful 
it temporarily replaces social order with social chaos before a new order can be imposed, 
if it can be imposed at all at all.     
 Each insurgent group has different characteristics which define the methods 
available to it.  The Vietnamese communist insurgency had threads that tied it to a 
centrally directed ideological and nationalistic leadership in Hanoi, giving it particular 
strengths and vulnerabilities.  When their victory came in 1975, the central direction 
from Hanoi and decimation of local VC leadership in South Vietnam enabled the 
communists to rapidly consolidate power and avoid much of the factional infighting and 
social unrest that characterizes more decentralized movements.  During the U.S. and 
GVN pacification campaign, on the other hand, the communists paid the price for this 
organization and corresponding need to communicate extensively between higher and 
lower levels by losing many of their best junior cadre to saturation patrols and 
identification in captured documents.  Other insurgent movements may not have the 
same tactical vulnerabilities due to their lack of central direction.  The long-term price 
for the short-term expediency gained by organizational decentralization occurs in the 
 
339. In this light, aerial bombing of population centers can be seen – like 
insurgency – as a strategy of weakness resorted to by nation states when other means of 
prosecuting war are not effective in achieving desired results.  Unlike a 
counterinsurgency, however, a nation employing area bombing may or may not have a 
vested interest in preserving the social cohesion of the targeted population. 
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difficult transition from simple armed opposition groups to an administrative competitor 
to the existing state.  A body of numerous armed groups recognizing no central authority 
might find it more difficult to reach governing consensus after the unifying threat of the 
original state is weakened.  
 The communist insurgency in South Vietnam was unified under a singular chain 
of command to achieve a singular goal – Vietnamese communist rule over all of 
Vietnam.  This unity of purpose limited the political remedies available to the GVN to 
win over insurgent groups and gave the VC access to vital support from North Vietnam.  
The South Vietnamese could not negotiate with individual insurgent cells and regional 
groups to redress their grievances and internally splinter the insurgency, but this unity 
and single-mindedness came at a high price as effective GVN pacification programs in 
Thua Thien stripped the insurgency of all but the most dedicated and fortunate South 
Vietnamese members.  Only in pockets of the Mekong delta, coastal Binh Dinh province 
in central South Vietnam, and rugged Pleiku province in the central highlands did the 
VC retain the strength to effectively oppose the pacification program by the end of 1970.  
In each of these areas, the insurgency existed on life support, propped up by infusions of 
Northerners into the infrastructure and the physical and psychological menace of the 
NVA.340   Other insurgent movements might have more diverse aims and limited desire 
to pay the price that the Vietnamese communists paid to achieve their goals and thus be 
more amenable to political, rather than coercive resolutions.  
 The responsibility of executing these coercive resolutions ultimately and 
eventually falls on the people and government of the threatened nation if it is to survive.  
In February 1969, during introductory remarks at a civic action orientation course in Da 
Nang, Major General Melvin Zais, the 101st Airborne Division commander, gave some 
indication of the difficulty involved in developing the South Vietnamese will to counter 
the insurgents.  “Quite frankly,” he said, “winning the people’s loyalty has been a far 
more formidable task than winning military victories.”  The hurdles included an enemy 
 
340. For an account on how the North Vietnamese communists consolidated 
power throughout South Vietnam after their defeat of the GVN in 1975 see Douglas 
Pike, PAVN:  People’s Army of Vietnam  (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1986). 
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who “through a skillful blend of terrorism to erode confidence in the Government of 
Vietnam, exploitation of failures of previous governments to serve the people, and 
persuasion that the alternative government they offer is the legitimate government to 
represent the Vietnamese people and satisfy their aspirations, [was] successful in gaining 
a grater commitment of loyalty than the GVN.”  The GVN’s actions since the partition 
of Vietnam at the 17th parallel in 1954 represented another hurdle since the Saigon 
government until recently tended to continue colonial policies that “had traditionally 
taken away and had given him [the rural peasant] nothing.  His only real contact with the 
government has been with tax collectors or other enforcers of onerous regulations.”  In 
order to change large-scale apathy and opposition to the existing government, Zais 
claimed that it must give “tangible indications that the GVN can provide security, a 
better material life, and social and legal justice. 341 
 The security, political, and economic elements of counterinsurgency which Zais 
spoke of form the three elements of a more complex notion best described as stability.  
Like a tripod, each of the three elements of stability is bound with the others and can 
only advance or decline in relative concert with one another if the structure is to remain 
upright.  In Thua Thien, the 101st Airborne did not deal at all with Vietnamese local 
political development and made a somewhat greater, though not decisive, contribution to 
economic development through road-building and direct aid to villages located near their 
permanent bases.  At higher levels the U.S. attempted to influence South Vietnamese 
political development, but on the ground the 101st dealt with the traditional Vietnamese 
peasant village and GVN military government as it existed.  Even with his division’s 
relatively limited focus on security, the subsequent 101st commander, Major General 
John M. Wright, still marveled at “the complexity of the U.S. effort in support of the 
 
341. Melvin Zais, in Hq., 101st Airborne Division, “Operation Nevada Eagle 
After Action Report Briefing Narrative, dated 1 April 1969,”  Introductory Remarks, III 
MAF Civic Action Orientation Course, 26 February 1969, page 2; Box 1, 101st Airborne 
Division Unit History Files, MACV Command Historian’s Collection, MHI. 
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Republic of Vietnam.”342  Economic and political gains should be considered as 
necessary advancements made to win the hearts and minds of a population and erode 
support for the insurgents through positive means.  The provision of security forms a 
vital negative corollary to these positive political and economic aims.343  Security is the 
ability to keep those whose hearts and minds cannot be won through positive action from 
acting to disrupt these positive aspects of stability.   
 Creating and preserving stability is a daily task conducted by a government over 
an indefinite period of time and not a singular campaign or battle.  A weak government 
may require extensive external support in any or all three areas to sustain stability and 
external support levels may fluctuate according to conditions present from region to 
region.  Insurgencies and counter-insurgencies take much time and effort for either side 
to win unless the existing government is willing to make extensive political concessions 
to salve insurgent demands, or the insurgents have a weak internal and external support 
base.  In the meantime, simply defining the difference between success and defeat can be 
problematic. 
 As General Wright discovered during Operation Randolph Glen, “the only 
significant problem encountered, and one which requires more work and effort to 
resolve, is that of measurement of progress.”  The general “recognized that this problem 
has been addressed at every level since the beginning of our effort in Vietnam,” but 
lamented, “it is one that continues.”  He realized that “tangible accomplishments can be 
tabulated and reported” as they had been exhaustively for years without finding the one 
key measurement to describe success against insurgency.  Eventually, Wright concluded 
that “it is more difficult to measure and report accurately the discernible fact that the net 
result of this coordinated effort is greater than the sum of the separately identified 
 
342. “Combat After Action Report: Operation Randolph Glen, 7 December 1969 
to 31 March 1970; dated 30 June 1970,” p. 21, Box 1, Unit History Files, 101st Airborne 
Division, MACV Command Historian’s Collection, MHI. 
343. Dave R. Palmer, Summons of the Trumpet:  U.S. –Vietnam in Perspective 
(San Rafael, CA:  Presidio Press, 1978), 220-21.  The retired general claims that “against 
an insurgency movement, pacification can never succeed without military security, while 
military operations are a waste unless they lead to pacification.” 
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components,” which could also be said to be true in reverse.344  Often, the sum of the 
components added up to more than the net result of coordinated effort. 
Measuring the success in a counterinsurgency effort is no less than quantifying 
the existing government’s effectiveness, a difficult measurement even in an established 
nation at peace.  Tests provided by natural disasters, internal upheaval, and war yield the 
true answers to a government’s effectiveness, but the final verdict can take years to 
discern.  In the meantime, there are no precision-guided munitions, blitzkrieg operational 
equivalents, or elite commando forces capable of cheaply imposing state authority over a 
portion of the population in revolt, just as there are no rapid and total legislative 
solutions to significant and divisive domestic political issues, and responsible military 
leaders should never promise such capabilities or results.  There simply are no painless 
or easy solutions to ending an insurgency. 
Typically, many Americans have wanted to think of war as an aberration, to be 
waged with unlimited resources for a sufficient length of time in order to achieve 
victory.  In campaigns where the nation’s goals were unclear or defined as something 
less than total defeat of the enemy, this traditional way of war was amended to creating 
the illusion of peace by simply waging war with limited means determined largely by the 
desire to avoid the complete mobilization of the American people and economy.  
Success in counterinsurgency, as the communists showed in Thua Thien, requires a 
different formulation for war that Americans have not embraced, their army seems ill-
prepared for, and their politicians have not found agreeable – applying sufficient force 
over indefinite time. 
 
344 Hq., 101st Airborne Division, “Combat After Action Report: Operation Randolph 
Glen, 101st Airborne Division, 7 December 1969 to 31 March 1970; dated 30 June 
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